Egypt FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
United States Army M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
maneuver in the Egyptian desert during Exercise Bright Star, 1987.
Courtesy United States Department of Defense
Between 1955 and 1975, the Egyptian armed forces depended
heavily on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided Egypt with
grants and loans to pay for equipment, training, and the services
of large numbers of military advisers. The Soviets initially
supplied outmoded equipment from surplus stocks to help Egypt
replenish its forces after the 1956 War, but in the early 1960s,
the Soviet Union began furnishing up-to-date MiG-21 fighter
aircraft, SA-2 SAMs, and T-54 tanks. The Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic (East Germany) supplied large numbers of
trainers and technicians, and Egypt sent many of its officers to
Soviet military institutions to learn new organizational and
strategic doctrines.
Egypt's defeat in the June 1967 War deepened the Soviet Union's
involvement in Egypt's military
(see War of Attrition and the October 1973 War
, this ch.). By the early 1970s, the number of
Soviet personnel in Egypt had risen to nearly 20,000. They
participated in operational decisions and served at the battalion
and sometimes even company levels.
Soviet advisers' patronizing attitudes, Moscow's slow response
to requests for more sophisticated equipment, and Cairo's desire
for more freedom in preparing for a new conflict were considered by
observers as some of the reasons for Sadat's decision to expel most
Soviet military personnel in July 1972. The Soviets continued to
provide equipment, spare parts, and replacements for equipment lost
during the October 1973 War, but Sadat was becoming increasingly
disenchanted with Egypt's reliance on Soviet weaponry. In March
1976, Sadat asked the People's Assembly to abrogate the 1971
Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
After Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty in 1979, the
United States strove to increase deliveries of armaments to Egypt
and to provide the country with American military advisers and
training. By 1989 this aid averaged US$1.3 billion a year and had
totaled more than US$12 billion. Egypt was the second largest
recipient of United States military aid after Israel, which
received US$1.8 billion annually. The United States supplied a
number of major weapons systems, including F-4 and F-16 fighter
aircraft, C-130 transports, E-2c Hawkeye electronic surveillance
aircraft, M60A3 tanks, M-113A2 APCs, I-Hawk antiaircraft missile
batteries, and improved TOW antitank missiles. The United States
military assistance program for FY 1990 included initial funding
for M1A1 tank coproduction, attack helicopters, and equipment to
enhance command, control, and communications systems. Under the
concurrent military education and training program of US$1.7
million for FY 1990, 174 Egyptian military personnel would receive
training.
The United States stationed 1,200 military personnel in Egypt
as of mid-1989. The presence of a large number of United States
advisers in Egypt was a source of some political friction. The
United States planned gradually to reduce the number in conjunction
with the long-term Egyptian goal of self-sufficiency.
Starting in 1981, the United States and Egypt had held joint
military exercises every other year under the name of Operation
Bright Star. The two countries conducted the largest of these
maneuvers near the Suez Canal in 1987 with 9,000 ground, air, and
sea personnel from each country. In alternate years, the two
countries also held combined air and sea exercises.
In 1981 Egypt agreed to allow the United States Rapid
Development Force (currently called the United States Central
Command) to use Egypt's base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea in the
event that a friendly Arab nation needed help in repelling an armed
attack. Preparations were made to upgrade the base by installing
fuel-storage tanks, lengthening runways, and building barracks and
docks. In 1984, however, the project was shelved because of
disagreements over who would manage construction and because the
United States Congress insisted that Egypt provide a formal
guarantee of access to the base. Mounting distrust among the
Egyptian public over close strategic ties with the United States
was an underlying factor in abandoning the project. Egypt
nonetheless indicated that the United States would still have
access to the base if help were needed by a friendly Arab
government.
Egypt was indebted to the United States for about US$4.5
billion, incurred at high interest rates in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, for the purchase of military equipment. Beginning in
1984, the United States provided all of its military assistance in
grant form. The interest payments on the earlier debt amounted to
as much as US$600 million in a single year. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
helped Egypt maintain its initial payments, and in 1989 Egypt was
negotiating a rescheduling of the debt at lower rates with the help
of private banks
(see Debt and Restructuring
, ch. 3).
Although as of early 1990 the United States continued to be
Egypt's main supplier of military equipment, Egypt's policy of
diversifying its sources of weaponry led it to enter into
cooperative military relations with a number of other countries.
Egypt acquired much of its modern aircraft from France, in some
cases assembling them in Egypt. Egypt was engaged in a number of
coproduction projects with Britain as well and assembled the Tucano
primary trainer in cooperation with Brazil. Egypt acquired Chinese
versions of Soviet-designed aircraft and submarines. Although an
insufficient supply of replacement parts of the large arsenal of
outdated Soviet equipment continued to present a problem, Egypt
entered into a new understanding with the Soviet Union in 1986 to
permit resumption of a modest flow of parts. Moscow also agreed to
relax the terms of repayment of Cairo's military debt to the Soviet
Union--estimated to be between US$5 billion to US$7 billion--over
twenty-five years without interest. According to ACDA, the value of
arms transfers to Egypt between 1983 and 1987 amounted to about
US$7.8 billion, of which US$3.4 billion came from the United
States, US$1.6 billion from France, US$550 million from China,
US$340 million from the Soviet Union, US$270 million from Italy,
US$200 million from Britain, US$60 million from West Germany, and
the remaining US$1.4 billion from unidentified sources.
Data as of December 1990
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