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Yugoslavia Threat Perception
Beginning in 1945, Yugoslavia's geopolitical situation made
it more important than size, economic resources, or military
power alone would warrant. Wedged between the Warsaw Pact and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliances in the
strategic Mediterranean region, Yugoslavia shared more than half
its 3,000-kilometer land border with three Warsaw Pact countries,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and also bordered two NATO
members, Italy and Greece. Neutral Austria to the north and
isolationist Albania to the south completed Yugoslavia's borders.
Between 1948 and 1955, the possibility of a Soviet invasion
to bring Yugoslavia back into the Soviet orbit remained the
largest factor in Yugoslavia's perception of external threat.
This scenario involved a possible military intervention in
support of pro-Soviet Yugoslavs
(see Internal Security
, this
ch.). Joint Soviet-Yugoslav declarations in 1955 and 1956
prohibited the threat or use of force in relations between the
two countries, but the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November
1956 undermined the credibility of those declarations. The
Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 further
heightened Yugoslavia's perception of external threat, leading to
a dramatic shift in Yugoslav military doctrine
(see Military Doctrine
, this ch.).
From 1968 until the mid-1980s, many Western and Yugoslav
military observers conjectured that if a general conflict erupted
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the Soviet Union would occupy
Yugoslavia. Control of the Yugoslav territory and coastline would
split NATO's southern flank and provide the Soviet Navy
anchorages and direct access to the Mediterranean Sea. Meanwhile,
the Soviet Union also menaced Yugoslavia by supporting with
varying degrees of enthusiasm Bulgaria's longstanding claim to
territory in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Albania also contributed to Yugoslavia's perception of threat
during the 1970s and 1980s. Albania had a strong interest in the
large ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo, economically the most
backward region of Yugoslavia. The explosive conditions in Kosovo
caused by unemployment, separatist movements, and Serbian
repression created a constant possibility of hostilities between
the two countries. Albania could block the Strait of Otranto
between itself and Italy, denying Yugoslavia access to the
Mediterranean Sea. The combined hostility of Albania and Bulgaria
posed a further threat to Yugoslavia. After leaving the Soviet
orbit in 1961, Albania preserved its military cooperation
agreement with Bulgaria, although it abrogated similar agreements
with the other Warsaw Pact countries. Continued relations between
Albania and Bulgaria hinged largely on their common hostility
toward Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, Yugoslavia sought to counteract such proximate
threats by maintaining good relations with, and obtaining
military technology from, other European neutrals such as
Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden.
After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in
1985, the perception of Soviet threat to Yugoslavia diminished.
Gorbachev's visit to Belgrade in March 1988 apparently allayed
many Yugoslav strategic concerns. In a declaration similar to
those of 1955 and 1956, the two countries again pledged respect
of mutual security.
While in Yugoslavia, Gorbachev addressed the concept of
limiting United States and Soviet arms in the Mediterranean
region. The Yugoslav reaction to Gorbachev's proposal revealed
the influence of the superpower balance in the region on
Yugoslavia's perception of its security. Gorbachev's proposal
essentially called for the elimination of tactical nuclear
weapons from United States forces in Greece and the United States
Navy's Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Yugoslavia opposed the
proposal because it lacked corresponding reductions in the
conventional weapons of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in the
region. The diminution of NATO and United States strength would
have reduced the relative security of Yugoslavia.
In 1990 rapid political change in Eastern Europe, possible
Soviet troop withdrawals, and the declining military relevance of
the Warsaw Pact combined to decrease Yugoslavia's perception of
external threat. A unilateral Soviet invasion had become a
virtual impossibility. Moreover, improved relations between
Yugoslavia and Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria made a coordinated
Warsaw Pact invasion unlikely.
Data as of December 1990
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