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Nicaragua Sandinista People's Army 1979-90
Sandinista ranks had ballooned during the final weeks
of the
insurrection with the addition of thousands of untrained
and
undisciplined volunteers. These self-recruits with access
to
weapons were the source of considerable crime and
violence. By
late 1979, the situation was clearly deteriorating, as
petty
crime mounted and some Sandinistas abused their authority
for
personal gain. To end the chaotic situation, FSLN
combatants were
regrouped into a conventional army framework. At its core
were
1,300 experienced guerrilla fighters. Most of the
remainder were
members of the popular militias and others who had played
some
role in the defeat of Somoza. Cuban military personnel
helped to
set up basic and more advanced training programs and to
advise
the regional commands. The new army, known as the EPS, was
placed
under the command of Humberto Ortega, one of the nine FSLN
commanders and brother of Daniel José Ortega Saavedra, the
Sandinista junta coordinator.
The Sandinistas announced initially that their goal was
to
build a well-equipped professional military of some
25,000. Their
primary missions were to deter attacks led by the United
States,
prevent a counterrevolutionary uprising, and mobilize
internal
support for the FSLN. The strength of the EPS increased
steadily
during the Contra war in the 1980s. At the time the peace
accords
for the Contra War went into effect in 1990, the EPS's
activeduty members numbered more than 80,000. Supplemented by
reservists and militia, the Nicaragua armed forces had an
overall
fighting strength of more than 125,000.
The build up of the regular army depended at first on
voluntary enlistments, but later in 1983 a universal
conscription
system, known as Patriotic Military Service, was adopted.
Males
between the ages of seventeen and twenty-six were
obligated to
perform two years of active service followed by two years
of
reserve status. Service by women remained voluntary.
Mandatory
conscription was bitterly resented. Thousands of youths
fled the
country rather than serve in the armed forces, and
antidraft
protests were widespread. The unpopularity of the draft
was
believed to have been a large factor in the Sandinista
election
defeat in 1990.
Inheriting only the battered remnants of the equipment
of
Somoza's National Guard, the Sandinistas eventually
acquired
enough Soviet heavy and light tanks and armored personnel
carriers (APCs) to form five armored battalions. The
Soviets and
their allies delivered large amounts of other equipment,
including 122mm and 155mm howitzers, 122mm multiple rocket
launchers, trucks, and tank carriers. A mix of infantry
weapons
employed by the Sandinista guerrillas was gradually
replaced by
Soviet AK-47 assault rifles in the EPS and eventually
among
combat elements of the militia as well.
The Sandinistas upgraded the modest air force left by
the
National Guard after sending personnel to Cuba and East
European
countries for pilot and mechanic training. The most
important
acquisitions were Soviet helicopters for battlefield
transport
and assault missions. Although pilots were trained and
runways
constructed in preparation for jet fighters, neither the
Soviet
Union nor France was willing to extend credits for the
purchase
of modern MiG or Mirage aircraft. The United States warned
that
the introduction of sophisticated jet fighters would risk
retaliatory strikes because of the potential threat to the
Panama
Canal. Armed patrol craft and small minesweepers replaced
the old
patrol boats left by the National Guard, to defend against
attacks on harbors and shore installations.
Data as of December 1993
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