You are here -allRefer - Reference - Country Study & Country Guide - Yugoslavia >

allRefer Reference and Encyclopedia Resource

allRefer    
allRefer
   


-- Country Study & Guide --     

 

Yugoslavia

 
Country Guide
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belize
Bhutan
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Caribbean Islands
Comoros
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Germany (East)
Ghana
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Cote d'Ivoire
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Laos
Lebanon
Libya
Lithuania
Macau
Madagascar
Maldives
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Nigeria
North Korea
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Seychelles
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
Soviet Union [USSR]
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zaire

Yugoslavia

The Military and the Party

In 1990 more than 100,000 YPA soldiers, airmen, and sailors were members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and formed party cells in the military. Because party membership was a criterion for officer status, virtually all officers were LCY members. Despite this, LCY control over the YPA was relatively loose. In fact, the large number of military personnel in the LCY made the YPA a powerful constituency with interests claiming full party attention.

As in most communist states, military representation in the party leadership was significant in the 1980s. The LCY Committee in the YPA was virtually a military wing of the party. The president of the committee, always a general, was likely eventually to become federal secretary for national defense. The committee held party conferences to elect delegates to represent the YPA at LCY congresses. YPA party conferences were similar to the regional conferences that elected republican and provincial delegates to LCY congresses. The YPA also elected its president, secretary, and fifty party committee members. YPA delegates elected to the Thirteenth LCY Congress in 1986 included primarily generals and other officers, but some noncommissioned officers, soldiers, civilian YPA employees, and higher military school cadets also participated.

The LCY Committee in the YPA elected fourteen officers to serve on the LCY Central Committee in 1986. Other officers were elected to the central committee as representatives of the party in the republics and autonomous provinces. By 1986, having steadily increased since the 1970s, the percentage of military leaders in the Central Committee was greater than the percentage of military personnel in the total population. In Central Committee representation, the YPA allotment almost equaled that of the republics and did equal that of the autonomous provinces. At various times, the federal secretary for national defense has been a member of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee.

Tito controlled the YPA by exercising his tremendous personal authority and purging the ranks occasionally, while allowing considerable professional autonomy. Many YPA leaders were loyal Tito compatriots from the Partisan years, although their numbers were declining noticeably by the late 1980s. Even in retirement, many of this group remained politically active within the Federation of Associations of Veterans' of the National Liberation War (Savez udruzenja boraca Narodno-oslobodilackog rata, SUBNOR, see Veterans' Association , ch. 4).

Military influence in the political system increased steadily after the early 1970s. The military earned its influence by stabilizing Yugoslavia during critical periods of internal tension. In 1979 its high political profile obligated the YPA to issue a formal disavowal of any intention to assume power after Tito's death. In the 1980s, the constant speculation about the political role of the YPA was due less to the political ambitions of Yugoslav generals than to the many social, economic, and political crises afflicting the state. On several occasions, military leaders felt compelled to warn that the army would not allow disunity to cause the dissolution of the Yugoslav state.

The possibility of a "Polish" situation was openly discussed; this term referred to General Wojciech Jaruzelski's 1981 imposition of martial law and communist military dictatorship during a political crisis in Poland. Were the LCY and civilian government unable to solve longstanding problems, the YPA might be seen as the last effective, cohesive force in Yugoslavia, intervening in politics to ensure the survival of the state. A military coup against the LCY was considered unlikely, however, because the YPA was too well integrated into the LCY and the process of government. The interests of the two organizations were more parallel than contradictory. The YPA was, to an extent, the party in uniform. If it acted to rescue party rule, it would actually be demonstrating LCY impotence and further undermining LCY legitimacy.

Data as of December 1990

Yugoslavia - TABLE OF CONTENTS

  • National Security

  • Go Up - Top of Page

    Make allRefer Reference your HomepageAdd allRefer Reference to your FavoritesGo to Top of PagePrint this PageSend this Page to a Friend


    Information Courtesy: The Library of Congress - Country Studies


    Content on this web site is provided for informational purposes only. We accept no responsibility for any loss, injury or inconvenience sustained by any person resulting from information published on this site. We encourage you to verify any critical information with the relevant authorities.

     

     

     
     


    About Us | Contact Us | Terms of Use | Privacy | Links Directory
    Link to allRefer | Add allRefer Search to your site

    ©allRefer
    All Rights reserved. Site best viewed in 800 x 600 resolution.