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Yugoslavia Strategy and Tactics
Yugoslav military doctrine assumed an omnidirectional threat,
but its strategy and tactics presupposed a heavily armored and
mechanized Soviet or Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion, entering
from the northeast and driving southwest to split the country.
Major exercises were held every few years to test the doctrine in
action. Special attention went to coordinating combat actions
between YPA and TDF units.
Yugoslavia's defense strategies were circumscribed largely by
geography and the size and capabilities of its forces
(see
fig. 15). However, military leaders believed their strategy and
tactics to be appropriate and viable, and their manpower and
equipment to be sufficient to defend against anticipated threats.
Also, the experience of the wartime Partisans proved the
feasibility of TDF for national defense.
The events of 1968 changed the previously exclusive emphasis
on a regular army, conventional war, and the defense of strategic
areas in the north of Yugoslavia. The developed northern part of
the country was recognized as virtually indefensible. The major
cities, industries, and communications networks situated on the
Danubian plain would be easy strategic targets for a potential
attacker, as such assets were in the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
TND doctrine required the YPA to blunt or at least slow an
enemy invasion in the north. While conventional forces fought
defensive actions along a nationwide front, one to three million
citizen-soldiers would mobilize in TDF units. Small TDF units
would engage alongside beside regular troops in their local
areas, with TDF tactics emphasizing mobility and light
antipersonnel and antiarmor weapons. The terrain would become
increasingly favorable to the defenders as fighting shifted from
the Danubian plain to the less developed mountainous and forested
areas of the Adriatic littoral and southern Yugoslavia. On this
terrain the tanks, mechanized infantry, and self-propelled
artillery of a superior enemy force would be less effective.
When possible, TDF units would coordinate their actions with
the YPA. This coordination was practiced in several major
nationwide maneuvers in the 1970s and 1980s. The TDF units also
were capable of continuing action independently under local
commanders. According to doctrine, the TDF would resort
ultimately to protracted guerrilla warfare against an invading
force to turn the blitzkrieg into a costly and lengthy
occupation. Independent TDF units would attack occupying forces
in as many places as possible and carry out harassing actions,
ambushes, and sabotage behind enemy lines. Yugoslav military
authorities believed that, based on current estimates of relative
military power and the Partisan experience of World War II, two
million enemy troops would be required to subjugate the country.
Such a commitment would deter a potential aggressor from invading
Yugoslavia while managing other strategic requirements.
Data as of December 1990
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