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Venezuela The Executive
The 1961 constitution continues the long tradition of a
powerful president, who serves as head of state and chief
executive. He or she must be a Venezuelan by birth, at
least
thirty years old, and not a member of the clergy. The
president
is elected by a plurality vote under direct and universal
suffrage, serves for five years, and cannot be reelected
until
after two intervening terms have passed. President Carlos
Andrés
Pérez became the first Venezuelan elected to serve two
terms of
office under this provision of the 1961 constitution; he
won the
December 1988 election after having served as president
from 1974
to 1979.
The president commands the armed forces, calls special
sessions of the Congress, and exercises sole control of
foreign
policy. He can authorize expenditures outside the budget
and can
negotiate loans. The constitution provides for a weak form
of
ministerial responsibility. This is rendered meaningless,
however, because while the constitution calls upon the
president
to consult with his ministers, it allows him to appoint
and
remove them. In fact, through his ministers, the president
can
adopt whatever regulations he chooses in order to
implement the
laws. These regulations are not subject to the approval of
Congress, and the courts are not empowered to review them.
The major challenges and limitations to presidential
power
are found not in constitutional restrictions but in the
political
system as defined by the major Venezuelan political
parties.
Limitations placed on presidential initiative by the play
of
forces within the president's party restricted
presidential
actions informally but effectively; in practice,
therefore,
political checks functioned more effectively than
constitutional
ones to prevent presidential abuses of authority.
The constitutional power to declare a state of siege
and
temporarily restrict or suspend constitutional guarantees
represents the ultimate exercise of presidential authority
under
the 1961 constitution. During Rómulo Betancourt's elected
tenure
(president, 1959-64), he felt compelled to use these
constitutionally sanctioned limitations in order to
prevail over
forces that threatened the survival of his legitimately
elected
government. It should be pointed out, however, that
certain
guarantees cannot be constitutionally abrogated under any
circumstances. The guarantee against perpetual
imprisonment and
the prohibition against the death penalty represent two
such
provisions.
Cabinet and noncabinet ministers serve as advisers to
the
president; they are appointed and removed by the president
without input from the Congress. Ministers may introduce
bills in
Congress, and they must submit an annual report and an
accounting
of funds to Congress at the beginning of each regular
session.
The ministers of energy and mines, finance, foreign
affairs,
interior, and national defense and the head of the Central
Office
of Coordination and Planning (Oficina Central de
Coordinación y
Planificación--Cordiplan) traditionally have been
considered the
most powerful and prestigious in the Council of Ministers,
or
cabinet.
The president determines the size and composition of
the
cabinet. Both Betancourt and Raúl Leoni (president,
1964-69), who
succeeded him as the second chief executive in the
democratic
period, appointed thirteen cabinet ministers. Since then,
the
number has grown as high as twenty-five. Some observers
have
noted a correlation between this increase in the number of
ministries and the oil bonanza that began in 1973. As the
oil
money flowed in, the number of ministries also increased.
Subsequently, even though the oil boom ended in the early
1980s,
presidents have found it difficult to operate with as few
ministries as Betancourt and Leoni did.
The growth of the cabinet was not surprising in light
of the
ambitious list of the government's goals in the 1970s and
1980s.
These included preserving democratic institutions,
maintaining
public order, modernizing the armed forces, managing the
external
public debt so as to avoid undesirable effects on living
standards, and directing the economy and the development
of the
country's physical infrastructure. All these broad and
wide-ranging goals fell within the president's purview and
range
of legislative initiatives; therefore, when Venezuelans
spoke of
"the government," almost invariably they meant "the
president,"
or "the executive."
Driven by this mandate, the centralized bureaucracy,
under
the control of the president, has become by far the
largest
employer in the country. Commonly cited figures on the
number of
public servants were inaccurate because they often
excluded those
employed by the many state corporations, among them those
dealing
with the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (Petróleos de
Venezuela, S.A.--PDVSA), the Foreign Commerce Institute,
the
Superintendency of Foreign Investment (Sistema de
Inversiones
Extranjeras--SIEX), and many others.
The tremendous growth of bureaucracy provoked
controversy,
especially as oil revenues declined during the 1980s. Many
Venezuelans felt that the growth of bureaucracy
contributed to
corruption, fiscal irresponsibility, and a declining level
of
services. And yet, a significant number of Venezuelans
worked for
the government either directly or indirectly or had close
relatives so employed. The Venezuelan press had been
vigorous in
its exposés of the most flagrant cases of nepotism, but
authorities had seldom taken effective action to curtail
this
practice. The 1989 switch to the direct election of
governors
lessened the opportunity for presidents to appoint
political
cronies to these offices. President Pérez's announced
policy of
privatization of some parts of the public sector could
also have
an impact on inefficient personnel practices. Through
1990,
however, the overall effect of these changes could not be
judged.
An early sign of Pérez's intentions toward fulfilling
his
pledge of greater privatization came with the announced
intention
to dissolve the Venezuelan Investment Fund (Fondo de
Inversiones
de Venezuela--FIV), once the most visible institutional
symbol of
the liberal application of oil revenues. Perhaps
ironically, the
FIV had been created by Pérez in 1974 during his earlier
presidency as a channel to direct the additional income
generated
by rocketing oil prices into the expansion of non-oil
sectors of
the economy. Allocations by the government to the FIV
funded
large-scale projects intended to boost the production of
steel,
aluminum, and electricity
(see Growth and Structure of the Economy
, ch. 3). In addition, possibly in an effort to
pave the
way for an eventual bid by Pérez to become the secretary
general
of the United Nations, FIV also channeled Venezuelan
financial
assistance to poor countries in Central America, the
Caribbean,
and the Andean region.
Early in 1990, the government reallocated FIV's assets
among
various ministries. This move, however, did not
necessarily
represent the demise of this powerful bureaucratic entity.
Some
sources indicated that FIV's technicians would be charged
with
administering the privatization program. By late 1990,
however,
the privatization program had yet to sell a single state
asset,
and some observers questioned the strength of Pérez's
commitment
to the process.
Data as of December 1990
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