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Nicaragua THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE
Anti-Sandinista exile groups, backed by the United
States
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) soon after their
formation,
began in the spring of 1981 to plan paramilitary
operations
against the government of Nicaragua. A year later, a new
civil
war was well under way. Together referred to as the
Nicaraguan
Resistance, the two main antigovernment organizations were
the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática
Nicaragüense--
FDN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (Alianza
Revolucionaria Democrtica--Arde). Based in Honduras, the
FDN
consisted largely of former members and officers of the
National
Guard in alliance with other groups, deserters from the
FSLN
militia, and disgruntled Miskito. According to a 1985
United
States Congressional study, forty-six of the forty-eight
command
positions in the FDN were held by former members of the
National
Guard. In lower units, the majority of group and
detachment
leaders had no previous National Guard service. Ordinary
soldiers
were mainly disaffected peasants or peasant mercenaries
with no
guard affiliation. As the fighting continued, many field
commanders were promoted from the ranks. Miskito, Sumo,
and Rama
(Misura), a right-wing Miskito group of 1,500 to 3,000
indigenous
troops led by a former Somoza agent, operated in
coordination
with the FDN. Miskito, Sumo, and Rama All Together
(Miskito,
Sumo, Rama, Asla Takanka--Misurasata), a Costa Rican-based
Miskito group under Brooklyn Rivera Bryan that was aligned
with
Arde, fought for Caribbean coast autonomy rather than
against the
Sandinista government.
Beginning with raids across the border, the FDN had by
1983
established a foothold along the Honduran border in the
northern
section of easternmost Zelaya Department. The FDN was
estimated
to have a strength of 10,000 to 15,000 persons by
mid-1984.
Advisory, financial, and material help from the CIA were
crucial.
According to the United States Department of State,
military and
nonmilitary assistance between 1982 and 1990 amounted to
US$300
million. This figure did not include an additional US$100
million
gathered by the United States National Security Council,
and aid
solicited from private organizations and foreign
governments,
much of it devoted to weaponry.
Operating out of Costa Rica, Arde included forces from
several factions, including those of Edén Pastora Gómez
(Commander Zero). Pastora was a hero of the 1978 FSLN
takeover of
the National Palace who had later become disenchanted with
the
FSLN. The Arde forces consisted of about 3,000 troops and
had
produced one well-publicized success by briefly occupying
the
town of San Juan del Norte. However, a split developed in
1984
when Pastora pulled his forces out of Arde over the issue
of
unification with the FDN and, as a result, the FDN's
military
campaign was severely weakened.
The funding of arms for the Contras, as members of the
Nicaraguan Resistance had come to be known (short for
contrarevolucionarios--counterrevolutionaries), was
cut
off by the United States Congress in 1984, contributing to
a
decline in Contra fortunes. The Contras were reduced to
hit-and-
run raids targeting civilian installations and sabotaging
infrastructure. Subsequently revitalized as arms purchased
with
private funds reached them, the Contras were able to carry
out
numerous attacks on isolated military units and occupied
the
northeast border region with Honduras and some rural
mountainous
areas. Yet they failed to establish a liberated zone where
they
could set up a provisional government. The Contras' brutal
practices of attacks on rural cooperatives, villages, and
clinics, often involving the deaths of civilians and the
torture
and killing of Sandinista officials and soldiers, brought
accusations that the Contras were conducting a deliberate
campaign of terrorism.
By mid-1985, the military balance began to shift to the
FSLN
forces, which had been strengthened by draft call-ups and
improved use of militia units. With the EPS numbering
40,000
troops and the active-duty militia 20,000, the government
forces'
offensive operations drove most of the Contras back into
Honduras. Long-range artillery shelled suspected Contra
camps
just inside the Honduran border. Many Nicaraguan villagers
in the
war zones were evacuated to resettlement camps to give the
government free-fire zones and to deny the Contras local
support
and intelligence. As part of its shift in tactics, the EPS
formed
thirteen Irregular Warfare Battalions (Batallones de Lucha
Irregulares--BLIs) to carry on the fight against the
Contras. The
BLIs were lightly armed, highly mobile, quick-reaction
forces
trained in counterguerrilla tactics. The use of
Soviet-supplied
helicopters to transport the BLIs added to the military
pressure
against the Contras.
Boosted by the resumption of weapons and ammunition
supplies
from the United States in 1986, the Contras mounted new
offensives, briefly capturing a number of remote towns and
cutting highway links. Some EPS helicopters were shot down
with
newly acquired shoulder-fired missiles. Although damaging
to the
Nicaraguan economy and costly in lives, the Contra
campaign never
posed a serious military threat to Managua or other large
cities.
The FDN claimed to have 10,000 of its 16,000 fighters
operating
inside Nicaragua; the FSLN said that there were only
6,000.
Although the United States Congress rejected the
request of
President Ronald Reagan's administration (1981-89) for
additional
military aid to the Contras in 1988 while peace
negotiations were
under way, it approved humanitarian aid that enabled the
Contra
forces to remain intact. After internationally monitored
Nicaraguan elections were set for February 1990, five
Central
American presidents agreed that a new organization, the
International Support and Verification Commission of the
Organization of American States, would oversee the
voluntary
demobilization, repatriation, or relocation of the Contra
forces
over a ninety-day period. The demobilization process began
on
April 1, 1990.
Under the terms of the accords, former members of the
resistance would have their confiscated property restored,
be
eligible for grants for rehabilitation and training, and
receive
parcels of land and credits enabling them to settle in
autonomous
rural development zones. Widows of slain Contras were to
be
provided with pensions. These commitments were, at best,
only
partially fulfilled. Many Contras who settled in the
development
zones soon abandoned them because the regions lacked the
necessary infrastructure. Some ex-Contras also returned to
their
former homes as fears of Sandinista retribution subsided.
Data as of December 1993
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