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Venezuela HISTORY OF THE ARMED FORCES
During the colonial era, Spain employed only a small
army in
the area later known as Venezuela. It relied primarily on
an
elaborate militia system that recruited members of the
local
population to maintain public order and guard against
foreign
attack. Militiamen generally were not professional
soldiers; they
held civilian occupations and met for drill on Sundays,
for
monthly inspections, and to keep watch on their local
communities
perhaps one evening a month. The militiamen received a
token
salary from the crown; service in the militia, however,
represented a source of prestige, primarily because of the
fuero militar (military privilege), which exempted
all
active militiamen from criminal or civil prosecution and
from
certain taxes and community work assignments that were
obligatory
for other citizens.
By 1810 the colony had several thousand active
militiamen.
These men provided the bulk of the armed force for the
independence struggle against Spain that occupied
Venezuela for
the next twenty years. Many thousands lost their lives as
Venezuelans played a dominant role in winning the
independence
not only of their own future country, but also of
Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. This achievement and the
Venezuelan
origins of several of the greatest leaders of the
revolutionary
period--including Francisco de Miranda, Simón Bolívar, and
José
Antonio Páez--remained sources of national pride for most
Venezuelans
(see The Epic of Independence
, ch. 1).
The militiamen made themselves into a regular army
during the
independence struggle. After 1830, however, a wave of
antimilitary sentiment led to the army's being relegated
to a
small and comparatively unimportant local security force,
a
status it retained until the twentieth century. For the
bulk of
the nineteenth century, successive governments reverted to
the
old colonial militia system to provide the nation's
primary armed
force. The nineteenth century was the age of the caudillo
in
Latin America, and in no other country was caudillismo
(rule by
local strongmen, or caudellos) more pronounced than in
Venezuela
(see A Century of Caudillismo
, ch. 1). Despite its
militaristic
trappings, however, caudillismo in Venezuela was more a
manifestation of personalistic loyalties than martial
aspirations. The employment of personal armies by
caudillos
rendered the regular standing army superfluous. In 1872
the
federal troops were dismissed entirely.
Venezuela did not reestablish a truly professional army
until
World War II. The transition, however, began under
Cipriano
Castro (president, 1898-1908). Although otherwise a
mediocre and
ineffective caudillo, Castro made one important
contribution to
Venezuelan politics; he established, on a permanent basis,
a
central authority with sufficient strength to resist all
regional
challenges to its existence. Whereas earlier caudillos had
viewed
the development of a strong national army as a threat to
their
personal control over the country, Castro recognized that
a
professional armed force could function as an effective
guarantor
of presidential rule. Among his innovations were the
creation of
a general staff and a chain of command that extended to
the
commanders of each state and local contingent. Castro
charged
these commanders to force local caudillos to submit to his
authority. The national army granted commissions to most
of those
who pledged their loyalty, and defeated those who
resisted.
Castro also established the Military Academy in Caracas,
at least
on paper, in 1903. The academy did not open until 1910,
however,
two years after Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-35) seized power
from an
ailing Castro.
Gómez built on the military policies established by
Castro.
Although the opening of the academy, the introduction of
foreign
military training missions, and the procurement of modern
armaments brought progress in the development of
professional
military capabilities, Gómez's most significant
achievement was
the abolition of the militia system via a 1919 decree.
That act
signaled the end of the age of caudillismo and the
beginning of
the age of Venezuelan militarism. Without a militia,
soldiers
could gain power only from within the ranks of the
national army.
Although he improved the capabilities of the army,
Gómez
never intended to establish a truly professional,
apolitical
force. Rather, Gómez's army served to enforce the
preeminence of
the traditional elite by preserving order, quelling
opposition,
and breaking strikes. After the oil industry became
established,
Gómez used some of its revenues to purchase modern
matériel for
the army in order to help preserve a climate of domestic
security
conducive to continued and expanded foreign investment.
The bulk
of the increased revenue from oil, however, went not to
the army,
but to Gómez himself.
After Gómez's death in 1935, Venezuela was ruled first
by his
minister of war, General Eleazar López Contreras
(president,
1936-41), then by López's minister of war, General Isaías
Medina
Angarita (president, 1941-45). Both of these presidents
encouraged the military to move away from direct
involvement in
politics and toward a more professional role, namely the
defense
of the country's borders and the maintenance of public
order
(see The Transition to Democratic Rule
, ch. 1). Castro had
first
brought foreign military missions to Venezuela in the late
nineteenth century; succeeding governments maintained this
tradition. Venezuelan officers also began to study abroad,
in
military academies in Peru, France, and the United States.
The
military also established social welfare measures during
this
period, as well as a mutual aid fund for officers.
Military
equipment purchases also modernized the services from a
technical
aspect. The officer corps, however, continued to be
dominated by
officers from the Andean state of Táchira, the home state
of
Castro, Gómez, López, and Medina. This cliquishness
rewarded
origins more than professional competence, to the
detriment of
the corps as a whole.
It was not until near the end of the Medina regime that
for
the first time a maximum retirement age was set for all
military
personnel. But the action came too late; such tardy
half-measures
toward professionalizing the military provoked resentment
among
junior officers, which eventually split the military. In
mid-
1945, junior officers founded a secret lodge, the
Patriotic
Military Union (Unión Patriótica Militar--UPM), which
endorsed
the establishment of democratic representative government
in
Venezuela, supported by an apolitical military. One of the
principal founders of the UPM was Marcos Pérez Jiménez,
then a
captain. Other prominent figures were Majors Carlos
Delgado
Chalbaud and Julio Vargas.
The UPM conspired with members of the political party
Democratic Action (Acción Democrática--AD) to bring about
this
new order. Thus, after the successful military rebellion
of
October 18, 1945, the seven-man ruling junta was made up
of four
adecos (AD members), two military officers, and one
independent. Major Delgado was the senior officer on the
junta.
The leading figure on the junta, however, was AD leader
Rómulo
Betancourt. Rómulo Gallegos, who was not a junta member,
ran for
and won the presidency in 1947 on the AD ticket.
During the trienio of civilian rule, the
military
enjoyed relative autonomy in dealing with its own
institutional
affairs. In turn, officers did not involve themselves in
social
or economic policy making or in routine political
decisions.
Nevertheless, the armed forces were among the principal
beneficiaries of the 1945 rebellion; from 1945 to 1947,
the
defense budget tripled, salaries rose dramatically, and
matériel
procurements increased substantially. Enrollment in the
Military
Academy more than doubled, and a large United States
military
mission arrived, making the United States the major
foreign
influence on the Venezuelan military. The navy was
reorganized
and the air force was granted autonomy from the army. The
young
officers now in charge also decided to cashier all
officers who
had attained ranks above major before the 1945 rebellion,
thus
leaving room for professionally trained officers to fill
the
upper ranks.
Despite these concessions and considerations, the AD
government proved unable to retain the loyalty of the
military.
The primary point of conflict between the two camps was
the
pursuit by AD of what the military leadership considered
to be
radical social reforms. Many officers also resented AD's
active
recruiting efforts among the officer corps. When
Betancourt
floated the idea of establishing a party militia, the
military
moved directly to preempt this challenge to its authority.
The
nearly bloodless coup of November 24, 1948, ousted
Gallegos and
AD from power.
A three-man provisional military junta, headed by Major
Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, who had served as defense
minister
during the trienio, assumed power. Allegedly
hesitant to
repeat the mistakes of 1945 by hastily reestablishing a
civilian
government, the provisional government gave increasing
signals of
its intention to establish a permanent military regime. In
November 1950, a band of thugs dragged the more molerate
Delgado
from his home and murdered him. His successor, Caracas
lawyer
Germán Suárez Flamerich, served as a figurehead for Pérez
Jiménez.
The elections of November 1952 removed any facade of
legitimacy from the Pérez Jiménez regime
(see The Triumph of Democracy
, ch. 1). After balloting marked by clumsy fraud
on the
part of the regime, had himself declared president. No
longer
directing affairs from behind the scenes, Pérez made no
pretense
of ruling democratically. Having no political
constituency, he
ruled in the name of and on behalf of the military.
Officers
received tremendous salary increases; new and exotic arms
were
purchased; and the luxurious Officers Club (Circulo de las
Fuerzas Armadas) was built in Caracas at a cost equivalent
to
millions of United States dollars to raise the military's
morale.
Pérez ruled in particularly brutal fashion. The regime
strictly censored the press and set up an intricate spy
network
to seek out and punish those suspected of disloyalty. The
National Security Police (Seguridad Nacional--SN) became
increasingly powerful and threatening to the integrity of
the
armed forces as they arrested more and more military
officers. In
a further effort to consolidate his power, Pérez, a native
of
Táchira, distributed key posts in the government and the
military
on the basis of personal loyalty rather than professional
merit--
a throwback to the old days of the tachirense
(native of
the state of Táchira) clique, but even more insidious in
its
debilitating effect on the military institution. Once
again,
junior officers grew to resent the incompetence,
corruption, and
brutality of their superiors. By showing favoritism to the
army,
Pérez also alienated air force and naval officers. It was
these
factions within the officer corps that led to military
rebellion
against Pérez in 1958. Although initially unsuccessful,
the
rebellion led by the air force triggered widespread
popular
unrest that brought other elements of the armed forces
into the
anti-Pérez coalition. The dictator fled the country on
January
23, 1958.
The five-man provisional military-civilian junta that
emerged
under the leadership of Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal guided
the
country directly toward what was now clearly the will of
the
people: a freely elected civilian government. Despite
numerous
revolts among the armed forces, the junta organized
elections
that culminated in Rómulo Betancourt's election to the
presidency
on December 7, 1958. Betancourt's inauguration on February
13,
1959, was a line of demarcation in Venezuelan history
between
centuries of military dominance and the modern era of
civilian
democratic rule.
Initially, the Betancourt government faced considerable
active opposition from within the armed forces. Right-wing
officers, disenchanted with liberal civilian rule,
attempted
coups on several different occasions, and twice in 1962
officers
and enlisted men of the Infantria de Marina (Marine
Infantry)
left-wing launched unsuccessful rebellions. Such
activities
eventually subsided, however. The government of Raúl Leoni
(president, 1964-69) saw only one small uprising by army
officers
loyal to Pérez. During periods of political crisis, rumors
periodically circulated in Venezuela that the military was
preparing to take power. After the 1960s, however, these
rumors
appear to have been without foundation. By 1990 the
democratic
order appeared to be well established.
Although the armed forces shunned a direct role in the
nation's politics, they continued to act as a powerful
pressure
group, lobbying in their own corporate self-interest.
Their
primary concerns included the protection of their share of
the
national budget, the security of the country's borders,
the
maintenance of internal order, the operation of the
police, and
the development of an indigenous military industry. It was
in
these areas that the civilian government had to consult
with and
secure the approval of the armed forces leadership before
proceeding with any major changes in policy.
Data as of December 1990
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