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Japan Labor Unions
Japan's 74,500 trade unions were represented by four
main labor
federations in the mid-1980s: the General Council of Trade
Unions
of Japan (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai, commonly known as
Sohyo),
with 4.4 million members--a substantial percentage
representing
public sector employees; the Japan Confederation of Labor
(Zen
Nihon Rodo Sodomei, commonly known as Domei), with 2.2
million
members; the Federation of Independent Labor Unions
(Churitsu
Roren), with 1.6 million members; and the National
Federation of
Industrial Organizations (Shinsanbetsu), with only 61,000
members.
In 1987 Domei and Churitsu Roren were dissolved and
amalgamated
into the newly established National Federation of Private
Sector
Unions (Rengo); and in 1990 Sohyo affiliates merged with
Rengo .
Local labor unions and work unit unions, rather than the
federations, conducted the major bargaining. Unit unions
often
banded together for wage negotiations, but federations did
not
control their policies or actions. Federations also
engaged in
political and public relations activities
(see Interest Groups
, ch.
6).
The rate of labor union membership, which was 35.4
percent in
1970, had declined considerably by the end of the 1980s.
The
continuing long-term reduction in union membership was
caused by
several factors, including the restructuring of Japanese
industry
away from heavy industries. Many people entering the work
force in
the 1980s joined smaller companies in the tertiary sector,
where
there was a general disinclination toward joining labor
organizations.
The relationship between the typical labor union and
the
company is unusually close. Both white- and blue-collar
workers
join the union automatically in most major companies.
Temporary and
subcontracting workers are excluded, and managers with the
rank of
section manager and above are considered part of
management. In
most corporations, however, many of the managerial staff
are former
union members. In general, Japanese unions are sensitive
to the
economic health of the company, and company management
usually
brief the union membership on the state of corporate
affairs.
Any regular employee below the rank of section chief is
eligible to become a union officer. Management, however,
often
pressures the workers to select favored employees.
Officers usually
maintain their seniority and tenure while working
exclusively on
union activities and while being paid from the union's
accounts,
and union offices are often located at the factory site.
Many union
officers go on to higher positions within the corporation
if they
are particularly effective (or troublesome), but few
become active
in organized labor activities at the national level.
During prosperous times, the spring labor offensives
are highly
ritualized affairs, with banners, sloganeering, and dances
aimed
more at being a show of force than a crippling job action.
Meanwhile, serious discussions take place between the
union
officers and corporate managers to determine pay and
benefit
adjustments. If the economy turns sour, or if management
tries to
reduce the number of permanent employees, however,
disruptive
strikes often occur. The number of working days lost to
labor
disputes peaked in the economic turmoil of 1974 and 1975
at around
9 million workdays in the two-year period. In 1979,
however, there
were fewer than 1 million days lost. Since 1981 the
average number
of days lost per worker each year to disputes was just
over 9
percent of the number lost in the United States. After
1975, when
the economy entered a period of slower growth, annual wage
increases moderated and labor relations were conciliatory.
During
the 1980s, workers received pay hikes that on average
closely
reflected the real growth of GNP for the preceding year.
In 1989,
for example, workers received an average 5.1 percent pay
hike,
while GNP growth had averaged 5 percent between 1987 and
1989. The
moderate trend continued in the early 1990s as the
country's
national labor federations were reorganizing themselves.
Data as of January 1994
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