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Thailand Foreign Relations since 1980
In the 1980s, the Cambodian-Vietnamese question was a
principal concern of Thai foreign policy makers, who found common
cause with countries that also opposed the Vietnamese occupation
of Cambodia. Security once again became an important
consideration in the determination of Bangkok's foreign policy.
In 1979 the ASEAN members were apparently divided over the
Cambodian-Vietnamese situation. Indonesia and Malaysia were
reportedly more conciliatory toward Hanoi than Thailand and
Singapore, viewing China rather than Vietnam as the principal
threat to regional stability. Indonesia and Malaysia wanted a
strong and stable Vietnam as a potential ally, or at least as a
buffer, against Chinese expansionism. They were inclined to
tolerate to a degree the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia and to
recognize the Heng Samrin regime, provided that some Vietnamese
troops were withdrawn from Cambodia and the political base of the
regime was reconstituted more broadly.
The ASEAN differences were turned aside in June 1980, when
Vietnamese troops crossed the border into Thailand. The
incursion, which coincided with an annual ASEAN ministerial
conference in Kuala Lumpur, was contrary to earlier Vietnamese
assurances that they would not encroach on Thai territory. The
ASEAN foreign ministers strongly condemned the incursion as "an
act of aggression" and reaffirmed their undivided support for the
UN resolution of November 1979. They also reaffirmed their
recognition of the deposed government of Democratic Kampuchea--
their rationale being that to recognize the Heng Samrin regime
would be tantamount to rewarding Vietnamese aggression in
Cambodia. At the first UN-sponsored international conference on
Cambodia held in New York in July 1981, Thailand and its ASEAN
allies played a key role in seeking a political settlement of the
Cambodian question. The conference was attended by delegates from
seventy-nine countries and observers from fifteen others, but it
was boycotted by Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union and its allies,
and some nonaligned nations. The conference adopted a resolution
that, among other things, called for a cease-fire by all armed
Cambodian factions, the withdrawal of all foreign troops under
the supervision of a UN observer group, the restoration of
Cambodian independence, the establishment of a nonaligned and
neutral Cambodia, and the establishment of an ad hoc committee
comprising Japan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
and Thailand to advise the UN secretary general on ways to
implement the resolution.
Relations between Thailand and China improved steadily in the
1980s, with Beijing sharing Bangkok's opposition to Vietnamese
military occupation of Cambodia and affirming its support for the
Thai and ASEAN stance on the Cambodian question. China sought to
reassure Bangkok of its withdrawal of support for the Communist
Party of Thailand and offered military assistance to Thailand in
the event the latter was attacked by Vietnam. In the mid-1980s,
Chinese arms and supplies for the Khmer Rouge resistance forces
reportedly were being shipped through Thai territory. In 1985 a
telephone hotline was established between Thailand and China in
an effort to coordinate their activities in the event of a major
Vietnamese incursion into Thailand. Cordiality in Thai-Chinese
relations was evident in a military assistance agreement signed
in Beijing in May 1987. This agreement allowed Thailand to
purchase, on concessional terms, Chinese tanks, antiaircraft
guns, missiles, ammunition, and armored personnel carriers.
Despite some friction over trade issues, Thai relations with
the United States were very close, especially from 1979 onward.
The United States reassured its commitment to Thai security under
the Rusk-Thanat agreement of 1962 as well as the Manila Pact of
1954. In addition to backing the ASEAN position on Cambodia,
Washington steadily increased its security assistance to Thailand
and also took part in a series of annual bilateral military
exercises. Spurred by Vietnamese incursions in 1985 and the
arrival in Vietnam of Soviet-piloted MiG-23s, Thailand decided to
buy twelve F-16 fighter-bombers from General Dynamics in the
United States. Moreover, under an accord reached in October 1985,
the two countries began to set up a war reserve weapons stockpile
on Thai soil, making Thailand the first country without a United
States military base to have such a stockpile. The stockpile,
subject to approval by the United States Congress, was to be used
only in a "nation-threatening emergency" or to repulse possible
armed invasion by Soviet-supported Vietnamese and other forces
from Cambodia.
Trade was an irritant in Thai-American relations, but many
observers agreed that the trade problems would not likely affect
the long-standing friendship and cooperation between the two
countries. The United States was a major trading partner and by
1985 had become the largest and most important export market for
Thai goods. Thailand enjoyed a trade surplus with the United
States, which grew from a modest US$100 million in 1983 to about
US$1 billion in 1986
(see International Trade
, ch. 3). Meanwhile,
there was growing Thai criticism that the United States had
become protectionist in trade relations with Thailand. By 1987,
however, many informed Thai had come to believe that problems in
Thai-American trade relations would be temporary.
In 1987 Thailand continued to express its desire for mutually
beneficial relations with the Soviet Union and to affirm its
neutrality in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Relations with Moscow,
however, were merely correct, if not cool, as a result of Thai
apprehension over Soviet intentions toward Southeast Asia in
general and Vietnam in particular. Thai concern was prompted by
Moscow's military aid to Vietnam and its continued support of
Hanoi's involvement in Cambodia. During his visit to Moscow in
May 1987, Minister of Foreign Affairs Siddhi Savetsila of
Thailand told his Soviet counterpart that Cambodia was "the test
case" of Soviet intentions toward Asia and the Pacific region. He
urged the Soviet Union to use its "immense influence and
prestige" to bring about a quick and durable settlement of the
Cambodian question. Such settlement, according to Siddhi,
entailed an early withdrawal of some 140,000 Vietnamese troops
from Cambodia, Cambodian exercise of the right of self-
determination, and the formation of a neutral and nonaligned
Cambodia posing no threat to its neighbors. At the end of the May
visit, a protocol was signed establishing a Thai-Soviet trade
commission.
As Thailand and Japan celebrated the centennial of their
relationship in 1987, Japan continued to be Thailand's principal
trading partner and largest foreign investor
(see International Trade and Finance
, ch. 3). The generally cordial relations
between the two countries--dating back to 1887, when Japan was
the first country to set up a foreign embassy in Bangkok--were
marred in the 1970s and 1980s by a continuous imbalance of trade.
In 1984 Thailand's trade deficit with Japan accounted for 62
percent of its total trade deficit for the year, up from 46
percent in the previous year. Japan's economic dominance was much
criticized as exploitive and, in late 1984, was the target of a
campaign against Japanese goods launched by university students.
The Thai government stated that such a campaign offered little or
no solution to the deficit problem. Thailand's preferred solution
was for Japan to open its market to Thai products, increase its
aid and loans to Thailand, set up export-oriented industries in
Thailand, and enhance economic cooperation through more active
transfers of technology. In 1986 Thailand's trade deficit with
Japan decreased 32 percent from the 1984 figure.
In 1987 a major foreign policy goal for Thailand was the
restoration of its traditionally cordial ties with Laos, strained
since 1975, when Bangkok came to perceive Laos as a client state
of Vietnam. In 1979 Thailand and Laos agreed to improve their
relations by promoting bilateral trade and allowing free access
to the Mekong River by border residents. Nonetheless, relations
between Bangkok and Vientiane continued to be tense, marred by
frequent shooting incidents on the Mekong. In 1981 Thailand
banned 273 "strategic" commodities from export or transshipment
to Laos. In mid-1984 armed clashes occurred over the status of
three remote border villages. Laos raised this issue in the UN
Security Council, rejecting Thailand's proposal to determine the
territoriality of the villages through a joint or neutral survey
team. Meanwhile, one important economic link continued to be
unaffected by political or security matters: Laos sold
electricity to Thailand, earning as much as 75 percent of its
annual foreign exchange from this transaction.
On the initiative of Laos, the two sides met in November 1986
to reaffirm their commitment to the 1979 accord on neighborly
relations. At about the same time, Thailand began to relax its
trade embargo, thereby decreasing the number of banned items to
sixty-one. Apparently, this action was taken under pressure from
Thai businessmen, whose exports to Laos had dropped sharply from
81 percent of the total imports of Laos in 1980 to 26 percent in
1984. Thai exports to Laos increased in 1985 and 1986, but the
future of economic links between the two countries was uncertain.
With Soviet assistance, the Laotians planned to complete by 1988
a major highway from Savannakhet across Laos to the Vietnamese
port of Danang, thus lessening the traditional dependence of Laos
on Thailand for access to the sea for foreign trade.
In March 1987, the two sides met again to discuss matters of
mutual concern but made no progress. Although 40,000 to 60,000
Vietnamese troops were still present on Laotian soil, Laos
continued to accuse Thailand of harboring its historic ambition
to dominate the region. Moreover, Vientiane accused Bangkok of
being in collusion with the United States in engaging in
unfriendly acts to destabilize the Laotian government. The
alleged acts, along with Thai occupation of the three "Lao
villages," were stated by Vientiane to be the main barriers to
improvement of Laotian-Thai relations. For its part, Thailand
charged that Laos was aiding the Pak Mai (New Party), a small,
pro-Vietnamese, Thai communist insurgent group that had split
from the Chinese-backed Communist Party of Thailand in 1979.
Furthermore, Thailand accused Laos of turning a blind eye to
heroin production inside Laos and of refusing to cooperate in the
suppression of narcotics trafficking between Laos and Thailand.
In March 1987, the Bangkok Post lamented in an editorial,
"It is strange but true that the country with which Thailand has
just about everything to share except ideology should happen to
be one of the hardest to deal with."
Nevertheless, Thailand was committed to solving its problems
with the neighboring states of Indochina--Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam. The Thai flexibility in foreign policy that had enabled
the country to avoid conquest or colonization by foreign powers
included a dedication to maintaining good relations with all
nations, great and small. Given this commitment and adaptability,
it was likely that Thailand, perhaps in concert with its ASEAN
partners, would soon reach a mutually agreeable accommodation
with its Indochinese neighbors.
* * *
Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State by
Charles F. Keyes is a good general introduction to the
socioeconomic and political setting of Thailand. Equally
informative are Thailand: Society and Politics by John
L.S. Girling, which provides an excellent perspective on Thai
politics from 1963 to 1977, based on the author's professional,
as well as scholarly, experience in Thailand; Thak
Chaloemtiarana's Thailand: The Politics of Despotic
Paternalism, which has an informative discussion on the
dynamics of military rule from 1947 to 1970; and Modern Thai
Politics: From Village to Nation, edited by Clark D. Neher, a
collection of useful articles dealing with Thai political culture
and process at all levels. Political dynamics, particularly "the
actual events, people, and institutions active during the period
of open politics" (1973-76), are given excellent treatment in
Political Conflict in Thailand by David Morell and Chai-
anan Samudavanija.
The Thai Young Turks by Chai-anan Samudavanija is
highly useful for understanding the role of the military in Thai
politics, with particular attention to the Class Seven (1960)
graduates of the Chulachomkhlao Royal Military Academy, David F.
Haas's Interaction in the Thai Bureaucracy offers a useful
discussion on the way district-level civil servants behave in
response to the structural and cultural parameters of Thailand's
bureaucratic polity. The Bureaucratic Elite of Thailand by
Likhit Dhiravegin is an insightful study of senior-level Thai
civil servants.
In addition, for an understanding of political events,
issues, personalities, and institutions active in the political
evolutions of the 1980s, specific articles on Thailand in the
following publications are recommended: Southeast Asian
Affairs, Asian Survey, and the annual Far Eastern
Economic Review Asia Yearbook. (For further information and
complete citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of September 1987
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