Venezuela STRATEGIC SETTING
Amphibious vessels
Courtesy Embassy of Venezuela, Washington
Like all countries, Venezuela must approach questions
of
security and defense by considering its geography, its
natural
resources, its population, and its regional political
interests.
During the modern era, two such considerations have shaped
Venezuelan security policy more than any others. These are
the
nation's status as a major producer and exporter of
petroleum,
and its role as a regional power within the
Caribbean Basin (see Glossary) area. The country's
external defense posture,
its
internal disposition of forces, and its relations with
neighboring states responded in large part to these
imperatives.
The development of Venezuela as a major oil producer
after
World War II transformed the nation both economically and
socially. This process of societal transition was
reflected in
the military institution as well. Long an unprofessional,
internal security-oriented force subject to the vagaries
of
policy as laid down by self-absorbed dictators, the
Venezuelan
military began a transition under democratic rule.
The growth of the oil industry provided both a
legitimate
mission for the armed forces in protecting the oil fields
and,
even more important, the resources with which to
accomplish that
mission. President Betancourt established the policy of
committing significant revenues to the military. Although
Betancourt's motivation was largely a political
one--keeping the
officer corps satisfied so as to forestall future military
intervention in affairs of state--his actions yielded a
benefit
in purely military terms as well. Subsequent
administrations have
maintained this policy. As a result, the National Armed
Forces
(Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales--FAN) had become by the 1970s
the
best equipped military force in Latin America. With this
strengthened military posture and the nation's enhanced
stature
in both regional and international arenas, the concept of
Venezuela as an actor with a defined sphere of influence
began to
take hold in Caracas. At the same time, other South
American
countries grew to resent, to varying degrees, falling
under the
shadow of their more resource-rich neighbor.
Venezuela's regional sphere of influence equated
roughly with
the strategic area that came to be known during the 1980s
as the
Caribbean Basin. Culturally, the countries of the basin
are
diverse, ranging from primarily Hispanic Central America
to the
former British colonies of the Eastern Caribbean to the
French
and African fusion in Haiti. Despite some variations, all
the
countries of the basin were economically underdeveloped,
and
therefore potentially unstable politically. Beginning in
the
1960s, the presence of communist Cuba, its major military
buildup, and its undisguised intentions to subvert
established
governments in the area added an urgency to the goal of
maintaining Caribbean stability. Cuba's alignment with the
Soviet
Union also forced strategists in democratic nations such
as
Venezuela to factor global variables into their security
posture.
During the 1980s, Venezuela involved itself actively in
the
Caribbean Basin. Despite some rhetorical bows to the
concept of
nonintervention, policy makers generally supported the
United
States intervention in Grenada in 1983. After the
reestablishment
of democratic government in that country, Venezuela
provided
limited economic aid to Grenada, as it had to other island
states.
In 1980 Venezuela and Mexico had signed the San José
Accord
to provide oil at subsidized rates and other economic
assistance
to designated beneficiary states in the Caribbean Basin
(see Foreign Assistance
, ch. 3). Their purpose was to cushion
the
impact of oil price increases on the small oil-importing
countries of the basin. Their motivations, however, were
as much
political and strategic as altruistic. Given the already
precarious economic condition of most of these countries,
the
added burden of oil price increases in 1973 and 1979 had
threatened to push many of them from stagnant poverty into
widespread social unrest. Although the accord became less
economically sustainable for Venezuela and Mexico as oil
prices
dropped throughout the 1980s, both countries continued to
uphold
its provisions and expand the number of beneficiaries
throughout
the decade, mainly because of the perceived political
benefits
and the potential adverse impact on the importing
countries of an
oil cutoff.
Although the Venezuelan military was capable of
projecting
its power to a limited extent within the Caribbean Basin,
it
never actively used this power. Instead, Venezuela has
applied
its efforts to promote regional stability mainly in the
diplomatic arena
(see Foreign Relations
, ch. 4). This
approach
was epitomized by the Central American crisis of the
1980s.
Venezuela was one of the original "core-four"
nations--along with
Mexico, Colombia, and Panama--that joined together in 1983
Contadora Group (see Glossary), in an effort to resolve
the
tensions in the region through negotiation and avoid armed
conflict and possible foreign military intervention.
Venezuela supported the Contadora process as a peaceful
path
to stability in an area where tensions had escalated
following
the 1979 seizure of power by the Sandinista National
Liberation
Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional--FSLN) in
Nicaragua. The Venezuelan government, led by President
Carlos
Andrés Pérez, had supported the Sandinistas during the
struggle
against Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle and
had
cooperated with Cuba, Costa Rica, and other governments to
supply
arms to the Nicaraguan rebels. The Pérez administration,
which
had some doubts as to the FSLN's commitment to democratic
principles, apparently believed that it could exert
sufficient
influence over a postrevolutionary Nicaraguan government
to
ensure some degree of pluralism. As the Sandinistas moved
to
force moderates out of the government, however, it became
clear
to Venezuela that the overwhelming foreign influence in
Nicaragua
was Cuban. Although Pérez had cooperated with Cuban leader
Fidel
Castro Ruz in arming the Nicaraguans, Venezuela still
viewed Cuba
as a regional competitor for political influence and as a
potential military threat. Therefore, as the FSLN
consolidated
its rule, set up Cuban-style mechanisms of control,
acquired
significant amounts of Soviet weaponry to equip a growing
military, and increasingly aligned itself with the Soviet
Union
and its communist allies in political and security
matters,
Venezuelans looked on with growing alarm.
The Contadora process, however, proved incapable of
dealing
with the complex Central American situation. Among the
core-four
nations, Venezuela found itself advocating a much more
moderate,
security-conscious position than that espoused by the
other
sponsoring countries. Early on in the process, the
government of
Colombian president Belisario Betancur Cuartas appeared to
take
the lead in the negotiating process. But as the talks
became
protracted, the Mexican government of Miguel de la Madrid
Hurtado
moved toward the forefront. The Mexicans, however,
generally
advocated conditions more favorable to the Nicaraguan
government
than to the more democratic states of Costa Rica,
Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala. From the Venezuelan perspective,
the
talks became increasingly counterproductive as they
dragged on
for years without producing an agreement. During the early
to
mid-1980s, Venezuelans became preoccupied to an increasing
extent
with their own economic crisis and apparently could not
muster
sufficient resources or influence to devote to what seemed
to
many a futile diplomatic exercise. As the United States
government worked behind the scenes to influence the
process
toward a resolution that would limit the interventionist
nature
of the Sandinista regime and promote pluralism in
Nicaragua,
Caracas came to concur informally with these goals and
disengaged
itself somewhat from the negotiations.
Data as of December 1990
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