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Israel
The Emergence of the IDF
In February 1950, the Israeli government had discreetly negotiated
a draft treaty with King Abdullah of Transjordan, including a
five-year nonaggression pact, open borders, and free access to
the port of Haifa. In April Abdullah annexed the West Bank and
East Jerusalem, thus creating the united Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. Ben-Gurion acquiesced because he thought this would mean
an end to independent claims on Israeli territory and material
claims on confiscated Arab territory. Abdullah, however, was assassinated
in July 1951. Moreover, Israel was boycotted by all its Arab neighbors,
and from the end of 1951 the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran
(at the southern end of the Gulf of Aqaba, where it opens into
the Red Sea) were closed to Israeli shipping.
Surrounded by enemies and having to integrate thousands of immigrants
into the new state, Ben-Gurion attempted to make the IDF the new
unifying symbol of the fledgling state. He realized that the socialism
of the Histadrut was ill suited to solving the problems facing
the new state. Above all, Israel needed a unity of purpose, which
in Ben-Gurion's thinking could only be provided by a strong army
that would defend the country against its enemies and help assimilate
its culturally diverse immigrants. Thus, Ben-Gurion added to the
socialist ethos of the Histadrut and kibbutz movements an aggressive
Israeli nationalism spearheaded by the IDF. To carry out this
new orientation, he cultivated a "new guard" Mapai leadership
headed by dynamic young General Moshe Dayan and technocrat Shimon
Peres. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the Dayan-Peres supporters
in Mapai and the "old guard" Labor establishment would compete
for power (see Multiparty System , ch. 4).
In November 1953, Ben-Gurion tendered his resignation, and the
less militaristic Moshe Sharett took over as prime minister. Under
Sharett's weaker leadership, the conflict between the old-guard
Mapai leadership and Ben-Gurion's new technocratic elite festered
openly. This led to a major scandal in the Labor Party called
the Lavon affair. Defense Minister Pinchas Lavon, an important
figure in the old guard, had authorized intelligence chief Benjamin
Gibly to launch Israeli spy rings in Cairo and Alexandria in an
attempt to embarrass Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser. The
Egyptians, however, caught and later executed the spies, and the
affair proved to be a major embarrassment to the Israeli government.
The commission authorized to investigate the affair became embroiled
in a test of strength between the young military establishment--
including Dayan and Peres--and the Mapai old guard, whose support
Lavon solicited.
In February 1955, Ben-Gurion returned to the Ministry of Defense,
and with the malleable Sharett still as prime minister was able
to promote his hard-line defense policy. This position resulted
in a number of raids against the Egyptians in response to attacks
on Israeli settlements originating from Egyptian-held territory.
Subsequently, Ben-Gurion was restored to leadership of the Mapai
government. At this time, his biggest concern was the rising power
of Nasser. By October 1955, Nasser had signed an agreement to
buy arms from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, while President
Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to supply Israel with weapons.
Ben-Gurion sought to inflict a mortal blow on the Egyptian regime.
Because Nasser threatened Western interests in the Suez Canal,
Ben-Gurion entered into secret talks with Britain and France about
the possibility of Israel striking at the Sinai Peninsula, while
Britain and France moved in on the Suez Canal, ostensibly to help
protect Western shipping from combat. In late October, the IDF
routed the Egyptian army at Gaza and after a week pushed to the
Gidi and Mitla passes. On November 5, 1956, the French and British
took over the Suez Canal area. After intense pressure from the
Eisenhower administration, which was worried about the threat
of Soviet military involvement, the European powers acceded to
a cease-fire.
In March 1957, Israeli troops were forced to withdraw. The war
served to spur Ben-Gurion's drive toward greater militarization.
Although Israel was forced to withdraw from Sinai, Ben-Gurion
deemed the war a success: the raids from Gaza ceased, UN peacekeeping
forces separated Egypt and Israel, greater cooperation with France
led to more arms sales to Israel and the building of a nuclear
reactor, and, most important, the army's near-perfect performance
vindicated his view on the centrality of the IDF.
Data as of December 1988
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