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Egypt Peace with Israel
In 1977 the outlook for peace between Israel and Egypt was
not good. Israel still held most of Sinai, and negotiations had
been at a stalemate since the second disengagement agreement in
1975. Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was a hard-liner and
a supporter of Israeli expansion. He approved the development of
settlements on the occupied West Bank and reprisal raids into
southern Lebanon. He also refused to approve any negotiation with
the PLO. After the food riots of January 1977, Sadat decided that
something dramatic had to be done, and so on November 19, 1977,
in response to an invitation from Begin, Sadat journeyed to
Jerusalem.
The world was amazed by this courageous move. The reaction in
Egypt was generally favorable. Many Egyptians accepted peace with
Israel if it meant regaining Egyptian territories. They were
tired of bearing the major burden of the confrontation and,
considering the sacrifices Egypt had already made, felt that the
Palestinians were ungrateful. Of the Arab countries, only Sudan,
Oman, and Morocco were favorable to Sadat's trip. In the other
Arab states, there was shock and dismay. The Arabs felt that
Sadat had betrayed the cause of Arab solidarity and the
Palestinians. In spite of Sadat's denials, the Arabs believed
that he intended to go it alone and make a separate peace with
Israel.
In fact, that is what happened. In December 1977, Egypt and
Israel began peace negotiations in Cairo. These negotiations
continued on and off over the next several months, but by
September 1978 it was clear that they were deadlocked. President
Jimmy Carter had become closely involved in the negotiations. In
an effort to break the deadlock, Carter invited Sadat and Begin
to Camp David. The negotiations were tense and almost broke down
several times. On September 17, however, Carter announced that
the Camp David Accords had been reached. They consisted of two
parts, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and
Egypt. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed on March 26,
1979. Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai within three years of
the treaty; normal diplomatic and trade relations were to be
established, and Israeli ships would pass unhindered through the
canal. Egypt, however, would not have full sovereignty over
Sinai. A multinational observer force would be stationed in
Sinai, and the United States would monitor events there.
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East was an elaboration
of the "autonomy" plan that Begin had put forward nine months
before. A "self-governing authority" was to be established for a
five-year transitional period, by the third year of which
negotiations would begin to determine the final status of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to conclude a peace treaty
between Israel and Jordan. Within one month of the ratification
of the treaty, Egypt and Israel were supposed to begin
negotiations for the establishment of the "elected self-governing
authority" in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They set
themselves the goal of completing the negotiations within one
year so that elections could be held "as expeditiously as
possible." These deadlines came and went, and by 1990 the
Framework for Peace had become a virtual dead letter. Begin made
his position perfectly clear: Jerusalem would remain undivided;
settlement would continue, and autonomy would never become
sovereignty. There would be no Palestinian state. On May 12,
1979, shortly before the autonomy talks were supposed to begin,
deputy Geula Cohen, a Zionist extremist, introduced a bill,
adopted by the Knesset, that declared Jerusalem to be Israel's
united and indivisible capital.
The Camp David Accords made Sadat a hero in Europe and the
United States. The reaction in Egypt was generally favorable, but
there was opposition from the left and from the Muslim
Brotherhood. In the Arab world, Sadat was almost universally
condemned. Only Sudan issued an ambivalent statement of support.
The Arab states suspended all official aid and severed diplomatic
relations. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, which it was
instrumental in founding, and from other Arab institutions. Saudi
Arabia withdrew the funds it had promised for Egypt's purchase of
American fighter aircraft.
In the West, where Sadat was extolled as a hero and a
champion of peace, the Arab rejection of the Camp David Accords
is often confused with the rejection of peace. The basis for Arab
rejection was opposition to Egypt's separate peace with Israel.
Although Sadat insisted that the treaty provided for a
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab
states and the PLO saw it as a separate peace, which Sadat had
vowed he would not sign. The Arabs believed that only a unified
Arab stance and the threat of force would persuade Israel to
negotiate a settlement of the Palestinian issue that would
satisfy Palestinian demands for a homeland. Without Egypt's
military power, the threat of force evaporated because no single
Arab state was strong enough militarily to confront Israel alone.
Thus, the Arabs felt betrayed and dismayed that the Palestinian
issue, the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, would remain an
unresolved, destabilizing force in the region.
Data as of December 1990
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