|
Venezuela Political Developments since 1958
Venezuelan political dynamics since 1958 have centered
on a
strong commitment to the democratic "rules of the game."
Although
Venezuelans--and foreigners alike--have pointed out that
this
democratic commitment was not without its blemishes, few
Venezuelans still spoke about the days of dictatorship as
the
golden days of their country. In general, most felt that
Venezuela's democracy was strong and robust, but that
democracy
alone had not brought about social justice or narrowed the
gap
between the very rich and the very poor. Indeed, the
practice of
democracy, in and of itself, was perhaps not even capable
of
achieving such goals.
Both AD and COPEI administrations have committed
themselves
to developing coherent, overall economic and social
development
policies. Such agencies as Cordiplan were established to
coordinate planning and contributed to rapid social and
economic
mobilization. Reform rather than revolution has been a
goal of
both major political parties. By the same token, the
policies of
sembrar el petróleo, "sowing the oil," revenues
served as
a link uniting different factions within and between the
two
major parties. Even in the less affluent 1980s, large
revenues
produced by the petroleum industry continued to contribute
to the
government's ability to finance and develop ambitious
programs in
agriculture, education, industrial diversification, and
health.
The nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1976,
a
long-sought goal by both major parties and practically all
groups
within Venezuela, was accomplished in a measured and
tempered
manner. Although not all parties to the nationalization
accords
agreed with every provision, most would admit that
nationalization has worked better than many expected.
Overall, it
has worked well enough to serve as a successful model for
other
countries with some of the same developmental dilemmas as
Venezuela. By ensuring that nationalization did not result
in the
drying up of foreign investment and, in turn, by ensuring
that
petroleum revenues served to some extent to underwrite
reform
programs, Venezuela created a financial cushion that
enabled
democratic governments to exert primary control over the
exploitation of the nation's resources.
AD captured the presidency and both houses of Congress
in
1973. Although it lost the presidency in 1978, AD remained
the
largest political party represented in the Senate and
secured the
same number of seats as the second largest party (and the
winner
of the presidency), COPEI, in the Chamber of Deputies.
Lesser
political parties such as National Opinion (Opinión
Nacional--
Opina) have won a few seats (usually under ten in the
Chamber of
Deputies) in various elections since 1958. Since the
reestablishment of democracy in 1958, however, the major
blocs of
senators and deputies have consistently belonged to either
AD or
COPEI. Possibly because their parties have either held the
presidency or have been considered potential winners of
the
presidency, AD and COPEI legislators have, in general,
displayed
responsibility in adhering to the political and
legislative
process and have not gone to extremes to destabilize the
executive.
Although Pérez's victory in the December 1988 elections
broke
the pattern of alternating victories for AD and COPEI, his
party
lost absolute control of Congress in the legislative vote.
AD's
share of the legislative vote fell to 43.8 percent, while
COPEI
obtained 31.4 percent and the leftist MAS doubled its
representation. Of a total 253 congressional seats--204 in
the
Chamber of Deputies and 49 in the Senate--AD won with 121
seats
(98 deputies and 23 senators), COPEI 89 seats (67 deputies
and 22
senators), and MAS 22 seats (19 deputies and 3 senators).
A
center-right group, the New Democratic Generation (Nueva
Generación Democrática), won seven seats (six deputies and
one
senator). Small left-wing parties obtained seven deputies
and
small center-right factions also elected seven deputies.
Although
the loss of absolute control of Congress might restrict
some of
the president's initiatives, overall it should represent
only a
minor impediment to the primacy of the executive.
The most outstanding political trend evidenced by six
administrations since 1959 has been a commitment to and
promotion
of representative democracy. To many observers, the
elections of
1988 assumed particular significance because they marked
thirty
years of democracy in Venezuela and indicated that
pluralist
democracy had a strong chance to survive. The food riots
in
Caracas in early 1989, which took place in spite of the
overwhelming popular vote for the then recently
inaugurated
president Pérez revealed a certain popular
dissatisfaction.
Opinion polls have shown that many Venezuelans felt as
though
they had little impact on their leaders and the way that
policies
were drafted and implemented. The alternatives on either
the
right or left of the political spectrum, however, seemed
to hold
little appeal, and almost no one desired a return to an
authoritarian regime.
AD and COPEI reforms have dramatically benefited large
segments of the population. Education and health reforms
have
opened job opportunities and improved the quality of life.
Both
literacy and life expectancy figures were among the
highest in
Latin America. Some other reforms, however well
intentioned, have
not succeeded. Most Venezuelans admitted that their costly
agrarian reform programs had neither provided much land to
poor
farmers nor managed to feed the nation, which continued to
import
significant levels of foodstuffs
(see Land Policies
, ch.
3).
Venezuela's mixed economic picture in many ways served
to
shape its foreign policy. Venezuela was a founding member
of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This
brought Venezuela into high-level contact with a number of
African countries, such as Nigeria, and with Middle
Eastern oil
producers. With the downturn of oil prices, Venezuela,
like other
once revenue-rich countries, had to face a continuing
struggle to
maintain foreign investment.
Jaime Lusinchi (president, 1984-89) sought to retain
Venezuela's creditworthiness by paying the interest on its
US$32
billion foreign debt, but was sadly disappointed when his
gestures were not tangibly rewarded by foreign bankers.
Bankers
praised Venezuela's political courage and agreed on the
country's
long-term prospects, but they declined to approve new
loans to
Lusinchi's government. The ensuing economic crisis forced
the
government to devalue the currency; as inflation and
unemployment
soared, Venezuelans again felt vulnerable at the hands of
the
"multinationals."
When President Pérez assumed office in 1989, he, too,
imposed
austerity measures in an attempt to persuade foreign
bankers to
restructure the old debt and make new loans available to
Venezuela. He achieved some initial success; austerity
programs,
however, have always proven difficult to sustain in the
face of
political and electoral pressure.
Data as of December 1990
|
