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Honduras The Suazo Córdova Administration: Caudillo Politics in
the
Shadow of the Military
Suazo Córdova, a country doctor from La Paz, was a
veteran of
Honduran political infighting, but he lacked the kind of
experience
that might have prepared him for the internationalist role
he would
play as president of the republic. His initial approach to
the
question of Honduras's role in the growing regional crisis
appeared
to stress coexistence rather than confrontation. This
approach
reflected Honduras's historical passivity in regional and
international affairs and took into account the regional
balance of
power, which did not favor Honduras. As a result, Suazo
Córdova's
inaugural speech stressed the issues of self-determination
and the
administration's desire to remain neutral in the face of
regional
upheaval.
In keeping with this conciliatory approach, on March
23, 1982,
Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgardo Paz Barnica proposed a
peace
plan to the permanent council of the OAS. The plan was
based on the
following six points: general disarmament in Central
America, the
reduction of foreign military and other advisers (then a
real point
of contention with the Nicaraguan government),
international
supervision of any final agreement, an end to regional
arms
traffic, respect for delineated and demarcated borders,
and the
establishment of a permanent multilateral dialogue. The
proposal
met with little support from other Central American
states,
particularly Nicaragua.
Gradually, the Suazo Córdova administration began to
perceive
the FSLN (commonly referred to as Sandinista)
administration as
obstructionist in regional and international forums, as
well as a
subversive force that intended to undermine political
stability in
Honduras through intimidation, propaganda, and direct aid
to
incipient insurgent groups. The emergence of a consensus
on this
point within both the Honduran administration and armed
forces
coincided with a significant expansion of the United
States role in
Honduras, both as policy adviser and as purveyor of
military and
economic aid.
Brigadier General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, who assumed
the
position of commander of the armed forces in January 1982
(see Respect for Human Rights
, ch. 5) emerged as a hardliner
against the
Sandinistas. Álvarez publicly declared Honduras "in a war
to the
death" with Nicaragua; he believed such a war should be
conducted
under the auspices of a triple alliance among Guatemala,
El
Salvador, and Honduras. Some observers also believed that
Álvarez
had another aspect to his anticommunist strategy, namely
covert
domestic surveillance and extralegal executions.
Álvarez's training
in Argentina, where such "dirty war" tactics were common
in the
1970s, lent some credence to the charges of increased
disappearances and other less extreme forms of harassment
against
the Honduran left. Álvarez's main rival for the post of
armed
forces commander, Colonel Leónidas Torres Arias, the
former head of
military intelligence, had assumed an attaché post in
Buenos Aires,
Argentina, after losing the struggle for command. From
Argentina,
Torres proceeded to castigate Álvarez in the media,
charging that
the general operated a personal death squad. The Honduran
Committee
for the Defense of Human Rights appeared to confirm
Torres's
charges to some degree by reporting an increase in the
number of
political disappearances nationwide. According to foreign
observers, the total numbers in no way rivaled those
registered in
El Salvador or Guatemala; the increase, however, was
statistically
significant for previously tranquil Honduras.
Álvarez's strong-arm tactics drew criticism from some
observers,
particularly the foreign press and international human
rights
groups. At the same time, however, leftist subversive
activity did
expand in the early 1980s. Much of this increase was
attributed
directly or indirectly to Sandinista support for
like-minded
Honduran groups such as the PCH, the Lorenzo Zelaya
Popular
Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Populares
Revolucionarias-Lorenzo
Zelaya--FPR-LZ), and the Honduran Revolutionary Party of
Central
American Workers (Partido Revolucionario de los
Trabajadores
Centroamericanos de Honduras--PRTC-H). Beginning with
minor
bombings, these groups eventually progressed to
kidnappings and
hijackings
(see Domestic Human Rights Organizations
, ch.
5). The
most ambitious effort was that launched by a platoon-sized
unit of
Nicaraguan-trained PRTC-H members who crossed the border
from
Nicaragua into Olancho department in September 1983. A
rapid
response by Honduran troops isolated the PRTC-H column;
twenty-
three of the guerrillas surrendered, and another
twenty-six died in
the mountains, many of starvation and exposure. A similar
incursion
in 1984 also failed to strike a revolutionary spark among
the
conservative Honduran peasantry.
The perception of a genuine leftist revolutionary
threat to
Honduran stability enhanced Brigadier General Álvarez's
power and
heightened his profile both in Honduras and the United
States. The
resultant appearance of an imbalance of power between the
military
and the nascent civilian government called into question
the
viability of Honduras's democratic transition. Some
observers saw
in Álvarez a continuation in the long series of military
caudillos
who had ruled the nation since independence. A coup and
reimposition of direct military rule appeared a virtual
certainty
to those who doubted Honduras's affinity for any form of
democratic
government. Others, however, pictured Álvarez more in the
mold of
Argentina's Juan Perón--a military-based caudillo who
successfully
made the transition to populist civilian politics. Like
most
officers, Álvarez had ties to the PNH. Álvarez served as
president
of the Association for the Progress of Honduras
(Asociación para el
Progreso de Honduras--Aproh), a group made up mainly of
conservative businesspeople and PNH leaders. The initial
goals of
Aproh were to attract foreign investment and to block the
growth of
"popular organizations" (labor unions, campesino groups,
and other
activist groups) such as those that supported the FMLN in
El
Salvador. Aproh's acceptance of funding from the South
Korea-based
Unification Church proved controversial and generated
negative
publicity for both the organization and for Álvarez. The
general's
purportedly popular following, moreover, was suspect. He
seemed
much more comfortable and adept at high-level political
maneuvering
than at grassroots organization. Eventually, even his
support
within the armed forces proved to be inadequate to sustain
his
ambitions.
Although Álvarez had appeared ascendant by 1982, some
observers
described the political situation in Honduras as a
triumvirate:
Brigadier General Álvarez formulating national security
policy and
refraining from a direct military takeover of the
government;
President Suazo supporting Álvarez's policies in return
for
military tolerance of his rule and military support for
his
domestic policies; and the United States government
providing the
economic and military aid that helped sustain the
arrangement. Some
disputed the claim that Suazo was subservient to the
military by
pointing out the fact that the president refused to
increase the
budget of the armed forces. That budget, however, failed
to take
foreign military aid into account. The increase in United
States
military aid from US$3.3 million in fiscal year
(FY--see Glossary)
1980 to US$31.3 million in FY 1982, therefore, represented
a substantial expansion in the military's role in
government.
Álvarez strongly supported United States policy in
Central
America. He reportedly assisted in the initial formation
of the
Nicaraguan Resistance (more commonly known as the Contras,
short
for contrarevolucionarios--counterrevolutionaries
in
Spanish), arranged large-scale joint exercises with United
States
forces, and agreed to allow the training of Salvadoran
troops by
United States special forces at a facility near Puerto
Castilla
known as the Regional Center for Military Training (Centro
Regional
de Entrenamiento Militar--CREM)
(see United States Military Assistance and Training
, ch. 5). The latter action
eventually
contributed greatly to Álvarez's ouster in early 1984.
The other major factor in the Álvarez ouster was the
general's
attempt to streamline the command structure of the armed
forces.
Traditionally, a collegial board made up of field-grade
officers
consulted with the commander in the formulation of policy
for the
Honduran armed forces. Álvarez proposed to eliminate this
organization, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(Consejo
Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas--Consuffaa), and to
replace it with
a board of eight senior officers. The reorganization would
have
concentrated and enhanced Álvarez's power over the
military by
allowing him to name his most trusted commanders to a
leadership
board that would rubber-stamp his policy proposals. At the
same
time, the reorganization had promised to make the armed
forces
function more efficiently, an important consideration if
hostilities broke out between Honduras and Nicaragua.
Alvarez's view on involvement in Nicaragua led directly
to the
1984 rebellion by his officers. Most observers had
expected
Honduras to serve as one staging area for a United States
military
intervention in Nicaragua if such an operation took place.
The
flawed but successful Operation Urgent Fury on the
Caribbean island
of Grenada in November 1983 had seemed to increase the
likelihood
of military action against the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua.
Although Álvarez supported a military solution to the
"Nicaraguan
problem," a significant faction of the Honduran officer
corps held
divergent convictions. These more nationalistic, more
isolationist
officers saw Álvarez as subservient to the United States,
giving up
more in terms of sovereignty than he received in aid.
These
officers also resented Álvarez's posturing in the media
and his
apparent aspirations to national leadership. On a more
mundane
level, certain officers also feared that Álvarez would
force them
out after he had solidified his power base within the
officer
corps. The prospect of early, involuntary retirement, with
its
attendant loss of licit and illicit income, prompted a
clique of
senior officers to move against Álvarez on March 31,
1984, seizing
him and dispatching him on a flight to Miami.
The ouster of Álvarez produced a number of
repercussions both in
Honduran domestic politics and in Honduran-United States
relations.
The armed forces, which had appeared to be moving in a
more
activist and outward-looking direction under Álvarez,
assumed a
more isolationist stance toward regional relations and
United
States policy initiatives. Air Force Brigadier General
Walter López
Reyes, the new commander in chief, demanded further
increases in
military aid in return for Honduran cooperation in
regional
affairs. After some equivocation, López closed the CREM.
He also
scaled back Honduran-United States military exercises. On
May 21,
1985, President Suazo Córdova and United States President
Ronald W.
Reagan signed a joint communiqué that amended a 1982 annex
to the
1954 Military Assistance Agreement between the two
countries.
Although the new accord allowed the United States to
expand and
improve its temporary facilities at Palmerola Air Base
near
Comayagua, it generally limited Honduran cooperation in
comparison
to the terms of the 1982 annex.
By 1984 the armed forces under López began to exert
pressure on
the United States-backed Contra forces, the bulk of which
operated
from bases in the southern departments of El Paraíso and
Olancho.
Honduran foreign minister Edgardo Paz Barnica reflected
the new
attitude toward the Contras in January 1985, when he
announced that
the government planned to expel them from Honduras.
Although that
statement reflected bravado and frustration more than
reality, the
Honduran military took more active steps to pressure both
the
Contras and, indirectly, the United States government. In
February
1985, the armed forces ordered the Contras to close a
hospital that
they had set up outside of Tegucigalpa. The Hondurans also
ordered
the Contras to shut down an office that had been used to
receive
official visitors, mainly from the United States. Around
the same
time, Honduran troops turned back two United States
Department of
State employees from a planned visit to a Contra training
camp; the
troops told the Americans that they lacked a newly
required permit
to enter the area.
Data as of December 1993
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