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China Post-Mao Development
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress
Central Committee in December 1978 officially made the Four
Modernizations basic national policy and reemphasized the
importance of intellectuals in achieving them. The policy of
"seeking truth from facts" was stressed, and scholars and
researchers were given freer rein to pursue scientific research.
Most mainstream intellectuals were content to avoid political
involvement and to take on the role of scholar- specialists within
their spheres of competence, with the understanding that as long as
they observed the four cardinal principles--upholding socialism,
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the party,
and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought--they would be permitted to
conduct their research with minimal bureaucratic interference. This
was accomplished more easily in the natural sciences, which are
generally recognized as apolitical, than in the social sciences,
humanities, and the arts.
The first serious challenge to the more tolerant policy toward
intellectuals came in 1980, as conservative ideologues in the
military and the party stepped up their calls to combat "bourgeois
liberalization," a loosely defined appellation for any writing or
activity believed to stretch the limits of the four cardinal
principles. By early 1981 opposition to "bourgeois liberalization"
was focused on Bai Hua, a writer with the Political Department of
what was then the Wuhan Military Region. Bai had long been a strong
advocate for relaxation of cultural and social policy, but what
especially alarmed the guardians of cultural orthodoxy was his
screenplay "Bitter Love," which depicted the frustrated patriotism
of an old painter who faces misunderstanding and ill-treatment when
he returns to China from the United States. When the screenplay
first appeared in a nationally circulated literary magazine in the
fall of 1979, it caused little stir. The motion picture version
however, which was shown to selected officials, drew strong
censure. A commentary in the April 18, 1981, issue of Jiefangjun
Bao (Liberation Army Daily) accused Bai Hua of violating the
four cardinal principles and described the screenplay as an example
of "bourgeois liberalism." The commentary was reprinted in the next
month's issue of Jiefangjun Wenyi (Liberation Army
Literature and Art), along with other articles critical of "Bitter
Love." Over the next few months the criticism was taken up by most
civilian newspapers, and acting minister of culture, Zhou Weizhi,
singled out "Bitter Love" for attack in a speech delivered to the
Twentieth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress Standing
Committee in September. Finally, Bai Hua yielded to the ostracism
and wrote a letter of self-criticism addressed to Jiefangjun
Bao and Wenyibao (Literary Gazette), in which he
apologized for a "lack of balance" in "Bitter Love" and for failing
to recognize the power of the party and the people to overcome
obstacles in Chinese society. Bai Hua was out of public view for
the next year but remained active, writing four short stories in
the period. In January 1983 he was invited by the Ministry of
Culture to participate in a Shanghai conference on film scripts,
and in May of that year the Beijing People's Art Theater presented
his new historical play, "The King of Wu's Golden Spear and the
King of Yue's Sword," thought by many to be a veiled criticism of
Mao Zedong and perhaps even of Deng Xiaoping. Although the "Bitter
Love" controversy caused considerable anxiety in the intellectual
community, it is as noteworthy for what it did not do as for what
it did do. Unlike previous campaigns in which writers and all of
their works were condemned, criticism in this case focused on one
work, "Bitter Love." Neither Bai Hua's other works nor his
political difficulties in the 1950s and 1960s were part of the
discussion. In fact, as if to emphasize the limited nature of the
campaign, at its height in May 1981 Bai was given a national prize
for poetry by the Chinese Writers' Association.
After a mild respite in 1982 and most of 1983, "antibourgeois
liberalism" returned in full force in the short-lived campaign
against "spiritual pollution" launched by a speech given by Deng
Xiaoping at the Second Plenum of the Twelfth National Party
Congress Central Committee in October 1983. In the speech, Deng
inveighed against advocates of abstract theories of human nature,
"bourgeois humanitarianism," "bourgeois liberalism," and socialist
alienation, as well as the growing fascination in China with
"decadent elements" from Western culture. Conservatives, led by
Political Bureau member Hu Qiaomu and party Propaganda Department
head Deng Liqun, used the campaign in an effort to oppose those
aspects of society that they disliked. The campaign soon was out of
control and extended to areas beyond the scope that Deng Xiaoping
had intended, raising fears at home and abroad of another Cultural
Revolution.
Because of the campaign against spiritual pollution,
intellectuals (including scientists and managerial and technical
personnel) and party and government cadres were hesitant to take
any action that could expose them to criticism. Peasants, whose
production had greatly increased under the responsibility system
adopted in 1981, felt uncertain about the future course of central
policy
(see Post-Mao Policies
, ch. 6). Because of this, many of
them returned their specialized certificates and contracts to local
authorities, sold their equipment, and lowered production targets.
Many ordinary citizens, especially the young, resented the sudden
interference in their private lives. Foreign businessmen and
government leaders expressed serious reservations about the
investment climate and China's policy of opening to the world.
Because of these adverse results, the central leadership
reevaluated the campaign and limited it to theoretical, literary,
and artistic circles and did not permit it to extend to science and
technology, the economy, or rural areas. All ideological,
theoretical, literary, and artistic issues were to be settled
through discussion, criticism, and self-criticism, without
resorting to labeling or attacks. By January 1984 the campaign
against spiritual pollution had died out, and attention was once
more turned to reducing leftist influence in government and
society.
Following the campaign's failure, and perhaps because of it,
the position and security of intellectuals improved significantly.
In 1984 the party and government turned their attention to
promoting urban economic reforms. A more positive approach to
academic and cultural pursuits was reflected in periodic
exhortations in the official press calling on the people to support
and encourage the building of "socialist spiritual civilization,"
a term used to denote general intellectual activity, including
ethics and morality, science, and culture.
Writers and other intellectuals were heartened by a speech
delivered by Hu Qili, secretary of the party Secretariat, to the
Fourth National Writers' Congress (December 29, 1984, to January 5,
1985). In the speech, Hu decried the political excesses that
produced derogatory labels and decrees about what writers should
and should not write and called literary freedom "a vital part of
socialist literature." But as writers began to test the limits of
the free expression called for by Hu Qili, they were reminded of
their "social responsibilities," a thinly veiled warning for them
to use self-censorship and to remain within the limits of free
expression.
These limits, still poorly defined, were tested once again when
Song Longxian, a young researcher at Nanjing University, using the
pseudonym Ma Ding, published an article entitled "Ten Changes in
Contemporary Chinese Economic Research" in the November 2, 1985,
issue of the trade union paper Gongren Ribao (Workers'
Daily). The article urged a pragmatic approach to economic theory
and sharply attacked much previous economic research. A somewhat
toned-downed version was republished in a subsequent issue of
Beijing Review, a weekly magazine for foreign readers, and
immediately became the center of a controversy continuing well into
1986. Ma Ding's supporters, however, far outnumbered his critics
and included some important government officials. In May 1986 the
editor of Gongren Ribao, writing in another economic
journal, summed up the controversy. He termed the criticism of the
article of far greater significance than the article itself and
commended the "related departments" for handling the "Ma Ding
incident very prudently" and "relatively satisfactorily," but he
expressed the hope that "more people in our country, particularly
leaders," would join in "providing powerful protection to the
theoretical workers who are brave enough to explore."
In 1986 there were numerous calls for a new Hundred Flowers
Campaign, and there were indications that these calls were being
orchestrated from the top. At a May 1986 conference to commemorate
the thirtieth anniversary of the original Hundred Flowers Campaign,
Zhu Houze, new head of the party's Propaganda Department, sounded
the keynote when he said, "Only through the comparison and
contention of different viewpoints and ideas can people gradually
arrive at a truthful understanding. . . ." Qin Jianxian, editor of
Shijie Jingji Daobao (World Economic Journal), carried this
theme further when he called for "unprecedented shocks to
political, economic, and social life as well as to people's ideas,
spiritual state, lifestyle, and thinking methods." In a July 1986
interview with Beijing Review, Wang Meng, the newly
appointed minister of culture, held out great expectations for a
new Hundred Flowers Campaign that he said "could arouse the
enthusiasm of writers and artists and give them the leeway to
display their individual artistic character." During the summer of
1986, expectations were raised for a resolution to come out of the
Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth National Party Congress Central
Committee in September, a resolution that General Secretary Hu
Yaobang promised would have a "profound influence on the
development of spiritual civilization." The actual document,
however, was a watered-down compromise that fell far short of
expectations. It became clear that intellectual policy is not a
matter to be easily resolved in the short-term but requires lengthy
debate.
Data as of July 1987
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