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Israel
The Peace Process
The international
climate at the time of Begin's rise to power in May 1977 leaned
strongly toward some type of superpowersanctioned settlement to
the Arab-Israeli dispute. New United States president Jimmy Carter
and Soviet leader Brezhnev both advocated a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
settlement that would include autonomy for the Palestinians. On
October 1, 1977, in preparation for a reconvened Geneva conference,
the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement
committing themselves to a comprehensive settlement incorporating
all parties concerned and all questions.
Nevertheless, the idea of a Geneva conference on the Middle East
was actively opposed and eventually defeated by a constellation
of Israeli, Egyptian, and powerful private American interests.
Begin proclaimed that he would never accept the authority of an
international forum to dictate how Israel should deal with its
territory, especially because, aside from Washington, the Israelis
would lack allies at such a meeting. Inside the United States,
the Jewish lobby and anti-Soviet political groups vehemently opposed
the Geneva conference idea. Sadat also opposed a Geneva conference,
seeing it as a way for Syria, supported by the Soviet Union, to
gain leverage in an Arab-Israeli settlement. Sadat realized that
if an international conference were held, Egypt's recovery of
Sinai, which was his primary objective in dealing with Israel,
would be secondary to the Palestinian issue and the return of
the Golan Heights to Syria.
To stave off an international conference and to save Egypt's
rapidly collapsing economy, Sadat made the boldest of diplomatic
moves: he offered to address the Knesset. Begin consented, and
in November 1977 Sadat made his historic journey to Jerusalem,
opening a new era in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Although Sadat
expressed his commitment to the settlement of the Palestinian
issue and to that issue's centrality in Arab-Israeli relations,
his main interest remained Israel's return of Egyptian territory.
Begin's acceptance of the Egyptian initiative was based on the
premise that Sinai, but not the West Bank, was negotiable. He
foresaw that exchanging Sinai for a peace treaty with Egypt would
remove Egypt from the Arab-Israeli military balance and relieve
pressure on Israel to make territorial concessions on the West
Bank. President Carter, who had been a major advocate of a Geneva
conference, was forced by the momentum of Sadat's initiative to
drop the international conference idea. Subsequently, he played
a crucial role in facilitating an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement.
Following nearly a year of stalled negotiations, Begin, Sadat,
and Carter met at Camp David near Washington, D.C., for two weeks
in September 1978. The crux of the problem at Camp David was that
Begin, the old-time Revisionist who had opposed territorial concessions
to the Arabs for so many years, was reluctant to dismantle existing
Sinai settlements. Finally, on September 17 he consented, and
the Camp David Accords were signed. On the following day, Begin
obtained Knesset approval of the accords.
The Camp David Accords consisted of two agreements: one dealt
with the future of the West Bank and the other with the return
of Sinai. The sections on the West Bank were vague and open to
various interpretations. They called for Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
and "the representatives of the Palestinian people to negotiate
about the future of the West Bank and Gaza." A five-year period
of "transitional autonomy" was called for "to ensure a peaceful
and orderly transfer of authority." The agreement also called
for peace talks between Israel and its other Arab neighbors, namely
Syria. The other part of the accords was more specific. It provided
for "the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally
recognized border," as well as for the Israeli right of free passage
through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal. The agreements
were accompanied by letters. A letter from Begin to Carter promised
that the removal of settlers from Sinai would be put to Knesset
vote. A letter from Sadat to Carter stated that if the settlers
were not withdrawn from Sinai, there would be no peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel. It was also understood that to make
the agreement more palatable the United States would significantly
increase aid to both countries.
Begin's limited view of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank
became apparent almost immediately after the agreement known as
the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel was signed in March
1979. The following month his government approved two new settlements
between Ram Allah and Nabulus. The military government established
civilian regional councils for the Jewish settlements. Finally,
and most provocative, autonomy plans were prepared in which Israel
would keep exclusive control over the West Bank's water, communications,
roads, public order, and immigration.
In effect, the acceleration of settlements, the growth of an
increasingly militaristic Jewish settler movement, and Israel's
stated desire to retain complete control over resources in the
territories precluded the participation in the peace process of
either moderate Palestinians, such as the newly formed National
Guidance Committee composed of West Bank mayors (the PLO refused
from the beginning to participate in the peace process) or King
Hussein of Jordan. No Arab leader could accept Begin's truncated
version of autonomy. Hussein, who had initially withheld judgment
on the accords, joined hands with the Arab radicals in a meeting
in Baghdad that denounced the Camp David Accords and the peace
treaty and ostracized Egypt. Sadat protested Israeli actions in
the occupied territories, but he was unwilling to change his course
for fear that doing so would leave Sinai permanently in Israeli
hands. President Carter objected to the new settlements but was
unable to force the Begin government to change its settlement
policy. Although ambassadors were exchanged; commercial, trade,
and cultural ties were established; and Sinai was returned in
May 1982, relations between Israel and Egypt remained chilly.
Data as of December 1988
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