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Venezuela Interest Groups and Major Political Actors
Historically, the decisive arbiters of Venezuelan
national
politics have been the armed forces. Three governments
since the
death of Gómez in 1935 have been overthrown by military
coups.
Mini-coups, barracks revolts, and discontent--not always
fully
reported--have also served as constant reminders to
civilian
politicians of the fragility of democracy. The armed
forces have
refrained from partisan political matters, especially
since the
early 1970s and throughout the 1980s; they have continued,
however, their involvement in resolving national crises
and in
implementing antisubversive campaigns
(see Missions
, ch.
5).
Although the balance of power among contending factions
since
1958 has favored groups committed to upholding the elected
government, a few officers from time to time have
contended that
they are the best guardians of the integrity of the
constitution
and the nation. These officers, however, have always
represented
a distinct minority and have posed no real threat to the
increasing supremacy of the civilian leadership. In
addition,
democratically elected presidents have exploited
interservice
rivalries to survive attempted coups. This proved
particularly
true in the years immediately following 1958. Both
Betancourt and
Leoni survived coup attempts through the loyalty of
military
factions that failed to rally to the cry of revolt from
other
factions or branches.
A successful strategy toward the military practiced by
both
AD and COPEI governments has been that of coaptation.
Liberal
defense budgets and generous benefits have been the norm.
Potential troublemakers were identified and sent to
distant
outposts or abroad. Generally, the military enjoyed free
rein to
deal with actual and potential subversives. Presidents
have
discreetly but deliberately sought the advice of military
leaders
in drafting and implementing major policies, especially
those
that affect areas that the military considered as "their"
special
prerogative, such as control and delineation of borders.
Unlike the military, the Roman Catholic Church has not
been a
major political force in Venezuelan politics. The church
was
never as prominent in Venezuela as it was in neighboring
Colombia. In addition, the fact that the Spanish clergy,
in
general, sided with their mother country rather than with
the
forces of independence, did not endear the church to the
early
Venezuelan patriots.
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the ranking
clergy had close ties with the governing conservative
oligarchy,
and the church played a dominant role in the educational
system.
The rise to power of the Liberals in the latter half of
the
nineteenth century, however, ushered in a period of
anticlericalism. It was not until the mid-twentieth
century that,
under the influence of the Christian social movement that
began
to criticize the maldistribution of wealth, the church
regained
some of its former influence.
Roman Catholic laymen played a prominent role in the
founding
of COPEI in 1946, and the announced disapproval of the
church
contributed to the fall of the dictator Pérez Jiménez in
1958. In
the 1960s, the involvement of the church in education and
welfare
increased and, although the church had no formal ties with
COPEI,
many believed that the support of clergymen and
church-affiliated
institutions contributed to the electoral successes of
COPEI in
1968 and 1978.
The church in Venezuela has been weakened, however, by
a
traditional lack of vocations. Many priests serving in
Venezuela
were foreign-born. Charismatic Protestant churches, on the
other
hand, were beginning to proselyte successfully, especially
among
the urban poor. The Roman Catholic Church did not have the
funds,
the personnel, or the enthusiasm to stem effectively this
new
challenge to its hegemony.
In addition to the military and the church, Venezuela's
bureaucracy can be regarded as a major interest group and
political power in its own right. The adoption of
far-reaching
reformist goals since 1958 has generated a proliferation
of
government agencies and a greatly enlarged bureaucracy.
Such
entities as Cordiplan, the Venezuelan Development
Corporation,
PDVSA, the National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional
Agrario--INA), and the Office of Integrated Educational
Planning
acquired institutional objectives that they actively
promoted in
their dealings with legislators and other policy makers.
Overlapping authority among such entities and competing
demands
on limited resources often led to discord.
According to estimates, the government created an
average of
about eight new state-owned enterprises each year between
1968
and 1970. That number grew to eleven in 1971, sixteen in
1972,
fourteen in 1973, seventeen in 1974, and nearly fifty in
1975.
With the explosion of state-financed enterprises came an
explosion of bureaucracy and a growing lack of
accountability.
Scandals were routinely exposed in the freewheeling
Venezuelan
press. By the end of the 1970s, few doubted that the
bloated
state sector was a major problem, and all the major
presidential
candidates in the 1978 campaign promised bureaucratic
reform,
privatization of inefficient enterprise, and greater
efficiency
and accountability. Once elected, however, candidates did
not
pursue their campaign promises with the same vigor with
which
they were uttered in the heat of the electoral campaign.
The inefficiency and bureaucratization of the economy
left it
vulnerable in the early 1980s to the downturn in oil
prices and
the maturation of the significant Venezuelan short-term
foreign
debt. Fiscal shortfalls threatened the financial viability
of
many state enterprises; close to 40 percent of the
country's
foreign debt consisted of short-term obligations incurred
by
state-owned entities. Again, the government initially
temporized
and conducted protracted negotiations with international
banks
and financial institutions rather than actually beginning
the
painful process of reining in the bureaucracy. It was not
until
1989, perhaps as a result of the shock of the food riots
and
looting in Caracas that resulted in hundreds killed, that
the
government of Carlos Andrés Pérez began to make a
concerted
effort to move toward a leaner and more accountable
bureaucracy.
The Pérez administration adopted privatization as its new
motto;
implementation, however, remained a slow, uncertain, and
difficult process.
Few disputed that the power of patronage was an
important
resource for cementing party loyalty and interparty
relations.
The allocation of available posts for political appointees
has
been an important factor in forming coalition governments.
Furthermore, government employees have played a
significant role
in electoral campaigns. Although a number of individual
ministries set up internal administrative systems, and
despite
the numerous proposals set forth since 1958 for general
standardization of government personnel policies, the
bureaucracy
still functioned largely on the basis of personal
contacts.
Along with the persistence of a powerful and large
bureaucracy, commercial and industrial forces have shown a
great
capacity to adapt to the democratic rules of the game and,
at the
same time, to use the government system to further their
interests. These forces have steadily moved up to replace
the
traditionally dominant landowning class and have
transposed
economic power into effective political power. The
informal means
of exerting pressure through family networks and social
clubs
have been complemented by linkages forged with the various
associational interest groups. Most of the business
groups, for
example, belonged to the Federation of Chambers and
Associations
of Commerce and Production (Federación de Cámaras y
Asociaciones
de Comercio y Producción--Fedecámaras). It represented a
great
number of interests in the fields of petroleum,
agriculture,
banking, industry, commerce, and services. Many of its
member
groups, such as the Bankers' Association, the Ranchers'
and
Livestock Association, the Chamber of the Petroleum
Industry, and
the Caracas Chamber of Industry, carried on large-scale
lobbying
of their own. In 1966, for example, Fedecámaras persuaded
President Leoni to allow leaders of the business community
to
participate in the formulation of economic development
policy. It
has also been much involved in setting the terms under
which
Venezuela has entered into various integration and other
economic
pacts in the region.
In 1962 a group of financiers and industrialists who
wanted
to participate more directly in electoral politics
organized the
Independent Venezuelan Association, whose objective was to
slow
the pace of economic reform. Another group of businessmen
joined
in a group called Pro-Venezuela, an entity opposed to
foreign
participation in the exploitation of national resources;
it
suggested instead the use of foreign experts to train
Venezuelans.
Organized labor was the largest and most cohesive of
the
mass-based political pressure groups that had emerged
since the
mid-twentieth century. Effectively stifled under military
and
dictatorial rule, labor did not begin to affect the
political
balance until the early 1940s. Labor backed the October
1945 coup
and benefited much from the short-lived AD government
(1945-48).
Unionization proceeded apace then, but labor failed to
avert the
November 1948 coup that brought Pérez Jiménez to power.
Pérez Jiménez further alienated labor by allowing the
immigration of thousands of workers from Southern Europe.
With
the return to democracy in 1958, however, organized labor
returned to political prominence. All political parties
vied to
obtain links to labor. By the late 1960s, more than half
of the
labor force was unionized. The Confederation of Venezuelan
Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela--CTV),
organized by AD militants, remained the most powerful of
the
labor confederations. Some of the more militant
CTV-affiliated
unions who favored severing links to the government split
from
the CTV to form the United Workers' Confederation of
Venezuela.
This group never challenged the strength of the CTV.
Similarly,
the Roman Catholic labor organization, the Committee of
Autonomous Unions, remained small and wielded little
political
clout
(see Labor
, ch. 3).
Because of the close links between AD and the CTV, the
CTV
has suffered corresponding splits when AD has been
divided. In
the 1960s, divisions in AD were reflected in contests for
CTV
leadership. From time to time, members of COPEI have won
certain
important leadership posts in the CTV, but AD has remained
the
major political force.
Students and universities traditionally have been
involved in
the political process in the twentieth century.
Betancourt,
Leoni, Villalba, Machado, and other members of the
Generation of
1928 were student leaders who dared to openly challenge
the
dictatorship of Gómez. COPEI itself traced its origins to
the
National Students Union, created in 1946 to defend the
Roman
Catholic Church and to oppose the Marxist-oriented
Venezuelan
Student Federation (Federación Estudiantil de
Venezuela--FEV).
FEV leaders took part in the protests against Pérez
Jiménez and
worked closely with the underground Patriotic Junta in the
final
push against the dictator in January 1958.
When Betancourt assumed the presidency in 1959, student
groups participated actively in the establishment of a
democratic
government. Shortly thereafter, however, many of them
became
disillusioned with what they perceived as the slow pace of
reforms and moved toward the left politically. Some,
attracted by
the Cuban model, took up arms in abortive attempts to
wrest
control of the government from Betancourt and the AD
reformers.
Of all the national universities, the Central
University of
Venezuela, in Caracas, has been the major focus of student
political activity. Most of the student groups at the
university
were linked with national political parties, but often the
student branches functioned quite independently in their
actions
and took much more radical stands than did the parties.
Students
made up a considerable proportion of the membership of
MIR, which
split off from the AD in 1960, and its militant
revolutionary
band of irregulars, the Armed Forces of National
Liberation
(Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional--FALN)
(see The Triumph of Democracy
, ch. 1).
The middle class has had a significant impact on
government
policies in the democratic era. The middle-class origins
of most
AD and COPEI leaders helped generate support for their
party
programs. Many of the new economic elites that have grown
up as a
result of the benefits produced by the petroleum bonanza
had
their origins in the middle sectors and generally
advocated
liberal democracy and public-sector involvement in the
economy.
With the downturn of oil revenues in the mid-1980s, this
mentality began to change somewhat as the government, as
well as
the middle sectors, considered the potential advantages of
privatization.
Data as of December 1990
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