Venezuela Venezuela and Colombia
These two neighbors shared many points in common. Both
were
large South American states with security concerns that
encompassed the Caribbean area as well. Both have
functioned
under representative democratic systems for decades.
Associated
under the Spanish colonial Viceroyalty of New Granada,
both
nations could point to Bolívar as their liberator
(see Spanish Colonial Life
, ch. 1). The disparities between Venezuela
and
Colombia, however, have contributed to a fluctuating
undercurrent
of tension over the years.
The most visible irritant in the relationship was the
dispute
over the boundary demarcation in the Golfo de Venezuela
(Golfo de
Guajira as the Colombian refer to it as--see
fig. 9). The
roots
of the boundary maritime issue stretch back to colonial
times.
The borders of the nations that emerged from the wars for
independence were not clearly defined. As these nations
grew,
disputes became unavoidable. In 1881 Venezuela and
Colombia
appealed to King Alfonso XII of Spain to arbitrate their
conflicting claims. Venezuela rejected the eventual 1891
arbitration decision because of a disagreement over the
location
of the source of the Río Oro. Fifty years later, the two
nations
signed a treaty that defined the border along the
Península de la
Guajira. This 1941 treaty, however, has been criticized by
many
Venezuelans for granting too much territory to Colombia.
This
attitude has hardened the stance of the armed forces with
regard
to the Golfo de Venezuela; it has also rendered more
tentative
the attempts of subsequent governments to negotiate the
boundary
in the gulf. Moreover, the development of oil resources in
the
area and the expectation of further expansion also raised
the
stakes involved in a potential resolution.
After an abortive effort in the early 1970s and an
adamant
refusal by Venezuela to submit the dispute to
international
arbitration, the two governments announced in 1981 a draft
treaty
designated the Hypothesis of Caraballeda. When President
Luis
Herrera Campins's foreign minister presented the draft to
representatives of the officer corps, however, he received
an
extremely negative reaction. Opposition to the treaty
quickly
spread, forcing the government to withdraw from further
negotiations with the Colombians. There have been no
formal talks
dedicated to the maritime boundary since that time.
In the mid- to late 1980s, Caracas and Bogotá rose
above
their diplomatic failure on the boundary issue to effect
greater
cooperation on security issues. In January 1988, the
interior
ministers of both countries met in the Venezuelan border
town of
San Antonio de Táchira. The meeting produced an agreement
to
increase the military presence on both sides of the border
and to
expand cooperation in such areas as counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency. The movement toward cooperation grew
out of a
shared realization that Colombia's internal security
problems--
namely drug trafficking and insurgency--were spilling over
the
border. On several occasions in the late 1980s, Colombian
guerrillas attacked posts manned by the Venezuelan Armed
Forces
of Cooperation (Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación--Fac)--also
known
as the National Guard. Drug trafficking activity, always
attended
by increased levels of violence, also picked up.
Venezuelans generally have tended to view Colombia as a
violent and unstable country whose problems and people
washed
over the border into more peaceful and prosperous
Venezuela. News
of attacks on border posts, kidnappings of wealthy
Venezuelan
ranchers by Colombian guerrillas, and drug seizures during
transshipment have reinforced this conception. Another
issue,
Colombian undocumentados (undoumented or illegal
aliens),
underscored for Venezuelans the disparities in both
internal
security and economic development between themselves and
their
neighbors. Estimates of the number of illegal Colombians
in
Venezuela varied, but most ran in the hundreds of
thousands
(see Migration
, ch. 2). Although some Venezuelans saw
Colombians as a
threat to law and order, their major impact was economic.
During
the boom years of the Venezuelan oil economy, the
Colombian
immigration issue constituted a minor irritant. As the
economy
constricted during the 1980s, however, Venezuelans grew
more
resentful of the Colombian presence. Nevertheless, it was
highly
unlikely that this problem, even in combination with the
Golfo de
Venezuela dispute, would provoke active hostilities
between the
two countries.
Data as of December 1990
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