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Egypt October 1973 War
On February 4, 1971, Sadat announced a new peace initiative
that contained a significant concession: he was willing to accept
an interim agreement with Israel in return for a partial Israeli
withdrawal from Sinai. A timetable would then be set for Israel's
withdrawal from the rest of the occupied territories in
accordance with UN Resolution 242. Egypt would reopen the canal,
restore diplomatic relations with the United States, which had
been broken after the June 1967 War, and sign a peace agreement
with Israel through Jarring. Sadat's initiative fell on deaf ears
in Tel Aviv and in Washington, which was not disposed to
assisting the Soviet Union's major client in the region.
Disillusioned by Israel's failure to respond to his initiative,
Sadat rejected the Rogers Plan and the cease-fire.
In May 1972, President Nixon met Soviet president Leonid
Brezhnev, and Sadat was convinced that the two superpowers would
try to prevent a new war in the Middle East and that a position
of stalemate--no peace, no war--had been reached. For Sadat this
position was intolerable. The June 1967 War had been a
humiliating defeat for the Arabs. Without a military victory, any
Arab leader who agreed to negotiate directly with Israel would do
so from a position of extreme weakness. At the same time, the
United States and the Soviet Union were urging restraint and
caution. However, the United States refused to put pressure on
Israel to make concessions, and the Soviet Union, which had
broken off diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of the
June 1967 War, had no influence over Israel. Internally, the
Egyptian economy was being steadily drained by the confrontation
with Israel. Economic problems were becoming more serious because
of the tremendous amount of resources directed toward building up
the military since the June 1967 War, and it was clear that Sadat
would have to demonstrate some results from this policy. In the
last half of 1972, there were large-scale student riots, and some
journalists came out publicly in support of the students. Thus,
Sadat felt under increasing pressure to go to war against Israel
as the only way to regain the lost territories.
In retrospect, there were indications that Egypt was
preparing for war. On July 17, 1972, Sadat expelled the 15,000
Soviet advisers from Egypt. Sadat later explained that the
expulsion freed him to pursue his preparations for war. On
December 28, 1972, Sadat created "permanent war committees." On
March 26, 1973, Sadat assumed the additional title of prime
minister and formed a new government designed to continue
preparations for a confrontation with Israel.
Then on October 6, 1973, Egyptian forces launched a
successful surprise attack across the Suez Canal
(see War of Attrition and the October 1973 War
, ch. 5). The Syrians carried
out an attack on Israel at the same time. For the Arabs, it was
the fasting month of Ramadan, and for Israel it was Yom Kippur.
The crossing of the canal, an astounding feat of technology and
military acumen, took only four hours to complete. The crossing
was code-named Operation Badr after the first victory of the
Prophet Muhammad, which culminated in his entry into Mecca in
630.
On October 17 the Arab oil producers announced a program of
reprisals against the Western backers of Israel: a 5 percent
cutback in output, followed by further such reductions every
month until Israel had withdrawn from all the occupied
territories and the rights of the Palestinians had been restored.
The next day, President Nixon formally asked Congress for US$2.2
billion in emergency funds to finance the massive airlift of arms
to Israel that was already under way. The following day, King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia decreed an immediate 10 percent cutback in
Saudi oil and, five days after that, the complete suspension of
all shipments to the United States.
Israel was shocked and unprepared for the war. After the
initial confusion and near panic in Israel followed by the
infusion of United States weaponry, Israel was able to
counterattack and succeeded in crossing to the west bank of the
canal and surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. With the Third
Army surrounded, Sadat appealed to the Soviet Union for help.
Soviet prime minister Alexei Kosygin believed he had obtained the
American acceptance of a cease-fire through Henry Kissinger,
United States secretary of state. On October 22, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 338, calling for a cease-fire by all
parties within twelve hours in the positions they occupied. Egypt
accepted the cease-fire, but Israel, alleging Egyptian violations
of the cease-fire, completed the encirclement of the Third Army
to the east of the canal. By nightfall on October 23, the road to
Suez, the Third Army's only supply line, was in Israeli hands,
cutting off two divisions and 45,000 men.
The Soviet Union was furious, believing it had been doublecrossed by the United States. On October 24, the Soviet
ambassador handed Kissinger a note from Brezhnev threatening that
if the United States was not prepared to join in sending forces
to impose the cease-fire, the Soviet Union would act alone. The
United States took the threat very seriously and responded by
ordering a grade-three nuclear alert, the first of its kind since
President John F. Kennedy's order during the Cuban missile crisis
of 1962. The threat came to naught, however, because a UN
emergency force arrived in the battle zone to police the ceasefire .
Meanwhile, Syria felt betrayed by Egypt because Sadat did not
inform his ally of his decision to accept the cease-fire. Two
days after Sadat, President Hafiz al Assad of Syria accepted the
cease-fire as well.
Neither side had won a clear-cut victory, but for the
Egyptians, it was a victory nonetheless. The Arabs had taken the
initiative in attacking the Israelis and had shown that Israel
was not invincible. The stinging defeats of 1948, 1956, and 1967
seemed to be avenged.
The Israelis, however, paid a heavy price for merely holding
their attackers to an inconclusive draw. In three weeks, they
lost 2,523 personnel, two and a half times as many,
proportionally speaking, as the United States lost in the ten
years of the Vietnam war. The war had a devastating effect on
Israel's economy and was followed by savage austerity measures
and drastically reduced living standards. For the first time,
Israelis witnessed the humiliating spectacle of Israeli
prisoners, heads bowed, paraded on Arab television. Also, for the
first time captured Israeli hardware was exhibited in Cairo.
In Egypt the casualties included about 8,000 killed. The
effect of the war on the morale of the Egyptian population,
however, was immense. Sadat's prestige grew tremendously. The
war, along with the political moves Sadat had made previously,
meant that he was totally in control and able to implement the
programs he wanted. He was the hero of the day.
Negotiations toward a permanent cease-fire began in December
1973. In January 1974, Kissinger began his shuttle diplomacy
between Egypt and Israel. On January 18, the first disengagement
agreement was signed separately by Sadat and Golda Meir. A second
disengagement agreement was signed on September 1, 1975. The
agreement provided for a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai and
limited the number of troops and kinds of weapons Egypt could
have on the eastern side of the canal. Israel agreed to withdraw
from the Abu Rudays oil fields in western Sinai, which produced
small but important revenue for Egypt. Egypt also agreed not to
use force to achieve its aims, a concession that in effect made
Egypt a nonbelligerent in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the price
for its agreement, Israel extracted important concessions from
the United States. Kissinger's secret promises to Israel included
meeting Israel's military needs in any emergency, preserving
Israel's arms superiority by providing the most advanced and
sophisticated weaponry, and pledging not to recognize or to
negotiate with the PLO.
On June 5, 1975, the Suez Canal was reopened. This was a
great moment for Sadat, not only politically but economically,
because the canal provided Egypt with considerable revenues
(see Suez Canal
, ch. 3).
Data as of December 1990
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