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Uruguay Evolution of the Army
The first armed forces associated with the Banda
Oriental, or
what was to become Uruguay, developed after the Spanish
hold on
Buenos Aires ended in 1810. Montevideo, the only Spanish
stronghold in the area, soon became embroiled in the
conflict,
and residents of the interior of the Banda Oriental
rebelled
against Spanish rule. Led by José Gervasio Artigas, the
independence movement was started by a band of guerrillas
that
first joined with the independent government in Argentina
to help
free Montevideo from Spanish rule. General Artigas
prematurely
declared Uruguay independent in 1815 and formally took
control of
the new national army, which consisted of one battalion of
ethnic
European settlers and one battalion of freed slaves
(see Artigas's Revolution, 1811-20
, ch. 1).
After Uruguay became an independent state in 1828, the
new
nation's army consisted of a poorly organized irregular
militia,
of which a substantial portion of personnel were inducted
slaves
or minor criminals condemned to service. The army was
employed in
a short campaign in 1832 against a remnant Indian force.
The low
quality of the army's personnel and its poor public image,
however, made it neither an influential force in politics
nor an
effective military establishment.
Independence did not bring peace or an end to foreign
military intervention. Uruguay was plagued by chronic
disorder
and repeated insurrections supported by various foreign
powers
(see Beginnings of Independent Life, 1830-52
, ch. 1). Most
of the
disorder derived from political factionalism, as evidenced
in the
1836 struggle between forces led by the nation's first
president,
General Jose Fructoso Rivera (1830-35, 1838-43), and his
successor, General Manuel Oribe (1835-38), who was backed
by
Argentina. In 1838 Rivera's army prevailed, and Oribe fled
to
Buenos Aires. Oribe returned in 1842, however, and, using
Blanco
and Argentine forces, commenced a nine-year siege of
Montevideo
that attracted French, British, and Italian intervention.
The
siege and the war between Colorado forces in Montevideo
and
Blanco forces outside the capital, known as the Great War
(Guerra
Grande, 1843-52), helped forge the identities of what were
to
become the nation's two dominant political parties
(see Political Parties
, ch. 4).
The end of the nine-year siege of Montevideo was
followed by
renewed conflict and foreign intervention. The Uruguayan
Army in
1852 consisted of infantry, cavalry, and artillery
elements and
had a total strength of some 1,800 personnel; it was
nonetheless
unable to control the private political armies kept by
local
caudillos. In 1858 the country established the National
Guard, in
which males between seventeen and forty-seven years of age
were
required to serve. The main effect of the National Guard,
however, was to provide local caudillos with
better-trained
personnel for their armies, which operated under the
auspices of
various factions of the Colorado Party (Partido Colorado)
or the
National Party (Partido Nacional, usually referred to as
the
Blancos).
Foreign intervention on behalf of the Blancos by
Francisco
Solano López, the Paraguayan dictator, embroiled Uruguay
in a
bloody war between the Triple Alliance of Argentina,
Brazil, and
Uruguay on the one side and Paraguay on the other side.
During
the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-70), some 3,000
Uruguayan
troops joined the more professional armies of Brazil and
Argentina. The Uruguayan Army emerged from the experience
with
somewhat more professional standards.
After the challenge of facing a foreign threat ended,
the
pattern of armed Colorado-Blanco clashes resumed. The war
had
strengthened the sense of national identity, but party
loyalty
remained intense, and for many Uruguayans it surpassed
loyalty to
the state. The army, itself highly politicized, worked to
control
banditry, engaged in public-works projects, and was active
in
controlling clashes between the private political armies.
The
number of combatants in the interparty struggles was never
large,
and the clashes were punctuated by a number of peace pacts
that
ended specific uprisings and formally redistributed power
held by
the dominant Colorados in Montevideo to accommodate Blanco
aspirations outside the capital.
The party clashes peaked around the turn of the
twentieth
century. A serious Blanco rebellion in 1897 ended in a
"pact
between the parties," but, as in the past, the Blancos
used the
opportunity to consolidate their power and improve their
armed
strength. After Colorado president José Batlle y Ordóñez
(1903-
07, 1911-15) moved to check Blanco growth, Blanco rural
leaders
rose up in 1904 in the last of the armed conflicts between
the
two parties
(see The New Country, 1903-33
, ch. 1).
After the defeat of the Blanco uprising, the army
replaced
the private armed forces of the caudillos as the nation's
dominant armed force. Batlle y Ordóñez appointed and
promoted
only loyal officers; by 1915 almost all army officers were
Colorados. In recognition of the politicization of the
army and
its growing influence, Batlle y Ordóñez and other civilian
leaders followed a careful policy of balancing frequent
transfers
of loyal and suspected units in and out of Montevideo with
increased investment in weaponry and increased personnel.
As a
result, the army nearly doubled in size between 1904 and
1914; it
grew from about 6,000 to 12,000 personnel. Its position as
the
nation's preeminent military force was strengthened after
Uruguay
made it illegal to address nonmilitary persons with a
military
title, which had formerly been a common practice among
Blanco
forces.
As the prospect of further revolution subsided, the
activeduty forces were reduced through attrition in an effort to
circumscribe the army's political role. The army was
spared
serious budget cutting but was reorganized into smaller
units
intended to be expanded in wartime. The increase in the
number of
units meant more officers and more promotions; at the same
time,
the increase in the number of units also made it harder
for
officers to forge a unified political force. The
government and
the armed forces leadership placed new emphasis on
developing an
apolitical and professional military institution, and as a
result
the army essentially withdrew from the political arena.
After World War I, the army came under the influence of
a
French military mission, and officers began to train at
the
Military Academy at St. Cyr, France, and at various
specialty
schools of the French army. Under a French plan, the
country was
divided into four military regions, and the military air
arm was
strengthened. Modern equipment, including aircraft, was
imported
from various European sources. The army was used to
support a
coup by President Gabriel Terra (1931-38) in 1933 but did
little
except to prevent legislators from entering the General
Assembly
(the nation's bicameral legislature).
During World War II, the United States replaced France
as the
nation's foremost foreign military influence. United
States
assistance under the Lend-Lease Agreement focused
primarily on
aviation. The armed forces spent the 1950s and 1960s
pursuing a
program of gradual equipment modernization.
Data as of December 1990
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