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Israel
Introduction
ISRAEL OBSERVED THE fortieth anniversary of its founding as a
state in 1988. Although a young nation in the world community,
Israel has been profoundly influenced by Jewish history that dates
back to biblical times as well as by the Zionist movement in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century Europe. These two strands, frequently in
conflict with one another, helped to explain the tensions in Israeli
society that existed in the late 1980s. Whereas Orthodox Judaism
emphasized the return to the land promised by God to Abraham,
secular Zionism stressed the creation of a Jewish nation state.
Zionism historically has taken different forms, and these variations
were reflected in twentieth-century Israeli society. The leading
type of early Zionism, political Zionism, came out of Western
Europe in large measure as a response to the failure of the emancipation
of Jews in France in 1791 to produce in the succeeding century
the degree of the anticipated reduction in anti-Semitism. Jewish
assimilation into West European society was inhibited by the anti-Jewish
prejudice resulting from the 1894 trial of Alfred Dreyfus, a French
Jewish officer. Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, in 1896 published
a book advocating the creation of a Jewish state to which West
European Jews would immigrate, thus solving the Jewish problem.
Rather than emphasizing creation of a political entity, cultural
Zionism, a product of oppressed East European Jewry, advocated
the establishment in Palestine of self-reliant Jewish settlements
to create a Hebrew cultural renaissance. Herzl was willing to
have the Jewish state located in Uganda but East European Jews
insisted on the state's being in Palestine, and after Herzl's
death in 1904, the cultural Zionists prevailed. Meanwhile, the
need arose for practical implementation of the Zionist dream and
Labor Zionism came to the fore, appealing particularly to young
Jews who were influenced by socialist movements in Russia and
who sought to flee the pogroms in Eastern Europe. Labor Zionism
advocated socialism to create an equitable Jewish society and
stressed the integration of class and nation. David Ben-Gurion,
who came to Palestine in 1906, became a leader of this group,
which favored a strong economic basis for achieving political
power. Labor Zionism in turn was challenged by the Revisionist
Zionism of Vladimir Jabotinsky, a Russian Jew who glorified nationalism
and sought to promote Jewish immigration to Palestine and the
immediate declaration of Jewish statehood.
The Zionist cause was furthered during World War I by Chaim Weizmann,
a British Jewish scientist, skilled in diplomacy, who recognized
that Britain would play a major role in the postwar settlement
of the Middle East. At that time Britain was seeking the wartime
support of the Arabs, and in the October 1915 correspondence between
Sharif Husayn of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner
in Egypt, Britain endorsed Arab postwar independence in an imprecisely
defined area that apparently included Palestine. In November 1917,
however, Britain committed itself to the Zionist cause by the
issuance of the Balfour Declaration, which stated that the British
government viewed with favor "the establishment in Palestine of
a National Home for the Jewish People," while the "civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" were not
to suffer. These two concurrent commitments ultimately proved
irreconcilable.
During the succeeding decades until the Holocaust conducted by
Nazi Germany during World War II, Jewish immigration to Palestine
continued at a fairly steady pace. The Holocaust, in which nearly
6 million Jews lost their lives, gave an impetus to the creation
of the state of Israel: thousands of Jews sought to enter Palestine
while Britain, as the mandatory power, imposed limits on Jewish
immigration to safeguard the indigenous Arab inhabitants. An untenable
situation developed, and in 1947 Britain referred the Palestine
problem to the United Nations General Assembly. The latter body
approved a resolution on November 29, l947, calling for a complex
partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. The Arab
Higher Committee rejected the resolution, and violence increased.
The establishment of the State of Israel was declared on May 14,
1948, and Arab military forces began invading the territory the
following day. By January 1949, Israel had gained more territory
than had been allotted by the partition; East Jerusalem and the
West Bank of the Jordan River remained in Jordanian hands as a
result of fighting by the Arab Legion of Transjordan, and the
Gaza area, and Gaza remained in Egyptian hands . Israel held armistice
talks with the Arab states concerned in the first half of 1949
and armistice lines were agreed upon, but no formal peace treaties
ensued.
Having achieved statehood, the new government faced numerous
problems. These included the continued ingathering of Jews from
abroad, the provision of housing, education, health and welfare
facilities, and employment for the new immigrants; the establishment
of all requisite government services as well as expanding the
country's infrastructure; the expropriation of Arab lands--including
lands left by Arabs who had fled during the 1948 war as well as
by Arabs obliged by the government to relocate--so as to provide
a livelihood for new immigrants; the establishment of a military
government to administer Arab population areas; and the growth
of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to safeguard national security.
Tensions continued to exist between Israel and its neighbors,
and as a result a series of wars occurred: in 1956 in the Suez
Canal area; in June 1967, during which Israel captured the Golan
Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem,
and the West Bank, adding about 800,000 Palestinian Arabs to its
population; and in October 1973, a war that destroyed Israel's
image of its invincibility. Israel's poor showing in the early
days of the 1973 war led to considerable popular disenchantment
with the ruling Labor Party; this declining popularity, combined
with the growing number of Oriental Jews who identified more readily
with the religious expressions of Menachem Begin than with Labor's
socialist policies, contributed to the coming to power of the
conservative Likud Bloc in the May 1977 elections.
The rise of Oriental Jews illustrated the changing pattern of
ethnicity in the course of Jewish history. In the late nineteenth
century, the majority of the Jewish population in Palestine was
of Sephardic (Spanish or Portuguese) origin, but by the time the
State of Israel was created Ashkenazim (Jews of Central or East
European origin) constituted 77 percent of the population. By
the mid-1970s, however, as a result of the influx of Oriental
Jews from North Africa and the Middle East, the Ashkenazi majority
had been reversed, although Ashkenazim still dominated Israel's
political, economic, and social structures. Oriental immigrants
tended to resent the treatment they had received in transition
camps and development towns at the hands of the Labor government
that ruled Israel for almost thirty years. Furthermore, Orientals
experienced discrimination in housing, education, and employment;
they recognized that they constituted a less privileged group
in society that came to be known as the "Second Israel."
In addition to the Ashkenazi-Oriental division, Israel has faced
a cleavage between religiously observant Orthodox Jews and secular
Jews, who constituted a majority of the population. In broad terms,
most secular Jews were Zionists who sought in various ways, depending
on their conservative, liberal, or socialist political views,
to support governmental programs to strengthen Israel economically,
politically, and militarily. Jews belonging to religious political
parties, however, tended to be concerned with strict observance
of religious law, or halakah, and with preserving the purity of
Judaism. The latter was reflected in the views of religiously
observant Jews who accepted as Jews only persons born of a Jewish
mother and the ultra-Orthodox who considered conversions by Reform
or Conservative rabbis as invalid.
A further divisive element in Israeli society concerned the role
of minorities: Arab Muslims, Christians, and Druzes. These sectors
together constituted approximately 18 percent of Israel's population
in late 1989, with a birth rate in each case higher than that
of Jews. Israelis in the late 1980s frequently expressed concern
over government statistics that indicated that the high birthrate
among Arabs in Israel proper (quite apart from the West Bank)
had resulted in an Arab population majority in Galilee. They were
concerned as well over the comparative youth of the Arab population
in comparison with the Jewish population. In general, members
of the ethnic minorities were less well off in terms of employment,
housing, and education than the average for the Jewish population.
The role of the Arab minority in Israel's economy has historically
been controversial. Labor Zionism advocated that all manual labor
on kibbutzim and moshavim (see Glossary) be performed by Jewish
immigrants themselves. As immigration increased, however, and
immigrants had skills needed by the new state in areas other than
agriculture, cheap Arab labor came to be used for agricultural
and construction purposes. After the annexation of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip in 1967, Arab day laborers became an even more
important factor in the Israeli economy, providing as much as
30 percent of the work force in some spheres, and in many instances
replacing Oriental Jews who had performed the more menial tasks
in Israeli society.
Despite its historical importance in Israel, agriculture has
not had major economic significance. For example, in 1985 agriculture
provided just over 5 percent of Israel's gross domestic product
(GDP--see Glossary) whereas industry contributed almost five times
as much. Israel's skilled work force excelled in the industrial
sphere, particularly in high-technology areas such as electronics,
biotechnology, chemicals, and defense-related industries or in
such highly skilled occupations as diamond cutting.
Although Israel had human resources, the lack of capital on the
part of many new immigrants after 1948 obliged the government
to provide funds for developing the country's infrastructure and
for many enterprises. This policy resulted in a quasi-socialist
economy in which ownership fell into three broad categories: private,
public, and Haltistadrat Haklalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael
(General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel) known as
Histadrut (see Glossary), the overall trade union organization.
Israel depended to a large degree on funds contributed by Jews
in the Diaspora (see Glossary) to provide government services
necessary to settle new immigrants and to establish economic ventures
that would ensure jobs as well as to maintain the defense establishment
at a high level of readiness, in view of Israel's position as
a "garrison democracy" surrounded by potential enemies. Despite
the inflow of money from Jews in the Diaspora, as a result of
large government spending for defense and domestic purposes, Israel
has generally been a debtor nation and has relied heavily on grants
and loans from the United States. Israel in the early 1980s also
had to deal with runaway inflation that reached about 450 percent
in fiscal year (FY--see Glossary) 1984. To curb such inflation,
the government instituted the Economic Stabilization Program in
July 1985 that reduced inflation in 1986 to 20 percent.
By 1987, the Economic Stabilization Program had led to a significant
increase in economic activity in Israel. Increased certainty brought
about by the Economic Stabilization Program stimulated improved
growth in income and productivity. Between July 1985 and May 1988,
a cumulative increase in productivity of 10 percent occurred.
The 1987 cuts in personal, corporate, and employer tax rates and
in employer national insurance contributions stimulated net investment
during the same period.
The freezing of public sector employment occasioned by the Economic
Stabilization Program began lessening the role of government in
the economy and of increased the supply of labor available to
the business community. However, the outbreak of the intifadah
(uprising) in December 1987 had an adverse impact on these trends.
The government has played a major role in social and economic
life. Even prior to the achievement of statehood in 1948, the
country's political leaders belonged primarily to the Labor Party's
predecessor, Mapai, which sought to inculcate socialist principles
into various aspects of society. Creating effective government
under the circumstances prevailing in 1948, however, entailed
compromises between the Labor Zionist leadership and the Orthodox
religious establishment. These compromises were achieved by creating
a framework that lacked a written constitution but relied instead
on a number of Basic Laws governing such aspects as the organization
of the government, the presidency, the parliament or Knesset,
the judiciary, and the army. An uneasy tension continued, however,
between religiously observant and secular Jews. For example, in
protest against the proposed new Basic Law: Human Rights (and
a possible change in the electoral system), which Agudat Israel,
a small ultra-Orthodox religious party, believed would have an
adverse effect on Orthodox Jews, in early November 1989 the party
left the National Unity Government for two months.
Until 1977 the government operated under a political power system
with two dominant parties, Labor and Likud. As a result of the
1977 elections, in which Labor lost control of the government,
a multiparty system evolved in which it became necessary for each
major party to obtain the support of minor parties in order to
govern, or for the two major parties to form a coalition or government
of national unity, as occurred in 1984 and 1988. The result of
Israel's proportional electoral system, in which voters endorsed
national party lists rather than candidates in a given geographic
area, has been a stalemate in which the smaller parties, especially
the growing right-wing religious parties, have been able to exert
disproportionate influence in the formation of governments and
on government policies. This situation has led to numerous proposals
for electoral reform, which were still being studied in early
1990, but which had a marginal chance of enactment because of
the vested interests of the parties involved.
A major factor in Israel's political alignment has been its relations
with other countries, particularly those of the West, because
of its dependence on financial support from abroad. Although Israel's
relations with the United States and Western Europe have generally
been good, since late 1987 criticism has grown in the West of
Israel's handling of the uprising in the occupied territories
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The agreement by the United
States in December 1988 to initiate discussions with the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) has indicated that United States
and Israeli interests may not necessarily be identical. Furthermore,
the feeling has increased that the United States should exert
greater pressure on Israel to engage in negotiations with the
Palestinians and to abandon its "greater Israel" stance, as expressed
by Secretary of State James A. Baker on May 22, l989. In October
1989, Baker proposed a five- point "framework" that involved Israel,
the United States, and Egypt to try to advance Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir's plan for elections in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Israel agreed in principle in November but attached two
reservations: that the PLO not be involved in the naming of Palestinian
delegates and that the discussions be limited to preparations
for the elections.
In addition to relations with the West, Israel has sought to
expand its economic relations, particularly, with both Third World
countries and with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to
influence the latter to allow increased emigration of Jews. The
sharp upswing in Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel--approximately
2,000 persons in November 1989 and 3,700 in December, with a continued
influx in mid-January 1990 at the rate of more than l,000 persons
per week--led to an announcement that Israel would resettle 100,000
Soviet Jews over the following three years. The cost was estimated
at US$2 billion, much of which Israel hoped to raise in the United
States. This influx aroused considerable concern on the part of
Palestinian Arabs, who feared many Soviet Jews would settle in
the West Bank.
Israel's relations with neighboring states have been uneven.
Egyptian president Anwar as Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem
in November 1977 led to the Camp David Accords in September 1978
and ultimately to the signing of a peace treaty and the return
of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. In 1989 Egypt began to play an
increasingly prominent role as mediator between Israel and the
Palestinians, particularly as reflected in President Husni Mubarak's
ten-point peace proposals in July. The PLO accepted the points
in principle, and the Israel Labor Party considered them a viable
basis for negotiations.
Tensions continued along Israel's northern border with Lebanon
because of incursions into Israel by Palestinian guerrillas based
in Lebanon. These raids led to Israel's invasion of Lebanon (known
in Israel as Operation Peace for Galilee) in June 1982, the siege
of Beirut, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, and withdrawal
to the armistice line in June 1985. As a result, relations with
factions in Lebanon and relations with Syria remained tense in
early 1990, whereas Israeli relations with Jordan had ended in
cooperation agreements concerning the West Bank; such agreements
were canceled by King Hussein's disclaimer on July 31, 1989, of
Jordanian involvement in the West Bank.
Israel's relationship with its neighbors must be understood in
the context of its overriding concern for preserving its national
security. Israel saw itself as existing alone, beleaguered in
a sea of Arabs. Accordingly, it has developed various security
principles: such as anticipating a potential extensive threat
from every Arab state, needing strategic depth of terrain for
defensive purposes, or, lacking that, needing an Israeli deterrent
that could take a conventional or nuclear form, and the necessity
to make clear to neighboring states, particularly Syria, actions
that Israel would consider potential causes for war. Another security
principle was Israeli autonomy in decision-making concerning military
actions while the country concurrently relied on the United States
for military matériel. (United States military aid to Israel averaged
US$l.8 billion annually in the mid- and late 1980s; other United
States government aid from 1985 onward brought the total to more
than US$3 billion annually).
Because of its national security concerns, the IDF, primarily
a citizen army, has played a leading role in Israeli society.
With exceptions granted to Orthodox individuals for religious
reasons, men and women have an obligation to perform military
service, a factor that has acted to equalize and educate Israel's
heterogeneous Jewish population. Although Israel operates on the
principle of civilian control of defense matters, a number of
the country's leaders have risen to political prominence on retiring
from the military, such as Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Ezer Weizman,
and Ariel Sharon. The key national role of the IDF and its pursuit
of the most up-to-date military matériel, although costly, have
benefited the economy. Defense-related industries are a significant
employer, and, through military equipment sales, also serve as
a leading source of foreign currency. Israel has excelled in arms
production and has developed weapons used by the United States
and other countries.
The IDF has not only served in a traditional military capacity
in the wars in which Israel has been engaged since 1948. Since
1967 it also has exercised military government functions in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This role has proved particularly
onerous for Israeli citizen soldiers once the intifadah
began in December 1987.
The intifadah has probably had a greater impact on the
lives of both Palestinians and Israelis than any other event in
recent years. For Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
the uprising has created a new younger generation of leadership,
a sense of self-reliance, and an ability to transcend religious,
political, economic, and social differences in forming a common
front against the Israeli occupation. In so doing, Palestinians
have organized themselves into local popular committees (coordinated
at the top by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising)
to handle such matters as education, food cultivation and distribution,
medical care, and communications. Committee membership remained
secret, as such membership was declared a prison offense in August
1988. Observers have commented that the committees were reliably
considered to include representatives of various political factions
within the PLO and some of its more radical offshoots, as well
as communists and members of the Muslim fundamentalist Islamic
Resistance Movement, known as Hamas. Israeli authorities initially
endorsed Hamas in the hope that it would draw Arabs from the PLO
(Hamas was given time on Israeli television in the November 1988
elections), but as it became more powerful, especially in the
Gaza Strip, Israel outlawed Hamas, Islamic Jihad (Holy War), and
Hizballah (Party of God), which were radical Muslim groups, in
June 1989, setting jail terms of ten years for members. The PLO
itself had been banned earlier in the occupied territories.
Various restrictions and punishments have been imposed from time
to time and in different locations on West Bank and Gaza Strip
residents since the intifadah began. Among actions taken
against Palestinians in the West Bank was the outlawing of professional
unions of doctors, lawyers, and engineers in August 1988. Universities
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been closed since October
1987. Schools in the West Bank were closed for more than six months
in 1988 and, after reopening in December 1988, were again closed
one month later; schools were open for only three months in 1989.
Instruction in homes or elsewhere was punishable by imprisonment.
Extended curfews have been instituted, often requiring people's
confinement to their houses. (For example, the approximately 130,000
Palestinian inhabitants of Nabulus experienced an eleven-day curfew
in February 1989, during which United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East trucks bearing
food were forbidden to enter the city). Water, electricity, and
telephone service have been cut, and periodically Palestinian
workers have been refused permission to enter Israel to work.
By the end of 1989, at least 244 houses had been destroyed, affecting
almost 2,000 persons. Beatings and shootings had resulted in 795
deaths and more than 45,000 injuries by the end of 1989. Approximately
48,000 Palestinians had been arrested and imprisoned since the
uprising began through December 1989. Administrative detention
without charge, originally for a period of six months and increased
in August 1989 to twelve months, was imposed on about 7,900 Palestinians,
and 61 Palestinians had been deported from Israel by the end of
1989. These restrictions were documented in detail in the United
States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
and the statistics of Al Haq (Law in the Service of Man), a RamAllah-based
human rights organization. Countermeasures instituted by Palestinians
have included demonstrations, boycotts of Israeli products, refusal
to pay taxes (resulting in the case of Bayt Sahur, near Bethlehem,
in September 1989 of extended twenty-four- hour curfews and the
seizure of property in lieu of taxes), strikes and intermittent
closings of shops, stonethrowing, and some terrorist acts including
the use of fire bombs, and the killing of about 150 Palestinians
considered Israeli collaborators.
Both Palestinians and foreign observers saw the intifadah
as having had a profound effect on the PLO. In the opinion of
many observers, the PLO had previously sought to minimize the
role of Palestinians in the occupied territories so as to maintain
its own control of the Palestinian movement. The coordinated activities
of the young Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip since the uprising have obliged the PLO to relinquish its
sole leadership. The PLO has been compelled to support solutions
for the Palestinian problem that it had previously opposed but
which were favored by residents of the occupied territories, namely
an international conference to resolve the Palestine issue and
a two-state solution. The uprising brought pressure on the Palestine
National Council, which included representatives of Palestinians
throughout the world, to bury its differences and to provide psychological
support to Palestinians within the occupied territories by announcing
the creation of a Palestinian state in mid-November 1988.
The intifadah has also had a substantial impact on Israelis
because of the escalation of violence. Israeli settlers in the
West Bank have taken the law into their own hands on numerous
occasions, shooting and killing Palestinians. In the course of
the intifadah, 44 Israelis had been killed by the end
of 1989, and, according to Israeli government statistics, more
than 2,000 Israelis had been injured. The uprising has also affected
Israeli Arabs, many of whom have experienced a greater sense of
identity with their Palestinian brothers and sisters. Evidence
is lacking, however, of acts of violence by Israeli Arabs against
Israeli authorities, something that many Israelis had anticipated.
The cost to Israel of quelling the uprising has been calculated
by the United States government at US$132 million per month, not
counting the loss in revenues from production and from tourism--the
latter dropped 40 percent but were beginning to rise again in
late 1989. The violence has not occurred without protest by Israelis.
Many of the soldiers of the IDF, for example, have found particularly
distasteful the use of force on civilians, especially on young
children, women, and the elderly, and have complained to government
leaders such as Prime Minister Shamir. The liberal Israeli movement
Peace Now organized a large-scale peace demonstration that involved
Israelis and Palestinians as well as about 1,400 foreign peace
activists on December 30, 1989, in Jerusalem; more than 15,000
persons formed a human chain around the city.
Many Israelis have expressed concern about the effects of the
violence on Israel's democratic institutions as well as on Israel's
image in the world community. A number of Israeli leaders have
publicly advocated a political rather than a military settlement
of the uprising. As early as the spring of 1988, a group of retired
generals, primarily members of the Labor Party, organized the
Council for Peace and Security, maintaining that continued occupation
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was actually harmful to Israel's
security, and that Israel should rely on the IDF rather than the
occupied territories for its security. The Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies of Tel Aviv University, a think tank composed of high-level
political and military figures, in a study conducted by Aryeh
Shalev, retired former military governor of the West Bank, concluded
in December 1989 that Israel's repressive measures had actually
fueled the uprising. Among individuals who have spoken out are
former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who endorsed chief of staff
Lieutenant General Dan Shomron's view that the intifadah
cannot be solved "because it is a matter of nationalism." To this
Eban added, "You cannot fight a people with an army." Eban maintained
that the PLO could not endanger Israel because Israel had "540,000
soldiers, 3,800 tanks, 682 fighter-bombers, thousands of artillery
units, and a remarkable electronic capacity." Observers have pointed
out that Israel's launching on September 19, 1988, of the Ofeq-1
experimental satellite provided it with a military intelligence
potential that reduced the need for territorial holdings. In September
1989, Israel launched Ofeq-2, a ballistic missile that further
demonstrated Israel's military response capabilities.
Both Eban and Ezer Weizman, minister of science and technology
in the 1988 National Unity Government, favored talking with the
PLO, as did General Mordechai Gur, also a Labor cabinet member,
former military intelligence chief General Yehoshafat Harkabi,
and several other generals. The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,
in its early March 1989 report, Israel's Options for Peace,
supported talks with the PLO. In fact, informal contacts between
Israelis and PLO members had already occurred, although such meetings
were a criminal offense for Israelis. On February 23, 1989, PLO
chief Yasir Arafat met in Cairo with fifteen Israeli journalists.
In early March, several Knesset members met PLO officials in New
York at a conference sponsored by Columbia University. In other
instances, Egyptians, Americans, and West Bank Palestinians have
served as intermediaries in bringing Israelis and PLO officials
together. In October 1989, however, Abie Nathan, a leading Israeli
peace activist, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for
meeting PLO members, and in early January 1990, Ezer Weizman was
forced out of the inner cabinet for meeting with PLO figures.
The families of Israeli prisoners of war, however, were authorized
in December 1989 to contact the PLO to seek the prisoners' release.
In addition to the pressures exerted by the intifadah,
the reason for the greater willingness to talk to the PLO has
been a perception that the PLO has followed a more moderate policy
than in the past. For example, in November 1988, Arafat explicitly
met United States conditions for discussions with the PLO by announcing
the acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338, which indicated recognition of the State of Israel,
and by renouncing the use of terrorism.
The majority of the government of Israel in January 1990, however,
continued to oppose talks with the PLO. For example, on January
19, 1989, Minister of Defense Rabin proposed that Palestinians
end the intifadah in exchange for an opportunity to elect
local leaders who would negotiate with the Israeli government.
The plan, which made no mention of the PLO, was presented to Faisal
Husayni, head of the Arab Studies Center in Jerusalem and a West
Bank Palestinian leader, just after his release from prison on
January 28. Minister of Industry and Trade Sharon in February
1989 sharply denounced any talks with the PLO. In mid-April, Prime
Minister Shamir stated that he would not withdraw Israeli troops
from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to facilitate free Palestinian
elections in those areas, nor would he allow international observers
of such elections. In late April, Rabin asserted that any PLO
candidate in Palestinian elections would be imprisoned.
Despite such indications of an apparent negative attitude toward
facilitating peace negotiations, on May 14, 1989, Shamir announced
a twenty-point cabinet-approved peace plan, which he had aired
privately with President George Bush during his May visit to Washington.
The basic principles of the plan stated that Israel wished to
continue the Camp David peace process; it opposed the creation
of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip or the West
Bank (by implication Jordan was considered already to be a Palestinian
state); it would not negotiate with the PLO; and there would be
"no change in the status of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district,
unless in accord with the basic program of the government." Israel
proposed free elections in the occupied territories, which were
to be preceded by a "calming of the violence" (the plan did not
specifically set forth an end to the uprising as a precondition
for elections, as Sharon had wished); elections were to choose
representatives to negotiate the interim stage of self-rule, which
was set at five years to test coexistence and cooperation. No
later than three years after the interim period began, negotiations
were to start for a final solution; negotiations for the first
stage were to be between Israelis and Palestinians, with Jordan
and Egypt participating if they wished; for the second stage,
Jordan would also participate and Egypt if it desired. In the
interim period, Israel would be responsible for security, foreign
affairs, and matters relating to Israeli citizens in the occupied
territories. The plan made no mention of voting rights for the
approximately 140,000 Arab residents of East Jerusalem, which
Israel occupied in 1967. In countering Israeli criticism of the
plan, Shamir restated his commitment not to yield "an inch of
territory."
Such an intransigent position also characterized those Israeli
West Bank settlers whose vigilante tactics have created problems
not only for Palestinians but also for the IDF in the occupied
territories. In late May 1989, West Bank military commander Major
General Amran Mitzna begged a visiting Knesset committee to help
"stop the settlers' incitement against the Israel Defense Forces."
The settlers were provoked by the army's interference with their
"reprisal raids" on Palestinians. The substantial reduction in
IDF forces in the West Bank, following a January 1989 reduction
in the defense appropriation reduction (variously reported as
US$67 or US$165 million) was followed by increased settler violence.
Concurrently, the IDF has reduced the number of days of annual
service to be performed by reservists from sixty (the number set
after the uprising began--it was thirty before the intifadah)
to forty-five, as a direct economy measure and to minimize the
impact on the Israeli economy of lengthy reserve service.
The serious problems facing the Israeli economy have fallen to
Minister of Finance Shimon Peres, who, as Labor Party head, served
as prime minister in the previous National Unity Government. The
need to remedy the serious deficits incurred by the kibbutzim
and the industries operated by the Histadrut, both areas of the
economy associated with the Labor Party, were considered a major
reason for Peres's having been named minister of finance in the
new 1988 government. Observers have commented that Peres made
a slow start in addressing the rising inflation rate, which was
nearing 23 percent in 1989; the growing unemployment, which amounted
to more than 9 percent; and the budget deficits. In late December,
Peres announced a 5 percent devaluation of the new Israeli shekel
(for value of the shekel--see Glossary) and a week later, when
unveiling the new budget on January 1, a further 8 percent devaluation.
Budget cuts of US$550 million were made in addition to government
savings of US$220 million by reducing food and gasoline subsidies.
The government also announced plans to dismiss thousands of civil
servants and to cut cost-of-living increases for all workers.
These components were collectively designed to revive the economy
and to stimulate exports. The Israeli public, however, was understandably
critical of these harsh measures, which made Peres personally
unpopular and decreased the possibility of his being able to force
an early election to overturn the Likud-led National Unity Government.
Israel in January 1990, therefore, faced a difficult future.
Economically, the country was undergoing stringent budgetary limitations
that affected all Israelis. Politically and militarily, it confronted
the ongoing intifadah and the question of its willingness
to talk to the PLO and to consider giving up land for peace, or
its continued use of the IDF to repress the Palestinian uprising
in the occupied territories. Militarily, it faced a possible threat
from its enemy Syria as well as from the battle- tested army of
Iraq. Politically, Israel was challenged by the growing strength
of right-wing religious and religio-nationalist parties and the
need for electoral reform to create a more effective system of
government. Socially and religiously, the country faced the issue
of reconciling the views of Orthodox Jews with those of secular
Jews, considered by most observers as a more serious problem than
differences between Oriental Jews and Ashkenazim. Any Israeli
government confronting such challenges was indeed called upon
to exercise the proverbial wisdom of Solomon.
January 25, 1990
* * *
The major event since the above was written was the fall on March
15 of the government of Likud prime minister Yitzhak Shamir on
a no-confidence vote over his refusal to accept the United States
proposal for discussions between Israelis and Palestinians to
initiate steps toward an Israeli-Arab peace plan. (Minister of
Commerce and Industry Ariel Sharon had resigned from the coalition
government on February 18 after the Likud central committee moved
toward approving such a dialogue). The fall of the government,
which was the first time that the Knesset had dissolved a government,
was preceded by Shamir's firing of Deputy Prime Minister Shimon
Peres on March 13, leading to the resignation of all other Labor
Party ministers in the National Unity Government. The no-confidence
vote resulted from a last-minute decision by Shas, a small ultra-Orthodox
Sephardic party, to abstain from voting, giving Labor and its
allies a sixty to fifty-five majority in the Knesset. On March
20, President Chaim Herzog asked Peres to form a government; despite
five-week efforts to achieve a coalition, Peres notified Herzog
on April 26 that he was unable to do so. This process again was
a first--the first time in forty-two years that a prime minister
candidate designated by a president had failed to put together
a government. On April 27 the mandate for forming a government
was given to Shamir, who as of early May was still negotiating.
Should this attempt fail, new elections will be required, but
the composition of the Knesset will probably not change significantly
in such an election.
Meanwhile, the negotiations conducted by both major parties involved
bargaining and significant material and policy commitments to
tiny fringe parties, particularly the religious parties, that
were out of proportion to their strength. As a result, Israelis
have become increasingly disenchanted with their electoral system.
On April 7 a demonstration for electoral reform drew approximately
100,000 Israelis, the largest number since the 1982 demonstration
protesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon. More than 70,000 people
signed a petition, endorsed by President Herzog, calling for the
direct election of the prime minister and members of the Knesset
so as to eliminate the disproportionate influence of small parties.
Moreover, on April 9 an Israeli public opinion poll revealed that
80 percent of Israelis favored changing the electoral system.
The situation was further complicated by the Israeli response
to Secretary of State Baker's statement on March 1 that the United
States would back Israel's request for a US$400 million loan to
construct housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants only if Israel
stopped establishing settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. The Israeli government stated that this condition was the
first time that the United States government had linked American
aid to the way that Israel spent its own money. In a March 3 news
conference, President Bush included East Jerusalem in the category
of territory occupied by Israel, saying that the United States
government opposed new Jewish immigrants being settled there (an
estimated 115,000 Jews and 140,000 Palestinian Arabs lived in
East Jerusalem as of March). Prime Minister Shamir announced on
March 5 that new Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would
be expanded as rapidly as possible to settle Soviet Jews--7,300
Soviet Jews arrived in March and 10,500 in April.
On April 18, Shamir appointed Michael Dekel, a Likud advocate
of settlements, to oversee the groundbreaking for four new settlements
in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
and to try to buy residential property in the Armenian Quarter
of the Old City of Jerusalem for Jewish occupancy. This action
was made possible by the absence from the government of Labor
Party ministers, who had been opposing various settlement activities.
Government sponsorship of Jewish settlement in Jerusalem, although
initially denied, included a grant of US$1.8 million to a group
of 150 persons, consisting of Jewish religious students and their
families, to rent through a third party St. John's Hospice in
the Christian Quarter of the Old City, which they occupied on
April 12, the eve of Good Friday. This incident caused among uproar
by Christian Palestinians and led to the protest closing of Christian
churches in Jerusalem for one day on April 27- -the first time
in 800 years that the Church of the Holy Sepulcher had been closed.
Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek testified in court opposing the settlement
on the grounds that it would damage Israel's international reputation,
harm public order in the Christian Quarter, and disrupt the delicate
and established ethnic balance of Jerusalem. The Supreme Court
announced on April 26 that it upheld the eviction of the settlers
by May 1.
In other developments, the European Community threatened sanctions
against Israel unless the government allowed the reopening of
Palestinian institutions of higher education in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, which had been closed since October 1987.
In reply, Israel stated on February 26 that it would allow sixteen
community colleges and vocational institutions, serving approximately
18,000 Palestinian students, to reopen in stages on unspecified
dates.
Iraq's president Saddam Husayn, who was extremely fearful of
an Israeli strike against Iraq, on April 2 threatened that Iraq
would use chemical weapons against Israel if it attacked. This
threat outraged the world community and was followed on April
3 by Israel's launch of a new three-stage rocket earth satellite
into a surveillance orbit.
Meanwhile, the intifadah continued. The Palestine Center
for Human Rights reported on March 19 that 878 Palestinian fatalities
had occurred up to that date. The Israeli human rights body stated
on April 3 that thirty Palestinians had been killed by Israeli
army gunfire in the first quarter of 1990, whereas Palestinians
had killed thirty-five of their number as suspected Israeli collaborators
over the same period. Israel announced on February 18 a 15 percent
reduction in the defense budget for 1990- 91, together with a
reduced number of service days for reservists, caused by the financial
costs of the uprising. No end to the intifadah appeared
in sight, with well-informed Israeli sources suggesting that the
uprising had strengthened the convictions of Israelis on both
sides: those favoring territorial maximalism and those advocating
compromise. The difference was thought to be a greater realism,
with maximalists feeling that the territories could be retained
only by removing a number of Palestinians from the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, and compromisers recognizing that negotiations
with the PLO would require significant concessions.
May 2, 1990
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of December 1988
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