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Israel
Israeli Action in Lebanon, 1978-82
The precarious sectarian balance prevailing in Lebanon has presented
Israeli policy makers with opportunities and risks. Lebanon's
Christian Maronites, who under French tutelage occupied the most
important political and economic posts in the country, were, like
Israeli Jews, a minority among the region's Muslim majority. As
early as 1954, Ben-Gurion had proposed that Israel support the
establishment in part of Lebanon of a Maronite- dominated Christian
ministate that would ally itself with Israel. During the Lebanese
Civil War (1975-76), then Prime Minister Rabin reportedly invested
US$150 million in equipping and training the Maronite Phalange
Party's militia.
The instability of Lebanon's sectarian balance, however, enabled
hostile states or groups to use Lebanon as a staging ground for
attacks against Israel. The PLO, following its expulsion from
Jordan in September 1970, set up its major base of operations
in southern Lebanon from which it attacked northern Israel. The
number and size of PLO operations in the south accelerated throughout
the late 1970s as central authority deteriorated and Lebanon became
a battleground of warring militias. In March 1978, following a
fedayeen attack, originating in Lebanon, on the Tel Aviv-Haifa
road that killed thirty-seven people, Israel launched Operation
Litani, a massive military offensive that resulted in Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. By June
Prime Minister Begin, under intense American pressure, withdrew
Israeli forces, which were replaced by a UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL). The withdrawal of Israeli troops without having removed
the PLO from its bases in southern Lebanon became a major embarrassment
to the Begin government.
By the spring of 1981, Bashir Jumayyil (also cited as Gemayel)
emerged as the Maronite strong man and major Israeli ally in Lebanon.
Having ruthlessly eliminated his Maronite rivals, he was attempting
to extend his authority to other Lebanese Christian sects. In
late 1980 and early 1981, he extended the protection of his Maronite
militia to the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Zahlah, in eastern
Lebanon. Syrian president Hafiz al Assad considered Zahlah, which
was located near the Beirut-Damascus road, a stronghold that was
strategically important to Syria. In April 1981, Syrian forces
bombed and besieged Zahlah, ousting the Phalangists, the Maronite
group loyal to Jumayyil, from the city. In response to the defeat
of its major Lebanese ally, Israeli aircraft destroyed two Syrian
helicopters over Lebanon, prompting Assad to move Soviet-made
SAMs into Lebanon. Israel threatened to destroy the missiles but
was dissuaded from doing so by the administration of President
Ronald Reagan. In the end, the Zahlah crisis, like the Litani
Operation, badly tarnished the image of the Begin government,
which had come to power in 1977 espousing a hard- line security
policy.
In June 1981, Israel held Knesset elections that focused on the
Likud's failure to stop the PLO buildup in southern Lebanon or
to remove Syrian missile batteries from the Biqa (Bekaa) Valley
in eastern Lebanon. To remove a potential nuclear threat and also
to bolster its public image, the IDF launched a successful attack
on the French-built Iraqi Osiraq (acronym for Osiris-Iraq) nuclear
reactor three weeks before the elections. Begin interpreted widespread
public approval of the attack as a mandate for a more aggressive
policy in Lebanon. The Likud also rallied a large number of undecided
voters by reducing import duties on luxury goods, enabling Israeli
consumers to go on an unprecedented buying spree that would later
result in spiraling inflation. Although Labor regained an additional
fifteen seats over its poor showing in 1977 when it won only thirty-two
seats, it was unable to prevail over Likud.
Begin's perception that the Israeli public supported a more active
defense posture influenced the composition of his 1981 postelection
cabinet. His new minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, was unquestionably
an Israeli war hero of longstanding; he had played an important
role in the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars and was widely respected
as a brilliant military tactician. Sharon, however, was also feared
as a military man with political ambitions, one who was ignorant
of political protocol and who was known to make precipitous moves.
Aligned with Sharon was chief of staff General Rafael Eytan who
also advocated an aggressive Israeli defense posture. Because
Begin was not a military man, Israel's defense policy was increasingly
decided by the minister of defense and the chief of staff. The
combination of wide discretionary powers granted Sharon and Eytan
over Israeli military strategy, the PLO's menacing growth in southern
Lebanon, and the existence of Syrian SAMs in the Biqa Valley pointed
to imminent Syrian-PLO- Israeli hostilities.
In July 1981, Israel responded to PLO rocket attacks on northern
Israeli settlements by bombing PLO encampments in southern Lebanon.
United States envoy Philip Habib eventually negotiated a shaky
cease-fire that was monitored by UNIFIL.
Another factor that influenced Israel's decision to take action
in Lebanon was the disarray of the Arab world throughout the early
1980s. The unanimity shown by the Arab states in Baghdad in condemning
Sadat's separate peace with Israel soon dissipated. The 1979 Iranian
Islamic Revolution, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September
1980, and the December 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan badly
divided the Arab world. The hard-line countries, Syria and Libya,
supported Iran, and the moderate countries, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and the Gulf states, supported Iraq. Moreover, Syrian president
Assad's regime, dominated by the minority Alawi Muslim sect, was
confronted with growing domestic opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood,
which Assad violently quelled in February 1982 by besieging the
city of Hamah. Finally, early United States opposition to an invasion
of Lebanon appeared to have weakened, following Israel's final
withdrawal from Sinai in May 1982.
Israel's incursion into Lebanon, called Operation Peace for Galilee,
was launched in early June 1982. After an attack on Israel's ambassador
in London carried out by the Abu Nidal group but blamed on the
PLO, Israeli troops marched into southern Lebanon. On the afternoon
of June 4 the Israeli air force bombed a sports stadium in Beirut,
said to be used for ammunition storage by the PLO. The PLO responded
by shelling Israeli towns in Galilee. On June 5, the government
of Israel formally accused the PLO of breaking the cease-fire.
At 11 A.M. on June 6, Israeli ground forces crossed the border
into Lebanon. The stated goals of the operation were to free northern
Israel from PLO rocket attacks by creating a forty-kilometer-wide
security zone in southern Lebanon and by signing a peace treaty
with Lebanon (see 1982 Invasion of Lebanon, ch. 5).
The June 1982 invasion of Lebanon was the first war fought by
the IDF without a domestic consensus. Unlike the 1948, 1967, and
1973 wars, the Israeli public did not view Operation Peace for
Galilee as essential to the survival of the Jewish state. By the
early 1980s--less than forty years after its establishment--Israel
had attained a military prowess unmatched in the region. The architects
of the 1982 invasion, Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan, sought to
use Israel's military strength to create a more favorable regional
political setting. This strategy included weakening the PLO and
supporting the rise to power in Lebanon of Israel's Christian
allies. The attempt to impose a military solution to the intractable
Palestinian problem and to force political change in Lebanon failed.
The PLO, although defeated militarily, remained an important political
force, and Bashir Jumayyil, Israel's major ally in Lebanon, was
killed shortly after becoming president. Inside Israel, a mounting
death toll caused sharp criticism by a war-weary public of the
war of and of the Likud government.
* * *
The literature on the cultural, political, and religious history
of Israel is immense. The works noted here and those listed in
the bibliography include easily available English-language materials
that are valuable futher reading not only for the serious student
but also for the interested layperson.
For a comprehensive and very detailed view of Jewish history
see the eighteen-volume work by Salo W. Baron and A History
of the Jewish People, edited by H.H. Ben Sasson. Another
valuable source covering all aspects of Jewish history is the
Encyclopaedia Judaica; a condensed history of the Jews
is contained in the sixteen volumes of the Israel Pocket Library.
Paul Johnson's A History of the Jews provides a more
recent overview.
A valuable summary of the origins of Zionism is set forth in
Arthur Hertzberg's introduction to The Zionist Idea: A Historical
Analysis and Reader. David Vital's books, The Origins
of Zionism and Zionism: The Formative Years, offer
scholarly accounts of the history of Zionism. More recent works
on Zionism include Shlomo Avineri's The Making of Modern Zionism
and Bernard Avishai's The Tragedy of Zionism.
The most comprehensive history of the modern State of Israel
is Howard Morley Sachar's two-volume A History of Israel.
Two other reliable general histories of Israel are Noah Lucas's
The Modern History of Israel and The Siege by
Connor Cruise O'Brien. A solid account of Israel's wars is provided
by Chaim Herzog's The Arab-Israeli Wars.
Five classics covering the pre-state era are Neville Mandel's
The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I, J.C. Hurewitz's
The Struggle for Palestine, Christopher Sykes's Crossroads
to Israel,George Antonius's The Arab Awakening,
and Michael J. Cohen's Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate:
The Making of British Policy 1936-1945. New Revisionist accounts
of the crucial years 1948-49 are contained in Tom Segev's 1949:
The First Israelis, Simha Flapan's The Birth of Israel:
Myths and Realities, and Benny Morris's The Birth of
the Palestinian Refugee Problem.
The most authoritative source on Israel's settlement policy in
the occupied territories is Meron Benvenisti's The West Bank
and Gaza Data Project. Two seminal works on Arabs in Israel
are Sammy Smooha's Israel: Pluralism and Conflict and
Sabri Jiryis's The Arabs in Israel. The best accounts
of Israel's incursion into Lebanon are Itamar Rabinovich's The
War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 and Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari's
Israel's War in Lebanon. (For further information and
complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1988
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