Egypt INTRODUCTION
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Egypt, 1990
Source: Based on information from Gazetteer of Egypt,
Washington, August 1987, v.
OCCUPYING A FOCAL GEOGRAPHIC bridge linking Africa and Asia,
contemporary Egypt is the inheritor of a civilization dating back
more than 6,000 years. The unification of Upper Egypt and Lower
Egypt in the third millennium B.C. required the development of
administrative and religious structures, and the monuments that
remain demonstrate the mathematical, astronomical, and
architectural skills attained in constructing rock tombs,
temples, and pyramids--the latter dedicated to the divine kings,
the pharaohs.
Egypt's strategic location has made it the object of numerous
conquests: by the Ptolemies, Romans, Greeks, Arabs, Fatimids,
Mamluks, Ottomans, and Napoleon Bonaparte. The most recent
conquerors, the British, granted Egypt partial independence in
1922 and withdrew completely in 1954. Of these foreign rules, the
Arab Muslim conquest, by its arabization and Islamization, had
the greatest impact on Egyptian life and culture, resulting in
the rapid conversion of the overwhelming majority of the
population to Islam and the spread of Sunni Muslim religious and
educational institutions. Shia Islam, represented by the Fatimid
conquest in 969, led to the founding the same year of Al Azhar,
later transformed into a Sunni theological school, and in the
1990s still regarded as the outstanding interpreter of Islamic
religious law (sharia).
The rule of Muhammad Ali (1805-48), an Albanian officer in
the army of the Ottoman sultan, who succeeded in detaching Egypt
from Ottoman control, represented another major influence on
Egypt's history. Muhammad Ali encouraged the development of
agriculture, by introducing long-staple cotton as a major crop;
by expanding Egypt's infrastructure through a network of canals,
irrigation systems, and roads; and by promoting secular
education. His efforts to create a manufacturing sector failed,
however, in part because Britain's tariff policies were designed
to favor the import of raw materials to be processed in Britain.
For contemporary Egypt, the Free Officers' 1952 Revolution,
spearheaded by Gamal Abdul Nasser, has clearly been the formative
event. Nasser's charismatic leadership institutionalized the role
of the military and created an authoritarian state that pursued
goals of "Arab socialism." These goals centered on the
implementation of agrarian reform, nationalization of key
industries, a one-party state (the Arab Socialist Union--ASU)
domestically, and closer ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe internationally. Major events of Nasser's regime included
the construction of the Aswan High Dam with Soviet aid; the take-
over of the Suez Canal in 1956, which led to the 1956 War and the
British-French-Israeli Tripartite Invasion of the Sinai Peninsula
(also known as Sinai); and the short-lived Egyptian-Syrian union
as the United Arab Republic (1958-61). Egyptian participation in
the June 1967 War with Israel resulted in Egypt's loss of the
Gaza Strip and Sinai and the so-called War of Attrition along the
Suez Canal in 1969-70.
Nasser's death brought to office his vice president, Anwar as
Sadat, also a military man but more conservative in political
outlook than his predecessor. Sadat's rule has been characterized
as patriarchal, a return to a traditional method of government
that relied on clientelism. Sadat demilitarized the state in
favor of the bourgeoisie and opened Egypt to capitalism and to
the West through the
infitah (opening or open door; see Glossary)
in 1974. Sadat also moved toward some democratization
and constitutionalism, represented by the Constitution of 1971,
which, however, concentrated power in the hands of the president.
Sadat's early successes in the October 1973 War with Israel made
him a popular hero and psychologically boosted the morale of
Egyptians. In an attempt to end the state of war with Israel,
Sadat journeyed to Jerusalem in November 1977; as a next step,
through the mediation of United States president Jimmy Carter, he
signed the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. These actions, however, and
Sadat's increasing repression of domestic opposition, resulted in
Egypt's being cut off from the rest of the Arab world and
ultimately led to Sadat's assassination by a Muslim extremist
group, Al Jihad (Holy War), in October 1981.
Husni Mubarak, Sadat's vice president, took over the
government and was initially regarded by many as an interim
president. He demonstrated a commitment to gradualism aimed at
modifying and preserving the best elements of his predecessors'
accomplishments while building domestic consensus, tolerating
opposition, promoting an equal partnership between the public and
private sectors, allowing greater democracy and
constitutionalism, and relying on technocrats for advice. In
addition, through skillful diplomacy he gained Egypt's return to
the Arab fold in 1987 and assumed a leadership role in the Arab
world. Simultaneously he maintained good relations with the West
and improved relations with the Soviet Union.
Mubarak's gradualism seemed to many observers a useful
leadership characteristic for contemporary Egypt. For example, he
strove to prevent the small but growing number of Muslim
extremists, sometimes referred to as fundamentalists, from
exercising disproportionate influence over the moderate body of
Muslims, who in November 1990 constituted approximately 90
percent of the country's population of about 56 million persons.
(In announcing the population figure, the Census Bureau stated
that the population has increased by 1 million persons in nine
months and seven days.) Although concerned about the intimidation
of Christian minorities, mainly Copts, at the hands of Muslim
extremists, as of mid-1991, the government has been unable to
prevent young Coptic Christians from acting on their own to
counter acts of violence against their religious centers and
property.
Since the 1952 Revolution, the government has appointed the
functionaries of mosques and Islamic religious schools. The
growth of Islamic political movements, especially the Muslim
Brotherhood, and of Islamic associations in universities resulted
in increased pressure on the government in the 1980s for
application of the sharia in legal decisions. Mubarak acceded to
the gradual application of the process.
The 1952 Revolution also expanded secular education, and from
1964 to 1974 the government was obliged by law to hire all those
with higher education degrees. The practice led to an overstaffed
and ineffective bureaucracy. The infitah ended this hiring
requirement, but by the mid-1980s unemployment among university
graduates was estimated to be as high as 30 percent.
The 1952 Revolution initiated free health care at public
health facilities. Although these services continued in the early
1990s, facilities often lacked adequate medical personnel. In
addition, a social security program was begun in the 1960s.
The 1952 Revolution had given priority to economic
development and had made the state the prime economic agent of
Arab socialism. The National Charter of 1962 clearly spelled out
the state's role. The role of the private sector, however, was
considerably enlarged by the infitah after the October
1973 War, and private-sector employees on average received three
times the salaries of government workers. Mubarak encouraged
private investment but funds flowed largely into the service
sector and agriculture rather than into industry, despite
government development plans (1982-86, 1987-91) designed to
promote the latter. The shortage of skilled personnel, especially
in the technical and industrial spheres, also had a major impact
on the economy.
Agricultural production had not benefited significantly from
the development process. By 1990, although production had shifted
away from concentration on long-staple cotton to such crops as
rice, fruits, and vegetables, self-sufficiency had fallen below
the 1960 level. Only approximately 3 percent of Egypt's land was
suitable for agriculture. Despite postrevolutionary land reforms,
increased mechanization, and land reclamation programs following
the construction of the Aswan High Dam--a program underway in
1991 involved 300,000
feddans (see Glossary) to be worked
jointly with Sudan--Egypt's agricultural output did not keep pace
with population growth. Although pricing reforms and the
elimination of government quotas for most crops helped increase
output, production remained insufficient. Part of the problem was
lack of proper drainage and consequent reduction of optimum
yields. In general, a major challenge facing Egypt was better
exploitation of its water resources, including exploration for
new underground water, particularly in the Western Desert, and
improved irrigation technology. Government development plans also
sought to promote generation of electricity and other energy
sources such as oil, gas, and coal as well as to improve further
the transportation network of roads, railroads, and canals and to
update telecommunications.
Egypt's major sources of foreign exchange used for
development projects and for needed imports were oil revenues,
Suez Canal tolls, tourism income, and workers' remittances from
the approximately 2.5 million Egyptians working abroad. Added to
these were capital grants from other Arab states after the
October 1973 War and, as well, economic and military grants from
the United States and loans from the Paris Club (the informal
name for a consortium of eighteen Western creditor nations) after
the conclusion of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel.
Egypt faced a serious economic situation in the late 1980s
and early 1990s: stagnation and ultimately negative economic
growth in addition to heavy indebtedness. After two years of
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary),
the Egyptian government finally concluded a
preliminary agreement in October 1990 that enabled it to
reschedule its US$18 billion debt to Paris Club members. The
agreement required Egypt to increase prices of certain basic
commodities such as gas, fuel oil, gasoline, electricity, flour,
and rice by eliminating or reducing subsidies. Mandated, as well,
were the devaluation and unification of the Central Bank exchange
rate and the exchange rate of commercial banks, raising of the
interest rate, and reforming of the foreign investment law. Egypt
also sought to promote privatization of the industrial public
sector--one of the recommendations of the
World Bank (see Glossary)--and
announced in October 1990 that it would establish
nine new industrial "free zones" to encourage investment and
create more jobs. Some officials recognized that, additionally,
the government needed to restructure management style in the
public sector and banking to encourage greater efficiency and
productivity. Another economic problem facing Egypt was rising
inflation, which between 1987 and 1989 had increased between 20
and 25 percent annually. In early 1991, inflation was estimated
to have dropped to 11 percent, but it nevertheless had a severe
impact especially on lower income groups.
Egypt also endeavored to improve its trade and financial
situation by concluding barter agreements that eliminated the
need to expend foreign currency. For example, in August 1990 it
reached a five-year agreement with the Soviet Union that was
worth ŁE5 billion, with other supplemental agreements to follow.
Egypt's economic situation became particularly critical in
1990 because of the Persian Gulf crisis. In October, before the
crisis developed into a war, the World Bank had calculated that
Egypt would lose US$2.4 billion in remittances from workers in
Iraq and Kuwait, US$500 million from the loss of exports to Iraq
and Kuwait, US$500 million from tourism, and US$200 million from
Suez Canal tolls. In addition, Egyptian minister of international
cooperation Maurice Makramallah estimated that Egypt would
require a further US$900 million to meet the needs of Egyptians
repatriated from Iraq and Kuwait. In early April 1991, after the
war, Egyptian officials announced that 700,000 Egyptians who had
worked in Iraq and Kuwait had returned home jobless. Estimates of
unemployment in early 1991 varied, with some figures as high as
20 percent, despite the approximate 684,000 visas issued to
Egyptians for work in Saudi Arabia after the Persian Gulf crisis
began.
The estimated costs did not take into account actual war
costs of sending about 38,000 Egyptian armed forces personnel to
Saudi Arabia and provisioning them. Saudi Arabia, which in
December promised US$1.5 billion, and Kuwait, together with
several European Economic Community (EEC) member nations, had
agreed to contribute to these costs and to the losses incurred by
Egypt's economy, but funds were slow in arriving. President
George Bush of the United States proposed in September that the
United States forgive Egypt its approximately US$7 billion
military debt because of Egypt's help in the Persian Gulf crisis;
Congress subsequently endorsed this proposal. This action
relieved Egypt of annual repayments amounting to more than US$700
million. Other countries such as Canada, several EEC member
states, the Persian Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia also forgave
Egypt's debt obligations. By early November 1990 the total debt
cancellation stood at about US$14 billion.
In subsequent action, Egypt sent a delegation in mid-April
1991 to the IMF requesting an eighteen-month standby agreement
and a loan. When United States secretary of state James A. Baker
III visited Cairo in March, he had promised that the United
States, grateful for Egypt's support in the war with Iraq, would
put in a good word for Egypt with the IMF. In mid-May the IMF
approved the standby agreement and granted Egypt a US$372 million
loan, but imposed certain additional conditions on the Egyptian
economy. The IMF agreement paved the way for Egypt to obtain
favorable terms from the Paris Club for its debt to member
countries. On May 25, it was announced that Egyptian government
debts would be reduced 50 percent and advantageous terms granted
on the remainder. In mid-June the World Bank agreed to an
additional US$520 million loan to Egypt.
Meanwhile, with regard to economic development Egypt signed
an agreement at the end of May 1991 with the African Development
Bank for a US$350 million loan to finance part of the Kuraymar
power station. This sum was supplemented by contributions of
US$100 million from the Arab Fund for Social and Economic
Development, US$100 million from the World Bank, and US$10
million from the Islamic Bank for Development. On July 10 the
Egypt Consultative Group, consisting of thirty countries and
institutions, pledged US$8 billion in aid to Egypt over the next
two years, more than twice the minimum Egypt had suggested. The
World Bank, which organized the group, stated that the donors had
determined on "massive support" for Egypt's reform program, which
it described as "daring" and "exhaustive." It estimated that
Egypt had lost approximately US$20 billion as a result of the war
in the Persian Gulf.
The endorsement of Egypt's policies represented by the action
of this World Bank-affiliated group was an encouraging sign. In
summary, however, Egypt's prospective economic situation depended
upon several factors: the successful implementation of the IMF
agreement, its capacity to promote itself as an investment and
financial center, its role in the region as well as its position
as a partner of the West, and perhaps most critically, its
ability to follow through on necessary economic reforms.
The role of government was prominent not only in Egypt's
economic life but also in other spheres, such as political
parties, parliamentary organization and elections, the judiciary,
and the military. The Constitution of 1971 validated a mixed
presidential-parliamentary-cabinet system with power concentrated
in the hands of the president, who had extensive opportunities to
bestow patronage, including the appointment of the prime
minister, and who could legislate by decree in emergencies.
Whereas the People's Assembly, the elected lower house,
theoretically could exercise a check on the president, in reality
this did not occur, and the assembly had no role in foreign
affairs or defense matters. The upper house, the Consultative
Council, was an advisory body created in 1980 when the Central
Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, then the only legitimate
political party, became the nucleus of the council.
Under Mubarak the People's Assembly acquired greater
authority over minor matters of state and more freedom of debate;
assembly committees also exercised an oversight role with regard
to cabinet ministers. The dominant political party remained the
National Democratic Party (NDP), which had succeeded the ASU, but
it was largely an appendage of the government. The new Electoral
Law in 1984 limited opposition seats in the assembly to parties
that obtained at least 8 percent of the vote, thereby eliminating
representation on the part of some of the small fringe parties.
In May 1990, however, Egypt acquired several new parties: the
Green Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, and the Young Egypt
(Misr al Fatah) Party became eligible to run for election. The
Supreme Administrative Court rejected, however, the application
for party status of the Nasserite Party on the ground that its
program was totalitarian. A similar request for party recognition
by the Muslim Brotherhood in January 1990 had been rejected
because the body had been formed on a religious basis.
In May 1990, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the
People's Assembly elected in May 1987 was invalid. It so ruled
because a 1986 amendment to the 1972 Electoral Law was judged
unconstitutional by reason of its discrimination against
independent candidates through use of the closed list system of
proportional representation, requiring selection of a single
slate. As a result, assembly legislation passed up to June 2
would stand, but new elections had to be held under the second-
ballot system, in which, if no individual received an absolute
majority, a run-off was held between the top two candidates.
Mubarak adjourned the existing assembly and called a referendum
for October 11 on whether the assembly should be dissolved. The
referendum resulted in new assembly elections called for November
29, with nine legal parties authorized to participate.
In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood and three of the major
opposition parties--the right-of-center New Wafd Party, the left-
of-center Socialist Labor Party, and the centrist Liberal Party--
declined to take part in the elections. They refused because of
amendments to the 1972 Electoral Law forbidding unified lists
(the Muslim Brotherhood had combined with the Socialist Labor
Party for election purposes) and preventing NDP members from
changing allegiance. Other reasons for the abstention of these
parties was the government's refusal to lift the state of
emergency or to allow judicial bodies to supervise the election.
As a result, in a very low voter turnout estimated at between 8
and 25 percent of those eligible, the NDP claimed to control 79.6
percent of the new assembly, with independents holding 19 percent
and the left 1.4 percent. The NDP percentage included, however,
ninety-five independents affiliated with the NDP, indicating that
party control was not as strong as it might seem. An
internationally known Egyptian political analyst has said that
the 1990 elections showed that local issues and loyalties counted
for more in party politics than political platforms and that
unless the NDP is separated from the government, Mubarak's desire
for reorganization of NDP structure in the interests of increased
democratization cannot occur. The November election was further
clouded by the October 12 assassination by Muslim extremists of
assembly speaker Rafat al Mahjub, constitutionally next in line
to the president.
The Persian Gulf crisis and the ensuing war resulted in
quandaries for various Egyptian parties other than the NDP. For
example, divisions occurred among Islamist groups with some
supporting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and others backing Iraq. The
Muslim Brotherhood decided to end its alliance with the Socialist
Labor Party and seek to gain party status of its own. The leftist
parties also experienced confusion, with some members of Tagammu
supporting each side in the Persian Gulf war.
Evidence of the greater role of constitutionalism was the
growing independence of the judiciary under Mubarak. Judges
increasingly defended the rights of citizens against the state.
The Ministry of Interior, however, often ignored court decrees.
On the foreign affairs front as well, Mubarak followed a
policy of gradualism. He continued the friendly relations with
the West established under Sadat but sought a more independent
course for Egypt. For instance, he improved relations with the
Soviet Union and rejected United States president Ronald Reagan's
proposal to take joint military action against Libya.
A number of events reflected Mubarak's growing confidence in
asserting his personal role and that of Egypt on the Middle East
scene. In September 1989, he proposed ten points to enable direct
Palestinian-Israeli talks on Israeli prime minister Yitzhaq
Shamir's election plan. The points included international
observers for the election, withdrawal of the Israel Defense
Forces from the balloting area, an end to Israeli settlement
activities in the
West Bank (see Glossary), and the participation
of East Jerusalem residents in the election. The Israeli Labor
Party endorsed the proposals, but the Likud government sharply
opposed them.
Egypt's more prominent role in the international sphere was
also reflected in Mubarak's April 1990 visits to various Asian
and European capitals: Beijing, Pyongyang, Moscow, and London. He
focused primarily on economic matters, seeking debt relief and
expanded export markets for Egypt. His purpose also included a
request for political action condemning Israel's settlement of
Soviet Jewish immigrants in the occupied territories and banning
weapons proliferation in the Middle East.
The major event affecting Egypt's relations with the Arab
world and the broader international sphere was clearly its
decision to side with Saudi Arabia and the United States in
opposing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Earlier
Mubarak had sought unsuccessfully to mediate between Iraq and
Kuwait. Egyptians were unsympathetic with Iraq despite the
presence there of nearly 1 million Egyptian workers because of
numerous instances of mistreatment of Egyptians by Iraq and
disenchantment with Saddam Husayn's Baath socialism and his
authoritarian actions. Mubarak's condemnation of Iraq's
occupation of Kuwait, therefore, was initially popular in Egypt;
as the crisis developed into war, however, popular support
appeared to wane somewhat although observers believed Egyptians
supported Mubarak's position approximately three to one.
Even before Iraq invaded Kuwait, its threats to that country
began producing a realignment in the Arab world. In mid-July
Syrian president Hafiz al Assad paid a historic visit to Cairo
after thirteen years of separation between the two nations; both
countries shared a concern about Iraq's growing bellicosity. The
visit led to the creation of a joint ministerial committee to
further cooperation in the economic, industrial, petroleum,
energy, agricultural, education, and information fields. (At the
beginning of April 1991, after the war, Mubarak and Assad met
again in Cairo and announced their opposition to breaking up
Iraq.) In mid-October Libyan president Muammar al Qadhafi visited
Cairo, as an aftermath of which a number of cooperation
agreements were also signed.
A further indication of the new alignment was the majority
vote in early September of League of Arab States (Arab League)
members to return Arab League headquarters to Cairo. Egypt had
been expelled from the Arab League in 1979 after signing the
peace treaty with Israel. Readmitted to the Arab League proper in
1989, Egypt had subsequently joined several League-affiliated
bodies such as the Arab Atomic Energy Organization and the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. The vote
indicated the split in the organization because only twelve of
the twenty-one members, those supporting the condemnation of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, sent their foreign ministers to the
Cairo meeting; representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Sudan,
Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, among others,
were conspicuously absent.
The rift was underscored by Egypt's announcement of its
decision in mid-September not to participate further in the Arab
Cooperation Council, a primarily economic body formed in 1989 by
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen,
prior to the May 1990 union of North and South Yemen). In
December Mubarak proposed the creation of a new Arab alliance
consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, presumably as a
replacement for the Arab Cooperation Council, and warned pro-
Iraqi Sudan that Egypt would act if Iraqi weapons were
transferred there.
Whereas it supported the United States, Egypt's stance in the
Persian Gulf crisis was a moderate one. It advocated the ouster
of Iraq from Kuwait, but in early November 1990, Mubarak sent
word to President Bush that sanctions should be given two to
three more months to work before any military attack on Iraq. In
a speech to the joint session of the People's Assembly and the
Consultative Council on January 24, 1991, Mubarak stated that he
had made twenty-six unavailing appeals to Saddam Husayn and had
eventually sent a force of 35,000 Egyptians to Saudi Arabia in
conformity with the provisions of the Arab Mutual Defense Pact
signed in 1950. Also in January, Mubarak sent Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ismat Abdul Majid to Washington with a message
indicating, among other points, that if Iraq withdrew from
Kuwait, Egypt considered Saddam Husayn's remaining in power
acceptable.
As the war was ending, Mubarak again addressed a joint
legislative session on March 3, 1991. He stated that Egypt was
prepared to help rebuild Iraq as well as Kuwait with Egyptian
labor and set forth a nine-point program, which he described as a
"pan-Arab appeal." The points included that there should be no
vengeance, that border disputes must be settled, that the Middle
East must be freed of weapons of mass destruction, that the Arab-
Israeli dispute must be settled, and that the basis for
participation of all Arab citizens in democracy should be
expanded. As time passed, however, Egypt became disillusioned by
the responses of Kuwait, particularly, and, to a lesser extent,
Saudi Arabia to Egypt's offers of manpower assistance. Egypt had
agreed to serve with Syria in a Persian Gulf peacekeeping force
proposed by the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council, in
accordance with the Damascus Declaration of March 6. Kuwait had
made public promises to grant contracts to Egyptian firms and to
hire Egyptian workers for its reconstruction efforts. It granted
minimal awards to Egypt, however, and implied that Egyptians were
fit only for menial labor. In addition, Kuwait indicated its
preference for United States rather than Egyptian troops on its
territory.
Informed observers believed that Mubarak's announcement on
April 8 that Egyptian forces would be withdrawn from the Persian
Gulf was the cumulative result of these factors. The United
States was shocked by Mubarak's decision and expressed its
displeasure to Kuwait, indicating that only a minimal number of
United States forces would remain in the area. As a result of
United States pressure, Kuwait modified its position, and Egypt
agreed in principle with United States secretary of defense
Richard B. Cheney to send peacekeeping and border patrol troops
to Kuwait. In mid-June the number of such troops remained to be
worked out, but Mubarak's visit to Kuwait on July 18 indicated
that relations between the two countries had improved. Other
evidence of improved Egyptian relations with all Arab states was
the unanimous election of Ismat Abdul Majid as secretary general
of the Arab League in May.
In the broader international sphere, Secretary of State Baker
paid several post-Persian Gulf war visits to Cairo in the first
half of 1991, and Egypt was among the first Arab states to
indicate its acceptance of the Baker plan for a twofold approach
to Middle East talks. The plan proposed that the United States
and the Soviet Union jointly sponsor an opening session to be
followed by direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab
neighbors. On July 19, in a further step toward easing Middle
East tensions, Mubarak proposed that Israel suspend the expansion
of settlements in the occupied territories, in return for which
the Arab states would end their economic boycott of Israel. Saudi
Arabia and Jordan soon afterward indicated agreement with this
proposal.
Mubarak's domestic policy has been summarized as one of
limited liberalization, limited Islamization, and limited
repression. These three factors all impinged on national
security, a sphere in which Mubarak emphasized the maintenance of
domestic stability, probably a more important concern after the
1979 peace treaty with Israel than external threats. Egypt had a
professional officer corps but a shortage of well trained
enlisted personnel, especially noncommissioned officers, because
of the attraction of higher paying civilian employment.
Conscripts, based on the 1955 National Military Service Law,
served for three years in one of the four services: army, navy,
air force, or Air Defense Force, or they might be assigned to the
police, prison guard service, or the military economic service.
Until the Persian Gulf crisis of late 1990-91, the last war in
which the armed services had seen action was the October 1973
War.
Egypt's defense spending was proportionately less than that
of most Middle Eastern countries, but it represented 11 percent
of gross national product
(GNP--see Glossary) in 1987, or 32
percent of total government spending. In addition, Egypt
benefited to a substantial degree from foreign military
assistance. From 1955 to 1975, this aid came primarily from the
Soviet Union, with the result that Egypt had much Soviet military
equipment in its inventory. From the signing of the peace treaty
with Israel in 1979 onward, the United States became Egypt's main
military supplier, and the orientation of the armed forces became
Western. Egypt's defense industry was the largest in the Arab
world, producing arms, ammunition, artillery, and other military
goods and assembling aircraft and armored vehicles for domestic
use or export to Third World countries.
With reference to internal security, the military were called
out to join the police and the paramilitary police, the Central
Security Forces (CSF), to suppress dissent when occasions
warranted. This occurred during the 1977 food riots and the 1986
riots by the CSF. The police and intelligence services kept a
watchful eye on rightwing Islamic groups, of which the Muslim
Brotherhood was the chief, but Al Jihad was one of the most
extreme--the organization's leader in Bani Suwayf in Upper Egypt
was killed in a riot in late June 1991. Left-wing factions were
kept under surveillance as well, although the Communist Party of
Egypt had been officially banned since the early 1950s. Former
Minister of Interior General Zaki Badr was responsible for the
arrest of as many as 20,000 persons charged with being dissidents
during his four-year tenure; this figure included arrests in
April 1989 of 1,500 persons accused of acts of Muslim extremism
against Christian churches and businesses. Moreover, human rights
organizations brought accusations of torture on a regular basis
against Egypt's internal security forces. Mubarak relieved Badr
of his post in early January 1990; his successor, General
Muhammad Abd al Halim Musa, stated that he considered the
opposition to be "part of the mechanism" of government. This
statement encouraged popular hope for a more liberal internal
security policy. Restrictions remained, however, and in September
1990, a group of Muslim activists and leftists was barred by the
government from traveling to Iraq and Saudi Arabia on a peace
mission.
Part of Egypt's internal security concern related to its
neighbor to the south, Sudan, which staged a massive pro-Iraqi
demonstration in Khartoum on January 19, just after the Persian
Gulf war began. Egyptian security forces had been keeping a
watchful eye on a number of Sudanese activists, and 500 of them
were rounded up and deported on January 23 as representing a
threat to Egyptian security. Although public demonstrations have
been outlawed in Egypt, about 2,000 Cairo University students
staged an antiwar demonstration on February 24, which Cairo
police broke up with tear gas. No serious injuries were reported.
The government's continuing concern over national security
was but one aspect of the problems posed by the Persian Gulf war.
The war had far-reaching political, economic, and diplomatic
implications for Egypt's future. In mid-July 1991, it remained to
be seen whether Egypt would continue to evolve democratic
political institutions, to reform governmental administrative
structures, and to promote economic reforms designed to further
agricultural and industrial development. Also in question was
whether Egypt could resume the position of Arab leadership it had
gained under Nasser, now that Syria's Hafiz al Assad was
reasserting his regional leadership role, and whether the
realignment resulting from the war would work in Egypt's favor.
July 23, 1991
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of December 1990
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