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Honduras Introduction
Unavailable
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Honduras, 1993
HONDURAS'S RUGGED TOPOGRAPHY and lack of natural resources
explain
much of its history and present-day underdevelopment. The
land has
been underpopulated since precolonial times; the great
civilizations of Middle America lay to the north, and
European
immigrants to the area were few in number because the
region lacked
mineral wealth and land suitable for farming. Extensive
mountain
ranges kept Honduras from being considered as a site for a
transisthmian canal in the nineteenth century. This
"rejection,"
however, brought the unexpected advantage of isolating the
new
nation from much of the international intrigue that
engulfed
Honduras's neighbors. Lack of large areas of flat land for
plantations also had an unanticipated result: Honduras
never
produced a powerful landholding oligarchy like those that
controlled the economies and politics of many of the
countries of
Central America, and as a result it has a more egalitarian
society
with a less rigid class structure than its neighbors.
Honduras has frequently been exploited by outsiders.
Neighbors
in Central America took advantage of Honduras's weakness
and
repeatedly intervened in Honduran internal affairs.
Countries
outside the region also manipulated Honduran politics from
time to
time to suit their own national interests. Intervention
and
manipulation were not limited to sovereign states. During
the first
half of the twentieth century, the Honduran economy was so
dominated by the export of bananas that foreign banana
companies
often exercised as much power as the national government.
Increased
nationalism and economic diversification have strengthened
national
institutions in recent decades, but Honduras remains a
nation
highly sensitive to and dependent on external forces.
Although Honduras is the second largest country in
Central
America, it has little land available for cultivation. The
terrain
for the most part consists of rugged mountains, with
narrow
coastal plains to the north and south. Rainfall is
abundant in the
Caribbean lowlands and on some of the north-facing
mountain slopes,
but most of the arable valleys are fairly dry. When viewed
from the
air, most of the landscape appears barren. Unlike the more
lush
mountain areas of Guatemala and southern Mexico, the
mountains and
dry valleys of Honduras have always been rather
inhospitable to
settlers.
Honduras lay at the southern edge of the advanced
civilizations
of pre-Columbian Middle America. One of the most notable
indigenous
groups was the Maya, whose civilization spread south from
the
Yucatán and Guatemala in the fifth century A.D. In what is
now
northwestern Honduras, the Maya built the major ceremonial
center
of Copán. For three and a half centuries, the city was one
of the
principal centers of Mayan culture and trade. Sometime in
the
ninth century A.D., Copán, as well as most other Mayan
cities, was
abandoned. The reason for this abrupt event continues to
puzzle
archaeologists. Theories of civil war, disease, drought,
overpopulation, and crop failure have all been proposed.
Whatever
the cause, the fall of the Mayan civilization apparently
affected
only the city dwellers. Although the priests and rulers
who built
the temples, inscribed the glyphs, and developed the
astronomy and
mathematics suddenly vanished, the peasants remained in
the area
and form a continuum of language and culture that exist to
this
day. European contact with Honduras began with
Christopher
Columbus in 1502, but little exploration or settlement by
Europeans
took place for the next two decades. Spanish conquistadors
and a
few settlers began arriving in the 1520s, but the area
soon became
a battleground for competing colonial authorities. The
population
of the area dropped precipitously as the indigenous
population was
nearly wiped out by new diseases, mistreatment, and
exportation of
large numbers of persons to other colonies as slave labor.
By 1539
only an estimated 15,000 native people remained under
Spanish
control; two years later this figure had declined to
8,000. Most of
the indigenous inhabitants were organized into
encomiendas,
a system that left the native people as vassals in their
villages
under the control of individual Spanish settlers.
The colony began to grow in the 1540s as a variety of
agricultural activities developed and limited gold and
silver
mining began. However, gold production declined in the
1560s, the
silver boom peaked in 1584, and economic depression
returned
shortly thereafter. By the seventeenth century, Honduras
had become
a poor and neglected backwater of the Spanish colonial
empire,
having a scattered population of mestizos (of mixed
European and
native ancestry), native people, blacks, and a handful of
Spanish
administrators and landowners. Cattle raising was the only
important economic activity, and much of the Honduran
interior and
Caribbean coast remained uncolonized and outside effective
Spanish
control.
The eighteenth century saw slow growth of the colony
as
agriculture diversified and grew and the central
government
increased its political control over the area. Conflict
over trade
policy, however, sparked a rivalry between Honduras's
principal
cities, León and Granada, a rivalry that eventually became
a blood
feud lasting for almost 200 years. In Spain, the Bourbons
assumed
the throne in the early years of the century, and the
revitalized
Spanish government made several efforts to wrest control
of the
Caribbean coast from the British.
In the early nineteenth century, Spanish power went
into rapid
decline. The Napoleonic wars created turmoil in Spain, and
the
Spanish colonies took advantage of this diversion of
attention and
resources in the motherland to establish themselves as
sovereign
nations. In 1821 the Central American provinces joined in
the
growing New World chorus by declaring their independence
from
Spain. After some initial debate over whether Central
America
should face independence alone, in early 1822 the Central
American
provinces declared their allegiance to Mexico.
The union with Mexico was brief. In 1823 the United
Provinces
of Central America broke free from Mexico. From its
inception,
however, the new federation faced a series of ultimately
insoluble
problems. Spanish rule had fostered divisions and local
suspicions
among the five provinces of the federation more than it
had
engendered any spirit of Central American unity. The
federation was
beset by constant political rivalry and fighting. Unable
to
maintain any form of central control, the federation
dissolved in
1838, and Honduras became a sovereign state.
The new nation emerged with a Spanish-indigenous
heritage that
survives intact to the present. Most of the population (an
estimated 90 percent in 1994) was mestizo. The dominant
language
and religion were, and still are, Spanish and Roman
Catholicism,
although evangelical Protestant groups have made many
converts in
the late twentieth century. The largest racial and
linguistic
minority continue to be not the native peoples, who were
almost
completely eradicated or assimilated, but English-speaking
blacks,
a legacy of early British control of the Caribbean coast.
The years after independence in the eighteenth century
were
neither peaceful nor prosperous in Honduras. The country's
weakness
attracted the ambitions of individuals and nations within
and
outside of Central America. Even geography contributed to
its
misfortunes. Alone among the Central American republics,
Honduras
shared land borders with its three potential rivals for
regional
hegemony--Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. This
national
rivalry was exacerbated by political divisions and civil
wars
throughout the isthmus, struggles that often crossed
country
borders. For a century and a half after independence,
Honduras was
ruled by dictators and subject to a constant series of
coups and
coup attempts. The combined impact of civil strife and
foreign
interventions kept Honduras in a position of relative
economic and
social backwardness.
The end of the nineteenth century and first decades of
the
twentieth century were a time of political and economic
change. The
peaceful transfer of presidential power in 1899 was the
first time
in decades that a constitutional transition had taken
place. But
1899 was a watershed year in another, even more important
sense. In
that year, the first boatload of bananas was shipped from
Honduras
to the United States. The fruit found a ready market, and
the trade
grew rapidly. The United States-based banana companies
constructed
railroad lines and roads to serve the expanding banana
production.
Perhaps even more significant, Honduras began to attract
the
attention of the United States government. Until the early
twentieth century, the United States played only a very
limited
role in internal Honduran political clashes. With its
investments
growing, however, the United States showed increased
concern over
Honduras's political instability. Although United States
marines
never occupied Honduras as they did neighboring Nicaragua,
the
United States frequently dispatched warships to waters
near
Honduras as a warning that intervention in Honduras was
indeed a
possibility if United States business interests were
threatened or
domestic conflict escalated.
From 1920 through 1923, there were seventeen uprisings
or
attempted coups in Honduras. Despite an international
conference
and various accords to promote stability throughout the
isthmus,
political strife in Honduras and its neighbors increased.
This
instability contributed to growing United States concern
over
Central America. Warships were again dispatched to the
western
Caribbean, and political aspirants and successive
governments in
Honduras were urged to honor constitutional provisions and
international agreements. The pressure by the United
States had the
desired result, and more stable governments were in power
from 1925
to 1931.
Political stability did not result in democracy,
however. From
1932 to 1954, the country was successively ruled by two
dictators--
Tiburcio Carías Andino and Juan Manuel Gálvez. Although
repressive
in rule, the two decades were a period of relative
political calm.
The administration of Carías sought to improve the
military and
engaged in a limited program of road building. His
successor,
Gálvez, continued Carías's policy of road building and
developing
coffee as an export crop; Gálvez also gave increased
priority to
education.
By the early 1950s, the economy had begun to diversify.
Although bananas were still the most important crop, other
agricultural products, such as coffee and cotton, became
significant export earners. For the first time in more
than half a
century, bananas accounted for less than 50 percent of
export
earnings at the end of the 1950s.
Politically, the period from 1956 to 1958 marked a
return to
the instability that had characterized Honduras in the
past. A coup
in 1956 ousted the elected president and marked a turning
point in
Honduran history. For the first time, the armed forces
acted as an
institution rather than as the instrument of a political
party or
of an individual leader. For decades to come, the military
would
act as the final arbiter of Honduran politics. An
election to
return the country to civilian rule was scheduled for 1957
and won
by a reformer, Ramón Villeda Morales. Although unhappy
with many of
his policies, the military allowed him to complete his
term. When
it appeared that another reformer, Ramón Ernesto Cruz,
might win
the 1963 elections, however, the military again seized
power and
installed General Oswaldo López Arrellano as president.
Growing
economic problems made the military regime increasingly
unpopular,
and except for a brief period in 1969 when the country
united
behind the military to fight the six-day Soccer War with
El
Salvador, pressure slowly built for a return to civilian
government.
An election was held in 1971, but after only nineteen
months in
power, the civilian president was again overthrown by the
military.
For a time, economic growth and land reform made the new
military
government popular. Toward the end of the decade, however,
the
economy again slowed, and rumors began to circulate about
governmental corruption and military involvement in
narcotic
trafficking. By 1978 it was clear that the military was
losing
control of the country. A coup in 1978 replaced the
military
president by a three-man junta, which promised to hold
elections.
A new constitution was drafted, elections were held, and
in January
1982, a civilian president was inaugurated.
The new constitution kept the basic form of government
Honduras
had had under its fifteen previous constitutions. A strong
president was to be elected by direct popular vote every
four
years. The National Congress, the unicameral legislature,
was
established with a varying number of members (128 in 1994)
elected
to four-year terms concurrent with the president. The
judicial
branch, theoretically independent of the other two, was in
reality
subject to pressure from the president and has often been
criticized for corruption and inefficiency.
Although democracy returned to Honduras in 1982, the
continued
underdevelopment of the country produced a crisis of
confidence in
Honduran society throughout the 1980s. Indeed during that
decade,
mounting economic and social pressures produced an acute
sense of
disorientation in Honduran society. The combination of a
worldwide
economic crisis, a sharp rise in crime, and the absence of
an
independent police force and judicial system left the
average
citizen with a pronounced sense of vulnerability.
Three presidents--Roberto Suazo Córdova (1982-86), José
Azcona
Hoyo (1986-90), and Rafael Leonardo Callejas
(1990-94)--had the
difficult task of consolidating democracy, appeasing the
military,
and spurring economic development, while insurgencies
raged in all
of Honduras's neighbors. A campaign against leftists in
the early
1980s led to frequent accusations of human rights abuses.
Extensive
military and economic aid came from the United States
during this
time, easing the effect of economic recession that
enveloped all of
Central America in the 1980s. The massive aid and presence
of
United States troops, however, evoked strong criticism
from
Honduran nationalists, as well as from many other segments
of
society, forcing the government to distance itself from
the United
States in the early 1990s.
Honduras's fourth democratically elected president
since the
return to democracy, Carlos Roberto Reina Idiáquez,
assumed power
in January 1994. Reina, the candidate of the Liberal Party
of
Honduras (Partido Liberal de Honduras--PLH), one of
Honduras's
traditional political parties, handily defeated Osraldo
Ramos Soto
of the more conservative National Party of Honduras
(Partido
Nacional de Honduras--PNH). The 62 percent turnout for the
elections was low by Honduran standards, however, and some
political observers attributed the low turnout to a lack
of
enthusiasm among the voters for either candidate. Analysts
also
indicated that although the 51 percent victory for Reina
appeared
to be a clear mandate, many of the voters cast ballots
against the
unpopular Ramos Soto rather than for Reina and his
policies.
During the campaign, Reina ran on a traditional PLH
platform of
antimilitarism and social reform. In addition, he called
for a
"moral revolution" to combat the widespread corruption
that many
felt permeated Honduran society and government. His clean
image and
calls for reform struck a sympathetic chord with the
electorate.
Reina was well known to Honduran voters--the
sixty-seven-year-old
lawyer was a lifelong politician who had been jailed in
the 1970s
for opposing policies of the military government, had
worked during
the 1980s for international human rights organizations,
and had
represented Honduras on the International Court of
Justice.
Economic problems were the first challenge to the new
president. Although the previous administration followed
strict
fiscal policies in its first three years in power, it went
on a
spending spree during its last few months. Inflation for
the first
two months of 1994 jumped to 16 percent, and the rapidly
deteriorating economic situation forced the Reina
administration to
act quickly. It devalued the
lempira (for value--see Glossary) from
US$1=6.2 to US$1=7.3 in February, froze the price of
forty-four basic foodstuffs for seventy days, and announced plans to
sell state enterprises.
In March 1994, Reina outlined his administration's
policies in his state-of-the-union address. Social programs,
especially those designed to lower the number of people living in poverty,
cut the infant mortality rate, and increase child nutrition
programs, would
be given priority. Although the overall budget was cut 10
percent,
social programs would increase to 35 percent of total
government
expenditures. Reina blamed many of Honduras's economic
problems on
corruption and urged the public and the nation's press to
join him
in his "moral revolution" to fight corruption at all
levels. He
vowed to rid the government of political appointees who
did little
work and promised to send a code of conduct for public
employees to
the National Congress for approval. Reina also promised to
reduce
the size of the armed forces and end the draft.
In the first step of his moral revolution, Reina
established a
new Ministry of the Public, charged with investigating
charges of
corruption. Independent of the government, an additional
responsibility of the Ministry of the Public was oversight
of the
Department of Criminal Investigation (Departamento de
Investigaciónes Criminal), created to replace the
much-criticized
National Directorate of Investigations (Directgorio de
Investigación Nacional), the special intelligence unit of
the armed
forces.
In April a bill was submitted to the National Congress
to end
the military draft. Military service had been a major
issue for
most Hondurans because of the way recruits were obtained.
Although
all Honduran men are required to serve two years, draft
lists were
commonly ignored, and recruits were obtained by forced
conscription
of young, usually poor, men off the streets. The armed
forces
commander in chief, Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, complained
that the
armed forces would lack sufficient personnel if the draft
(and the
press-gang technique of gathering new soldiers) were
abolished. In
a surprise move, however, the military announced it would
abide by
the National Congress's decision, and the measure was
eventually
passed.
Despite attempts to increase social spending, the
overall
economy continued to deteriorate throughout 1994. The
largest
problem, however, proved not to be government fiscal
policies but
rather a severe energy crisis. A nationwide drought
lowered the
level of water in the Francisco Morazán dam, the country's
principal source of electricity. The dam was producing
only half of
its 300-megawatt capacity in June after one of its four
generators
had to be shut down. Rotating blackouts of twelve hours
per day
crippled industrial production. Food and fuel prices were
increased
in the autumn to compensate for increased transportation
costs. By
the end of 1994, officials of the Roman Catholic Church
warned that
social unrest would increase if the economic crisis
continued to
deepen.
Although politically more stable than perhaps at any
other time
in its history, in late 1994 the country still faced
daunting
economic and social problems. The transportation and
communication
system was woefully inadequate for the nation's needs. Per
capita
income stood at US$650, one of the lowest figures in the
Western
Hemisphere. At least 40 percent of the total population
was
illiterate. Less than half the population completed
elementary
school. Health care for the rural population (about 50
percent of
the total) and much of the urban poor was practically
nonexistent.
Malnutrition and disease were widespread. And despite
government
calls for increased spending on social programs, stringent
budgetary measure presaged less, rather than more, money
for
government programs to improve health and education
facilities.
Given the grim social indicators, it is surprising that
Honduras
has managed to avoid, so far, the political violence that
has
plagued its neighbors with similar social problems. The
question
for Honduras in the future undoubtedly will be how best,
with its
limited resources, to deal with the growing pressures on
its
society while avoiding domestic unrest.
Tim L. Merrill
December 22, 1994
Data as of December 1993
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