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Hungary Principles of Foreign Policy
When superpower relations deteriorated in the early to
mid1980s , Hungary defined a role for small- and medium-sized
states
in maintaining ties between countries of the Warsaw Pact
and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The reasons for
Hungary's interest in East-West dialogue lay in its
relatively
liberal domestic policies as well as its foreign economic
policies. Following the Revolution of 1956, the leadership
determined that a policy of isolation threatened the
stability of
the Soviet alliance system in general and Hungary in
particular.
In addition, the leadership believed that without access
to the
world economy, Hungary's economy would continue to lag
behind the
economies of the West.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet invasion
of
Afghanistan, the crackdown on the Solidarity labor union
movement
in Poland, and the deployment of United States
intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Western Europe led to a
deterioration of relations between the superpowers.
Hungary
resisted this worsening of relations with the West. Thus,
the
theory that Hungary had won some freedom of action in the
domestic sphere by remaining loyal to the Soviet Union in
foreign
policy lost much of its validity in the mid-1980s.
Several factors led Hungary to push for an independent
stance. First, the Kadar regime believed that any return
to
economic isolation from the West would endanger policies
designed
to modernize the economy and to promote political
liberalization.
In turn, these two policies were intended to encourage
popular
political support for the regime and bolster its
legitimacy.
Their failure could have led to political catastrophe for
the
leadership. Second, Romania and the German Democratic
Republic
(East Germany) were pursuing their own independent
initiatives
with selected NATO countries. The Hungarians believed that
their
policy would also find supporters in Bulgaria and Poland,
both of
which needed help from the West to overcome their economic
problems. Third, the Soviet leadership experienced
internal
differences over the issue of East-West relations. In 1984
some
Soviet economists and political commentators positively
evaluated
the Hungarian reforms. The Kadar regime believed that it
had
allies in the top Soviet leadership, possibly including
thenGeneral Secretary Konstantin U. Chernenko himself.
The Soviet Union used its allies in the Communist Party
of
Czechoslovakia (CPC) to reply to Hungary's initiatives. On
March
30, 1984, the CPC daily Rude Pravo published a
scathing
critique of Hungary's policy, which it labeled "one-sided
particularism." The article maintained that the Hungarian
stance
would lead to a weakening of the common international
strategy
and foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact, encourage efforts
by
capitalist states to gain one-sided advantages by
promoting
differences among socialist states, and favor a narrow,
nationally oriented approach to transitory economic
difficulties.
The Czechoslovak newspaper also argued that the Hungarians
attached importance to distinctions between large and
small
states rather than to the class structure of these states.
Finally, Rude Pravo complained that national
interests
were beginning to take precedence over the interests of
the
Soviet alliance system as a whole. Articles in several
Soviet
party and government publications echoed the Czechoslovak
comments, suggesting that the CPC and the CPSU coordinated
their
attacks on Hungary.
Secretary of the Central Committee for Foreign Policy
Matyas
Szuros laid out Hungary's response to the charges of its
allies.
In 1984 Szuros began publishing his justifications for
Hungary's
stance. He later added other arguments to underscore
Hungary's
stance. Szuros averred that, although relations between
the
superpowers might be poor, historical traditions and
contemporary
geopolitical relations could encourage the development of
relations between certain socialist states and certain
capitalist
states. Particularly the small- and medium-sized states in
each
alliance system, through dialogue and constructive
relations,
could improve the international atmosphere and thereby
create
possibilities for the improvement of relations between the
United
States and the Soviet Union. In turn, such an improvement
could
lead to an overall reduction of international tension.
Szuros believed that national interests had to be given
more
weight when formulating common Warsaw Pact positions on
foreign
policy and military issues. A conception of the common
goals of
socialist states could command the support of the
individual
socialist countries only if it took national interests
into
account. Szuros rejected the notion that, by pursuing its
national interests, Hungary sought to gain one-sided
advantages
from the West. He wrote that as a result of historical and
geopolitical factors, capitalist states showed different
degrees
of interest in developing relations with the various
socialist
states. Thus Bulgaria carried on intense relations with
Greece
and Turkey, and Austria and West Germany developed close
relations with Hungary.
In 1985 and 1986, Szuros broadened these considerations
when
he wrote that the communist movement lacked an
organizational and
a political center that could enforce prescriptions for
behavior.
He argued that although a common ideology united the
international communist movement, ideology was neither a
code of
dogma nor a closed system but a body of ideas undergoing
constant
change. Szuros therefore advocated the "proper adaptation"
of the
basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to specific national
circumstances. These formulations justified renovations in
domestic policy, in turn leading to innovations in foreign
policy, including Hungary's opening to the West.
In July 1986, Szuros went beyond these arguments when
he
wrote that small- and medium-sized countries had more to
lose in
the event of a conflict between the superpowers than did
the
superpowers themselves. Therefore, smaller countries had
objective interests in seeking and maintaining detente.
Smaller
countries also had a special responsibility to contribute
to an
atmosphere encouraging the reduction of tension, deepening
of
dialogue, and strengthening of trust. Therefore, claimed
Szuros,
small- and medium-sized states had interests of their own,
regardless of their class structure.
Data as of September 1989
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