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Egypt Army
The army has always been the largest and most important branch
of the armed forces. The army had an estimated strength of 320,000
in 1989. About 180,000 of these were conscripts. Before the June
1967 War, the army divided its personnel into four regional
commands. After the 1967 debacle, the army was reorganized into two
field armies--the Second Army and the Third Army, both of which
were stationed in the eastern part of the country. Most of the
remaining troops were stationed in the Nile Delta region, around
the upper Nile, and along the Libyan border. These troops were
organized into eight military districts. Commandos and paratroop
units were stationed near Cairo under central control but could be
transferred quickly to one of the field armies if needed. District
commanders, who generally held the rank of major general,
maintained liaisons with governors and other civil authorities on
matters of domestic security.
The army's principal tactical formations in 1988 were believed
to include four armored divisions (each with two armored brigades
and one mechanized brigade); six mechanized infantry divisions
(each with two mechanized brigades and one armored brigade); and
two infantry divisions (each with two infantry brigades and one
mechanized brigade). Independent brigades included four infantry
brigades, three mechanized brigades, one armored brigade, two air
mobile brigades, one paratroop brigade, and the Republican Guard
armored brigade. These brigades were augmented by two heavy mortar
brigades, fourteen artillery brigades, two surface-to-surface
missile (SSM) regiments, and seven commando groups. Each consisted
of about 1,000 men.
Although disposition of the forces was secret, foreign military
observers estimated that five Egyptian divisions were in camps west
of the Suez Canal while half a division was in Sinai. The Second
Army was responsible for the area from the Mediterranean Sea to a
point south of Ismailia; the Third Army was responsible from that
point southward to the Red Sea. The government deployed the armies
in this way partly because of a desire to protect the canal and the
capital from a potential Israeli invasion and partly because the
housing facilities and installations for the two armies had long
been located in these areas. The commander of the Western District
controlled armored forces supplemented by commando, artillery, and
air defense units (possibly totaling the equivalent of a reinforced
division) that were stationed at coastal towns in the west and in
the Western Desert (also known as the Libyan Desert) facing Libya.
Even though the Egyptian military became oriented toward the
West after the October 1973 War, it still had large amounts of
Soviet equipment in its arms inventory. As of 1989, an estimated
five of the twelve divisions and portions of other units had made
the transition to American equipment and order of battle. The stock
of main battle tanks consisted of 785 M60A3s from the United
States, together with more than 1,600 Soviet-made T-54, T-55, and
T-62 models. Some of these older Soviet tanks were being refitted
in the West with 105mm guns, diesel engines, fire-control systems,
and external armor. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) consisted of
1,000 M-113A2s from the United States, more than 1,000 BTR-50s and
OT-62s from the Soviet Union, and about 200 Fahds, which were
manufactured in Egypt based on a design from the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany). The army also had more than 700 infantry
combat vehicles that were manufactured by the Soviet Union and
Spain. Egypt also launched a program to increase the mobility of
artillery and rockets by mounting them on the chassis of tanks and
APCs.
The army possessed a variety of antitank rockets and missiles,
including older Soviet models, Egyptian rocket systems derived from
the Soviet ones, and Milan missiles from France, Swingfire missiles
produced in Egypt under British license, and TOW (tube-launched,
optically sighted, wire-guided) missiles from the United States.
The army mounted the TOWs and Swingfires on locally built jeeps. A
plan to add TOWs to Fahd APCs was still at the prototype stage (see
table 13, Appendix).
During the 1980s, the armed forces implemented a program to
improve the quality and efficiency of its defense system by
introducing modern armaments while reducing the number of
personnel. The army was expected to lose more personnel than the
other branches of the military. The army, however, had little
incentive to cut its enlisted strength because doing so would
further reduce the need for officers, who were already in excess of
available positions. Moreover, service in the army helped relieve
the nation's unemployment situation and provided some soldiers with
vocational training. Nevertheless, plans called for a reduction in
army strength by as much as 25 percent.
During each of the wars with Israel, the army had demonstrated
weaknesses in command relationships and communications. Under the
influence of Soviet military doctrine, higher commanders had been
reluctant to extend operational flexibility to brigade and
battalion commanders. Rigidity in planning was another shortcoming.
Commanders reacted slowly in battlefield situations; the system did
not encourage initiative among frontline officers. Prior to the
October 1973 War, the army made many improvements in the way it
prepared officers for combat. Moreover, the complex planning that
preceded the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the execution
of the initial attack demonstrated a high level of military
competence. Later, however, when Israel launched its counterattack,
the Egyptian high command reacted with hesitation and confusion,
enabling Israel to gain the initiative in spite of determined
Egyptian resistance.
Decision making in the army continued to be highly centralized
during the 1980s. Officers below brigade level rarely made tactical
decisions and required the approval of higher-ranking authorities
before they modified any operations. Senior army officers were
aware of this situation and began taking steps to encourage
initiative at the lower levels of command.
A shortage of well-trained enlisted personnel became a serious
problem for the army as it adopted increasingly complex weapons
systems. Observers estimated in 1986 that 75 percent of all
conscripts were illiterate when they entered the military and
therefore faced serious obstacles when trying to learn how to use
high-technology weaponry. Soldiers who had acquired even the most
basic technical skills were eager to leave the army as soon as
possible in search of higher-paying positions in the civilian
sector. By United States standards, the army underutilized its
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), many of whom were soldiers who had
served a long time but had not shown any special aptitude. Officers
with ranks as high as major often conducted training that would be
carried out by NCOs in a Western army. In a move to retain welltrained NCOs, the army in the 1980s started providing career
enlisted men with higher pay, more amenities, and improved living
conditions.
The Frontier Corps, a lightly armed paramilitary unit of about
12,000 men, mostly beduins, was responsible for border
surveillance, general peacekeeping, drug interdiction, and
prevention of smuggling. In the late 1980s, the army equipped this
force with remote sensors, night-vision binoculars, communications
vehicles, and high-speed motorboats.
Data as of December 1990
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