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Syria Introduction
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Figure 1. Administrative Divisions
FROM INDEPENDENCE in 1946 through the late 1960s, Syria stood
out as a particularly unstable country in a geographic region
noted for political instability. Illegal seizures of power seemed
to be the rule as Syrians were governed under a series of
constitutions and the nation's political direction made several
abrupt ideological lurches. Therefore, when Minister of Defense
Hafiz al Assad assumed authority in yet another coup in November
l970, many believed his regime was merely one more in a long
string of extralegal changes of government. Indeed, because of
the coup's similarity to previous ones, at the time there was
little evidence to suggest otherwise. Nonetheless, from 1970
until mid-1987, Assad has provided Syria with a period of
uncommon stability, all the more remarkable when viewed against
the backdrop of the nation's postindependence history of
political turbulence.
Although uncertainty and internal tension are threads that
run through Syrian history, not all conflict has been negative.
From the earliest days of civilization to more recent times,
struggle among various indigenous groups as well as with invading
foreigners has resulted in cultural enrichment. Phoenicians,
Canaanites, Assyrians, and Persians are but a few of the peoples
who have figured prominently in this legacy. As significant were
the contributions of Alexander the Great and his successors and
the Roman and Byzantine rulers
(see Ancient Syria
, ch. 1).
But as great as these considerable foreign influences were,
few would disagree that the most important additions to Syria's
rich culture were made following the death of the Prophet
Muhammad, when Arab conquerors brought Islam to
Greater Syria (see Glossary). By A.D. 661, Muawiyah, the
governor of Syria, had
proclaimed himself caliph, or temporal leader, and established
Damascus as the seat of the Umayyad Empire. Thus began a dynasty
whose realm stretched as far west as southern France and as far
east as Afghanistan, an expanse of territory that surpassed even
that which Rome had held a few centuries earlier. Thirteen
hundred years after his death, the memory of Muawiyah and his
accomplishments still stirs pride and respect in Syria. Likewise,
the image of the great Muslim general Saladin (Salah ad Din al
Ayubbi), who defeated the Christian Crusaders in 1187, is deeply
imprinted on the Syrian psyche.
These native heroes notwithstanding, it was foreign
domination that determined the political boundaries of present-
day Syria. First the Ottoman Turks, then after World War I the
French, and, more recently, the Israelis shaped the contours of
the nation, breaking off chunks of what was Greater Syria and
repositioning borders to leave the configuration of the
contemporary state. In spite of these territorial changes,
support for a return to the glory that was Greater Syria and a
development of a powerful nation-state has remained strong.
Syrians share a vision of a pan-Arab entity--the unification of
all Arab brethren throughout the region
(see Political Orientations
, ch. 4).
Despite the rhetoric and idealism, in Syria, as in many
developing nations, strife between and among communities has
hindered development of a genuine national spirit. Also, the
importance of regional, sectarian, and religious identities as
the primary sources of loyalty have frustrated nation-building.
Although about 85 percent of Syrians were Muslims, in 1987 most
scholars agreed that the domination of Assad's small
Alawi (see Glossary) sect over the larger
Sunni (see Glossary) community was
at the root of much of the internal friction, even though ethnic
issues also accounted for a certain amount of tension. Other
significant minorities that contributed to social tensions were
Druzes (see Glossary), Kurds, Armenians, and Circassians
(see The Peoples
, ch. 2).
Although internal discord is a fact of life in every country
in the Middle East, it is difficult to imagine that dissent in
any of them could have been met more brutally than it was in
Syria in the 1980s. One dissident group was the Muslim
Brotherhood, a Sunni fundamentalist, antigovernment movement
whose popularity grew markedly in the late 1970s. Unlike Islamic
fundamentalist movements in certain other Middle Eastern
countries, the Muslim Brotherhood opposed the Assad regime not so
much for its secularism as for its sectarian favoritism. To
protest Alawi domination, the Muslim Brotherhood and other like-
minded groups undertook a series of violent attacks against the
Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party government. After
Assad's attempts at negotiation failed, Muslim Brotherhood
attacks increased in frequency, and the government responded in
kind. Using his armed forces, in late 1981 Assad finally isolated
Muslim Brotherhood adherents in their strongholds of Aleppo and
Hamah
(see
fig. 1). In February 1982, with no regard for civilian
safety, the full force of the Syrian army was brought to bear on
the rebels in Hamah. Entire sections of the city, including the
architecturally magnificent ancient quarter, were reduced to
rubble by tank and artillery fire, as upward of 25,000 citizens
were killed. This lesson in abject obedience was not lost on the
populace, for as of mid- 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood and its
antigovernment allies were almost moribund
(see The Assad Era
, ch. 1;
Ethnic and Religious Opposition Movements
, ch. 5).
Other violent stresses on internal stability occurred later
in 1982. In June, Israel invaded Lebanon with the stated aim of
driving away Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrillas
from Israel's northern border. After a few days of fighting and
constant Israeli advances, it became obvious that Israel's goal
was not merely the creation of a security zone, but rather the
complete destruction of the PLO or at least its forced expulsion
from Lebanon. In achieving this objective, armed confrontation
with Syrian forces was inevitable. Although some of the Syrian
units gave a good accounting against the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF), in general the IDF overwhelmed the Syrians. This
domination was nowhere more evident than in air battles over the
Biqa Valley in which the Israeli Air Force destroyed nineteen air
defense sites and downed more than eighty Syrian aircraft, while
losing only two aircraft
(see Syrian-Israeli Hostility
, ch. 5).
Despite these setbacks, as the only Arab leader to stand up to
the Israeli assault, Assad gained the respect of other Middle
Eastern states. The defeats were not enough to induce Syria to
withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and eventually it worked out a
modus vivendi with the IDF.
But for Syria there was no relief from internal pressures.
Having weathered a "miniwar" in Lebanon, in 1983 another crisis
arose when in November Assad suffered a severe heart attack that
hospitalized him for several months. In February 1984, in a
premature effort to succeed his brother, Rifaat al Assad moved
his Defense Companies (now called Unit 569) into positions around
the capital. Fighting broke out but soon subsided; however, in
May it erupted once more in Latakia. As Hafiz al Assad recovered
and reasserted his authority, he neutralized political
opportunists (including his brother) while making changes in the
Baath Party and army hierarchies. To restore faith in his regime,
Assad began promoting a personality cult, the net effect of which
was to identify government with Hafiz al Assad rather than to
encourage government through political and social institutions
(see Post-1982 Political Developments
, ch. 4). Thus, in 1987 many
concerns remained about succession and about whether or not Syria
could peacefully survive the loss of Assad as the adhesive that
held together the diverse elements of society.
An added concern was the perilous state of the economy
(see Period of Economic Retrenchment, 1986-90
, ch. 3). Years of
drought in the early 1980s had effectively stymied agricultural
growth. By the time production began to rebound in the mid-1980s,
commodity prices for Syria's agricultural goods were dropping.
Furthermore, the fledgling oil industry was retarded by the
worldwide slump in petroleum prices and by Syria's own decision
to cease pipeline transportation of Iraqi oil, thus surrendering
lucrative transit fees. Moreover, Syria's stance in the Iran-Iraq
War and its intransigence on other regional matters so angered
wealthier Arab nations that they reduced financial support to the
Assad regime.
And perhaps most salient, the need to provision tens of
thousands of troops stationed in Lebanon and to maintain strong
defenses against Israel caused a crushing defense burden.
Although figures on defense outlays varied widely, in the late
1980s they apparently accounted for anywhere from one-third to
just over one-half of all government spending. Regardless of
which figure is accepted, clearly military spending was
inhibiting development by diverting funds from desperately needed
social programs.
The armed forces has played a central role in Syria's recent
social and political history. As in many Third World countries,
the army has provided minorities with a channel for upward
mobility. Alawis in particular used this route of social
advancement, and by the early 1960s they held influential
positions in the military government. When in 1966 General Salah
al Jadid overthrew General Amin al Hafiz, a Sunni, for the first
time in the modern era an Alawi ruled Syria. Jadid, in turn, was
overthrown in 1970 by Assad, another Alawi. Since then Assad has
seen to it that only trusted relatives or friends, most of them
Alawis, occupied or controlled politically sensitive or powerful
positions. Similarly, because the armed forces are both the
mainstay of his regime and the most likely threat to it, Assad
has been deferential to the needs of the military forces and has
raised the standard of living for those in uniform
(see Conditions of Service, Morale, and Military Justice
, ch. 5).
In addition to domestic discord, Syria has been subjected to
many external strains. Not the least of these has been Syria's
long-standing engagement in Lebanon. Although some analysts saw
this involvement as part of a desire to recreate Greater Syria,
others viewed it as a pragmatic manifestation of Assad's
ambitions toward regional hegemony. Regardless of motive, Syria's
presence in Lebanon presented dangers and opportunities. The
principal problem was that the worsening Lebanese situation
jeopardized the safety of Syrian troops and drained Syria's
fragile economy. Nevertheless, at various times since 1976,
Syrian intervention has had the positive effect of quelling some
of the violence that has swept Lebanon and raised faint hopes of
peace. Such positive intervention occurred most recently in
February 1987, when Assad sent his forces into West Beirut to
restore order to the Muslim half of the city
(see Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, 1975-87
, ch. 5).
Some scholars call Syria a nation of contradictions with good
reason. Certainly these are inconsistencies in Syria's regional
and international politics
(see Foreign Policy
, ch. 4). In spite
of the pan-Arab ideology that is at the heart of the ruling Baath
Party principles, Syria was one of only two Arab states (Libya
being the other) supporting non-Arab Iran against Iraq in the
Iran-Iraq War. In addition, Syria's steadfast refusal to
negotiate with Israel ever since the June 1967 War and its
support for radical Palestinian factions have set it apart from
most of the Arab world.
In foreign relations, Syria proved it could be a supportive
friend or obstinate foe--in fact, sometimes both within a short
period of time. For example, every few years Syria seemed to
begin a rapprochement with Jordan and Iraq, its neighbors to the
south and east, but these thaws in otherwise cool relations have
been short. Likewise, relations with various Lebanese and
Palestinian factions have blown hot and cold.
Certainly the Soviet Union has found Assad a less than
pliable client. Throughout the Soviet-Syrian relationship, Assad
has taken much more in military assistance than the Soviets have
received in terms of influence in Syria or the rest of the
region. For the most part, Soviet efforts to dominate Syrian
political and even military activities have had limited success
(see Syria-Soviet Relations
, ch. 4).
In 1987 Assad was thought by many to be an enigma, thus his
nickname, "the sphinx." Having survived the tribulations of
seventeen years of rule, he deserved his reputation as a wily and
able politician. Diplomatic and practical when circumstances
called for these qualities, Assad could also be manipulative and
merciless, especially with regime opponents. Syrian dissidents in
exile or regional political enemies have not been immune from
Assad's intelligence and security networks. Insofar as Assad has
assented to terrorist training in Syrian-controlled Lebanon and
even on Syrian soil, he most likely has at his disposal a pool of
individuals willing to carry out certain violent missions.
Clearly, media attention given to Syria's complicity in terrorist
incidents in Western Europe in the mid-1980s has underscored such
activity
(see Sponsorship of Terrorism
, ch. 5).
In summary, in mid-1987 Syria was enjoying a period of
unprecedented internal stability. In many ways, Assad had very
nearly realized his ambitions for leadership in regional affairs.
Syria was a key to the Palestinian problem and to any resolution
of the Arab-Israeli dispute; it was also at the vortex of the
Lebanese situation. Furthermore, it was making its presence felt
in the Iran-Iraq War. Its economy, although by no means
burgeoning, was at least resilient in the face of difficult
circumstances. And even though its international image was
tarnished because of its association with terrorism, that, too,
was improving as a result of Syria's crackdown on
Shia (see Glossary) extremists in Lebanon. Most troublesome,
perhaps, was
the unresolved question of who would succeed the somewhat frail
president. It was uncertain if any successor could overcome the
conflicts that were sure to surface after Assad or could maintain
the nation's pace of development.
August 31, 1987
Thomas Collelo
Data as of April 1987
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