Egypt SECURITY CONCERNS AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES
United Nations Emergency Force and Israeli officers meeting
with beduins in southern Sinai Peninsula, 1975
Courtesy United Nations, Y. Nagata
After the disengagement agreement of 1974, the threat of an
Israeli attack on Egypt diminished significantly, and a second
disengagement agreement was concluded in 1975. In 1979 Egypt and
Israel signed a treaty of peace under which Israel agreed to
withdraw its forces in stages from the Sinai Peninsula, further
reducing the likelihood of a new conflict between the two
countries.
Nevertheless, Egypt's experience of four wars with Israel
continued to shape the thinking of Egyptian military planners. In
1986 Egyptian commander in chief Abdul Halim Abu Ghazala asserted
that Israel still embraced a strategy of maintaining military
strength superior to that of all of its neighbors combined. Egypt's
policy, he declared, was to "neutralize" this strength so that it
could not be used for aggressive purposes threatening the security
of the Arab states.
A chain of Egyptian fortifications east of the Suez Canal was
manned by the equivalent of about one-half of a mechanized
division, which was less than Egypt was permitted under the peace
treaty. Annual military exercises practiced reinforcement of Sinai
by the five Egyptian divisions that could be quickly deployed
across the canal. Egyptian deployments in the area had a defensive
character, however, and their forces west of the canal occupied
permanent bases that had existed for many years.
In addition to its concern about Israel, Egypt's 1,000-
kilometer border with Libya remained a problem for Egyptian defense
planners in 1990 despite a campaign of reconciliation by Libya's
leader, Muammar al Qadhafi. Egypt believed that Qadhafi had amassed
a stockpile of Soviet weaponry beyond any foreseeable defensive
needs and was seeking additional advanced weaponry, including
Soviet MiG-29 combat fighters and medium-range missiles. Libya had
an estimated 40,000 troops backed by modern tanks, missiles, and
combat planes at air bases adjacent to the Egyptian-Libyan border.
Although Qadhafi announced in May 1988 that all combat forces would
be pulled back from the border, the Egyptian minister of defense
claimed in 1989 that a major part of the Libyan army was still
deployed along the border zone.
Sudan, Egypt's neighbor to the south, presented no direct
military problem for Egypt. The border between the two countries
was unguarded except for policing to prevent smuggling and drug
trafficking. Because the two countries shared a long cultural and
political history, Egypt regarded Sudanese territory as providing
added depth to the country's strategic defenses. Egypt was
reportedly concerned about the coup in Sudan in June 1989 that
brought to power a group of military officers identified with
Islamism. The deterioration of Sudan's economy and internal
security, accentuated by the mismanagement of the military junta,
posed the danger of instability on Egypt's southern flank.
Egypt's role in Sudan was linked to its general policy
promoting African regional stability and moderation. Egypt provided
military assistance and advisers to Nigeria, Somalia, and Zaire and
focused on Africa in marketing the products of its defense
industry. Egypt sold arms to African nations that agreed to use
them only for national defense rather than for domestic control
over their citizens.
Egypt believed that the Red Sea was of vital interest to the
country's strategic objectives because this body of water was
closely associated with the security of the Suez Canal. Egypt
believed, moreover, that any threats to the security of the nations
surrounding the Persian Gulf or on the Arabian Peninsula could
signal a threat to its own security. Against threats from Iran,
Egypt had pledged its support to the states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Egypt also expressed a willingness
to play a larger role in the Persian Gulf through the provision of
military advice, training, and sales of arms and equipment. Egypt
chose, however, not to participate in a joint Arab force, which had
been proposed to protect the GCC states against Iran. Egypt
provided large quantities of arms to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War,
and thousands of Egyptians were working in Iraq.
Data as of December 1990
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