Honduras FROM CONTADORA TO ESQUIPULAS: THE CRISIS ABATES
The Contadora Process
Although the crisis in Central America derived
primarily from
domestic pressures, the region's growing instability
during the
1980s had drawn the attention and intervention of numerous
foreign
actors, chief among them the United States, the Soviet
Union, and
concerned nations of Latin America. The Contadora
negotiating
process (named for the Panamanian island where it was
initiated in
January 1983) sought to hammer out a solution among the
five
Central American nations through the mediation of the
governments
of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. The
negotiations proved
arduous and protracted. By mid-1985, the talks had bogged
down. The
Nicaraguan delegates rejected discussion of
democratization and
internal reconciliation as an unwarranted intervention in
their
country's internal affairs. Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and
Costa Rica maintained that these provisions were necessary
to
ensure a lasting settlement.
Another major point of contention was the cessation of
aid to
insurgent groups, particularly United States aid to the
Contras.
Although the United States government was not a party to
the
Contadora negotiations, it was understood that the United
States
would sign a separate protocol agreeing to the terms of a
final
treaty in such areas as aid to insurgents, military aid
and
assistance to Central American governments, and joint
military
exercises in the region. The Nicaraguans demanded that any
Contadora treaty call for an immediate end to Contra aid,
whereas
all the other Central American states and the mediating
countries,
with the exception of Mexico, downplayed the importance of
such a
provision. In addition, the Nicaraguan government raised
objections
to specific cuts in its military force levels, citing the
imperatives of the counterinsurgency campaign and defense
against
a potential United States invasion. In an effort to break
this
impasse, the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and
Uruguay
announced in July 1985 that they would join the Contadora
process
as a "support group" in an effort to resolve the remaining
points
of contention and achieve a comprehensive agreement.
Despite the combined efforts of the original "core
four" nations
and the "support group," the Contadora process
unofficially came to
a halt during June 1986 when the Central American
countries still
failed to resolve their differences sufficiently to permit
the
signing of a final treaty draft. The United States
Congress's
approval of military aid to the Contras during the same
month
hampered the process, according to representatives of most
of the
mediating countries. Although the mediators vowed to
continue their
diplomatic efforts and did convene negotiating sessions
subsequent
to the unsuccessful June 6 meeting in Panama City, the
Contadora
process was clearly moribund.
After the Contadora process stalled, the regional
consensus of
opinion seemed to be that a streamlined, strictly Central
American
peace initiative stood a better chance of success than one
that
included countries outside the region. During the course
of the
Contadora negotiations, the Honduran government had sought
to
achieve an agreement that would settle the Nicaraguan
conflict in
such a way as to assure eventual reassimilation of the
Contras into
Nicaraguan society. At the same time, the Honduran
military had
sought to maintain its expanded relationship with the
United
States. Paradoxically, the Honduran government found
itself
espousing positions similar to those supported by its
traditional
adversary, El Salvador. As a new democracy, Honduras also
enjoyed
support from the government of Costa Rica, a more
established
democracy. The government of Guatemalan president Marco
Vinicio
Cerezo Arévalo established a more independent position,
but still
supported the concept of a diplomatic solution to Central
America's
troubles.
Data as of December 1993
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