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Thailand National Assembly
In the 1980s, the bicameral parliament, unable to
successfully challenge the tradition of bureaucratic dominance
over state affairs, was overshadowed by the executive branch. The
National Assembly continued to be an instrument of cabinet rule,
with its legislative agenda issuing for the most part from the
executive branch.
Under the Constitution, the National Assembly was structured
to accommodate both the military and civilian bureaucratic elite
and the electorate. The influence of the traditionally powerful
bureaucracy was channeled through the Senate, whose members were
nominated by the prime minister for pro forma appointment by the
king. Up to 85 percent of the Senate membership in the late 1980s
was drawn from the armed forces and the police. The intent of
this arrangement was to encourage the military to play its
traditional political role through the upper house rather than
through a coup or countercoup.
Senators served a term of six years, and one-third of them
were retired every two years. Retirees could be reappointed for
an unlimited number of terms. A senator was required to be at
least thirty-five years of age, a Thai citizen by birth, and not
a member of any political party. Other membership qualifications
were broadly phrased, including the requirement that appointees
have "knowledge and experience in various branches of learning or
affairs which will be useful to the administration of the state."
House of Representatives members represented the populace.
They were elected for a four-year term by direct suffrage and
secret ballot at the ratio of a member to each 150,000
inhabitants. Each province (changwat), regardless of
population, was entitled to at least one seat. A constituency
with a population in excess of 75,000 also qualified for a seat.
A candidate had to be at least twenty-five years of age, a Thai
citizen by birth, and a member of a political party. As a rule,
an election had to be held within sixty days from the expiration
of the four-year term of the lower house. When the House was
dissolved by royal decree (on the recommendation of the prime
minister), a new election was required within ninety days.
The two chambers conducted their business separately under
their respective presidents (speakers) and vice presidents, who
were chosen from among the membership. Under the Constitution,
the president of the Senate was automatically the speaker of the
National Assembly and in that capacity was empowered to play a
strategic role in the selection of the prime minister.
In the 1980s, lower house members demanded that their
president, rather than the president of the upper house, have a
decisive role in the process of selecting the prime minister.
This policy was necessary, they said, because the House of
Representatives, not the military-dominated Senate, collectively
represented the will of the electorate. A bill to amend the
Constitution to make the lower house speaker the president of the
National Assembly was introduced in 1986 but failed to pass.
In 1987 the customary role of the Senate as a major vehicle
for the power of the bureaucracy and a counterweight to the
elective lower house remained little changed, even though its
stature seemed to have diminished somewhat after April 1983. At
that time, certain senatorial powers granted under temporary
clauses of the Constitution expired despite the army's efforts to
have these clauses extended
(see
Political Developments, 1980-87
, this ch.). Under these clauses, the Senate had had the power to
deliberate jointly with the lower chamber on annual appropriation
bills, on "an important bill relating to the security of the
Kingdom, the Throne, or the national economy," and the power to
vote on no-confidence motions. The army and its political allies
in parliament failed to have the clauses extended because of
factious squabbles. If they had succeeded, the military's
political power would have been enhanced greatly.
The lapse of the transitory provisions, however, did not
affect the Senate's power to address such matters as the
appointment of a regent, the royal succession, reconsideration of
a bill vetoed by the prime minister, constitutional
interpretation, a declaration of war, the ratification of
treaties, the appointment of members of the Constitutional
Tribunal, and constitutional amendments. In joint sessions
senators also could render their opinion on any aspect of affairs
of state to the prime minister when requested to do so by the
latter. Such opinion was advisory and nonbinding.
Bills could be introduced only by the Council of Ministers or
the members of the House of Representatives. Major legislation
originated mostly in the cabinet, but only the lower house, with
the prior endorsement of the prime minister, could initiate an
appropriations bill. An ordinary bill had to be sponsored by a
political party and endorsed by at least twenty party members.
Bills were passed by a majority, the quorum being not less than
one-half of the total members of either house in which the bills
originated.
A bill passed by the House was sent to the Senate. The Senate
was required to act on an ordinary bill within ninety days and on
an appropriations bill within sixty days. If the Senate failed to
act in either case, the bill was considered to have been
consented to by the Senate, unless the lower chamber had extended
the time. Disagreements between the two houses were resolved by a
joint committee. When the dispute pertained to an appropriations
bill and the lower house voted to reaffirm the bill it had
originally passed, the prime minister was required to present the
bill to the king for his assent and promulgation. At that point,
the prime minister could exercise his important legislative role.
He might advise the king to approve or veto the bill; in the
latter event, the National Assembly needed two-thirds of its
total membership to override the royal objections (actually the
prime minister's objections).
Members of the assembly, who had parliamentary immunity,
could question formally a cabinet minister or the prime minister
on any appropriate issue except one in which executive privilege
was involved. A motion of no-confidence against either an
individual minister or the cabinet en masse could be initiated
only by members of the lower house. Such a motion required an
affirmative vote of at least one-half of the lower house
membership. Senators could not take part in no-confidence
debates.
Data as of September 1987
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