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Thailand Background
Since World War II, no single factor has shaped the style and
substance of Thai foreign relations more than the establishment
of a communist-run government in China in 1949. The communist
triumph aroused a Thai fear of southward Chinese expansion, in
which the economically powerful and ethnocentrist Chinese
minority in Bangkok might serve as a potential fifth column.
Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950 and growing evidence of
clandestine communist Chinese roles in local insurgencies in
Southeast Asia reinforced Thai resolve to act in concert with
other anticommunist nations. The formal installation of a
communist administration in Hanoi after the decisive defeat of
the French at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 set the stage for
Thailand's signing of the Manila Pact, a collective security
agreement, in September 1954. The resulting Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO), as the regional body was formally called,
had as its members Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. SEATO
headquarters was in Bangkok.
Nevertheless, Thailand viewed the effectiveness of collective
security with some degree of skepticism. On March 6, 1962, in an
attempt to allay Thai apprehensions, the United States and
Thailand reached a new understanding under what came to be known
as the Rusk-Thanat
agreement (named after then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman). Under the
agreement, the United States pledged that, in the event of
aggression it would help Thailand unilaterally without prior
agreement of all other parties to the Manila Pact.
During the 1960s, Thailand maintained close economic and
security ties with the United States, while at the same time
striving to foster regional cooperation with its noncommunist
neighbors. Its assumption was that regional solidarity and
national security were mutually reinforcing and would provide an
effective deterrence to communism. In 1961 Thailand joined Malaya
(since 1963, Malaysia) and the Philippines in launching the
Association of Southeast Asia as a nonmilitary, nonpolitical
vehicle for consultation and mutual assistance in economic,
cultural, scientific, and administrative matters.
In 1967 the Association of Southeast Asia was replaced by a
broader regional group, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand. The members agreed to cooperate in food
production, industry and commerce, civil aviation, shipping,
tourism, communications, meteorology, science and technology, and
Southeast Asian studies. Consultation and cooperation were to
take place through an annual ministerial conference held in each
of the five ASEAN countries in alphabetical rotation. As a result
of the formation of the regional organization, consultation
between Thailand and the other ASEAN countries on external
problems increased greatly in the 1970s.
The Thai response to the external uncertainties of the 1970s
was a graphic demonstration of the flexibility of its foreign
policy. The external catalyst was an apparent shift in American
strategic thinking with regard to China and the Vietnam conflict.
The shift was sensed in Bangkok in the late 1960s--in March 1968,
when President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his intention to seek
a negotiated peace in Vietnam and again in July 1969, when
President Richard M. Nixon told Thai leaders in Bangkok of his
intention to lower the future American military profile in Asia
without undertaking any new security obligations. At that time,
Nixon reaffirmed the United States resolve to "honor its present
commitments in Southeast Asia" and to continue its support of
Thai efforts in the areas of security and economic development.
Not surprisingly, in 1968, before the "Nixon Doctrine" was
proclaimed in 1969, Thailand hinted at its desire to open
channels of communication with China, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (North Korea), and the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (North Vietnam). These channels were considered necessary
by the Thai in order to solve difficulties and achieve peaceful
coexistence. In late 1970, a government committee was set up to
explore the possibility of normalizing relations with China.
After 1971, as the United States and China moved toward
reconciliation and detente, Thai soul-searching began in earnest.
In 1972 Thailand sent sports teams to China, and in 1973 Thailand
made overtures to Hanoi for a dialogue shortly after the United
States and North Vietnam signed a cease-fire agreement. In 1974 a
Thai delegation conferred with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in
Beijing on measures to improve bilateral relations. At that time
Zhou was reported to have assured the Thai delegation that China
would stop aiding communist insurgents in Thailand, while
underlining his concern over increasing Soviet influence in
Southeast Asia. In December 1974, the Thai government lifted a
fifteen-year ban on trade with China. In March 1975, a month
before Saigon fell, Thailand announced its decision to recognize
and normalize diplomatic relations with China.
In the wake of communist takeovers in Phnom Penh and Saigon
in April 1975, Thailand moved expeditiously to realign its
foreign policy. Thailand's security ties with the United States--
the pillar of Bangkok's foreign relations for nearly three
decades--were downplayed as part of accentuating a policy of
friendship with all nations. In July 1975, the Thai revoked a
military accord with the United States under which American
troops had been allowed on Thai soil. Thailand also agreed with
the Philippines in principle that SEATO, having outlived its
usefulness, should be phased out as early as possible. The
crowning moment of the policy of readjustment came in July 1975,
when Thailand and China signed a formal agreement on establishing
diplomatic relations. Noteworthy was the absence of a Chinese
demand for the prior removal of American troops from Thailand, in
striking contrast to Hanoi's insistence that Thailand should
first renounce its policy of "collusion" with the United States
before any reconciliation could take place.
The normalization of relations with its Indochinese neighbors
became pressing as refugees from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam
streamed across the Thai frontier, straining Thai resources and
raising tensions in the border regions. Relations with Laos,
bound to Thailand by a shared history, religion, ethnicity,
culture, and language, were tense. Much of the problem centered
on Laotian Meo tribespeople who had taken refuge in Thailand
after the communist-led Pathet Lao forces gained control of
Vientiane in May 1975. For years the Meo and some Thai irregular
troops had waged clandestine operations against the Pathet Lao
forces, reportedly with the knowledge and cooperation of the
government of Thailand. After intermittent clashes on the Mekong
River, Thailand in November 1975 closed the frontier with Laos,
causing hardship in Vientiane; this action prevented oil, food,
and other essential goods from reaching Laos through Thai
territory, the historical transit route to the landlocked
country. Tension eased somewhat after January 1976, when the
border was reopened following Thai recognition of the new Laotian
regime. In August 1976, the two countries signed an agreement on
the transport of Laotian goods through Thailand in exchange for
Thai air routes over Laos to Vietnam and Hong Kong. Nonetheless,
recurring border incidents led to a temporary Thai economic
blockade of Laos in late 1977. By the end of the year, Laotian
refugees accounted for 73,000 of about 95,000 Indochinese
refugees encamped in Thailand.
In April 1975, Thailand was the first country in Southeast
Asia to recognize the new regime of the communist
Khmer Rouge (see Glossary) in Phnom Penh. In October the
two countries agreed
in principle to resume diplomatic and economic relations; the
agreement was formalized in June 1976, when they also agreed to
erect border markers in poorly defined border areas.
Meanwhile, the withdrawal of all American troops from
Thailand by July 1976 paved the way for the Thai-Vietnamese
agreement in August on normalizing relations. In January 1978,
Bangkok and Hanoi signed an accord on trade and economic and
technical cooperation, agreeing also to exchange ambassadors,
reopen aviation links, resolve all problems through negotiations,
and consult on the question of delimiting sea boundaries.
Progress toward improved relations with the Indochinese states
came to an abrupt halt, however, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia
in December 1978, and in January 1979 installed in Phnom Penh a
new communist regime friendly to Hanoi.
This invasion not only provoked a Chinese attack on Vietnam
in February 1979 but also posed a threat to Thailand's security.
Bangkok could no longer rely on Cambodia as a buffer against
Vietnamese power. Bangkok was forced to assume the role of a
frontline state against a resurgent communist Vietnam, which had
300,000 troops in Cambodia and Laos. The Thai government began
increasing its defense capabilities. While visiting Washington in
February 1979, Prime Minister Kriangsak asked for and received
reassurances of military support from the United States. His
government also launched a major diplomatic offensive to press
for the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and for
continued international recognition of Democratic Kampuchea under
Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime. As part of that offensive,
Kriangsak also journeyed to Moscow in March 1979--the first visit
ever by a Thai prime minister--to explain the Thai position on
the Cambodian question and to reassure the Soviets that
Thailand's anti-Vietnamese position was neither anti-Soviet nor
pro-Chinese. Such reassurances were believed to be necessary in
view of Vietnamese accusations that Thailand collaborated with
China and the United States in aiding and abetting the Khmer
Rouge forces against the Heng Samrin regime.
The Thai offensive, backed by Bangkok's ASEAN partners, was
rewarded in a United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution
adopted in November 1979. The resolution called for immediate
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, asked all nations
to refrain from interfering in, or staging acts of aggression
against, Cambodia, and called on the UN secretary general to
explore the possibility of an international conference on
Cambodia.
Data as of September 1987
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