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Nicaragua Foreign Influences and Assistance
The influence of the United States on the National
Guard was
overwhelming for many years. Between 1950 and 1976, when
military
relations were cut off, the total value of United States
military
aid was US$18.2 million. In addition, some 5,400 members
of the
guard received training in the United States. After the
loss of
United States aid, the National Guard managed to obtain
some
equipment and training assistance from Israel during the
final
years of the Somoza era to compensate for the loss.
Cuba had the predominant influence on the FSLN during
the
period before July 1979. Advice, training, money, and
moral
support were provided, as were some Soviet-made weapons.
Captured
National Guard weapons were at first used to arm the FSLN
guerrillas, but as the struggle to overthrow Somoza
escalated in
the late 1970s, purchases on the international arms market
reached the Sandinistas through Panamanian ports,
transiting
Costa Rica, which acquiesced in arms transshipment.
In addition to Panama and Costa Rica, Venezuela and
other
nations of the Andean Pact aided the anti-Somoza effort in
the
late 1970s in a variety of ways. A Simón Bolívar Brigade,
formed
in Colombia but also including sympathizers from a number
of
countries, participated in limited combat alongside the
FSLN.
Although both the Nicaraguan and Cuban governments
downplayed the
level of Cuban influence, the Cuban role was clearly
paramount.
FSLN leaders requested military aid from the United
States in
mid-1979, but it was uncertain how serious their request
was
because they had already accepted Cuban military advisers.
Although the request for military aid was rejected, the
United
States did offer to provide some training in the United
States
and to supply advisers, instructors, and some assistance
in
noncombat areas. All of these offers were refused by the
Sandinista leaders. The United States administration
criticized
France for proceeding with a sale of US$15.8 million in
equipment--consisting mainly of two patrol boats, two
helicopters, trucks, and rocket launchers. As a result of
the
United States stance, no further military equipment was
transferred from Western suppliers.
In March 1980, a high-level delegation that included
Minister
of Defense Humberto Ortega traveled to Moscow and signed a
variety of agreements. Both Nicaraguan and Soviet
officials hotly
denied that these accords included secret military
agreements.
The FSLN leaders also visited Bulgaria and the German
Democratic
Republic (East Germany); both countries subsequently
provided
military advisers, and some Nicaraguan pilots were trained
in
Bulgaria.
Deliveries of Soviet weapons began soon after the visit
to
Moscow. They included the T-55 heavy tank mounted with a
100mm
gun, which was an older model of tank with capabilities
that were
limited under Nicaraguan conditions. Heavy artillery and
multiple
rocket launchers appeared, far surpassing in range and
firepower
all other artillery in the region. APCs, jeep-like
vehicles,
trucks, tanker trucks, and mobile workshops followed to
add
mobility to the EPS. Soviet helicopters supplied to the
Nicaraguan air force gave the EPS the means to respond
more
rapidly to attacks and raids by the Nicaraguan resistance.
Criticizing the Soviet-assisted buildup of the EPS,
United
States officials underscored the threat of Nicaragua's
growing
military potential to its neighbors. Other observers
regarded the
newly acquired weaponry as essentially defensive, adding
little
to Nicaragua's capacity to wage war beyond its borders.
The
United States Department of State estimated that the
Soviet Union
and its allies delivered some 120,000 tons of military and
military-related equipment, valued at US$3.3 billion
between 1980
and 1990. In most cases, deliveries consisted of older
equipment
provided at discounted prices under generous terms or as
donations.
Prior to July 1979, Panamanian ties with the FSLN were
strong, and Panama's support of the Sandinistas included
volunteers in a Panamanian brigade that fought alongside
the
Sandinistas. A group of Panamanian National Guard officers
arrived in Managua in late 1979 to offer advisory
services, but
found that Cubans had already arrived to become the key
advisers
to the EPS and security organs. Venezuela briefly
considered
providing training for the nascent Sandinista air force,
but
declined because of the strong Cuban presence. The United
States
claimed that as many as 3,500 Cuban military and security
advisers were serving in Nicaragua by late 1985, although
other
sources said there were far fewer. Cuban officers were
present
during combat operations and served as pilots in some
cases, but
Nicaragua denied that they actively participated in the
fighting.
Of thousands of Soviet and Eastern European personnel in
Nicaragua, only about thirty to forty Soviet citizens,
fifty to
sixty East Germans, and a few Bulgarians served with the
Nicaraguan military, mostly to provide training in the use
and
maintenance of Soviet equipment.
The impact of the lessons of the Sandinista success and
the
subsequent direction taken by the FSLN was considerable,
especially in Central America and the Caribbean region.
The FSLN
victory, in effect, delivered a message to conservative,
military-dominated administrations in the area that they
could
afford to ignore similar groups in their countries only at
their
own peril. In 1980 and 1981, the FSLN leadership did not
hesitate
to proclaim Sandinista support for guerrilla movements in
Central
America, especially in El Salvador, but was circumspect
when
issues of direct arms and military assistance were raised.
In
1981 the United States cut off economic assistance to
Nicaragua
after publishing an extensive and controversial white
paper
documenting a flow through Nicaragua of Soviet and Cuban
arms to
the Salvadoran guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí National
Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación
Nacional--
FMLN). However, FMLN guerrillas were trained by Nicaraguan
and
Cuban officers in Nicaragua. When the United States stated
that
Nicaragua's aid to the Salvadoran rebels was the United
States
motive for supporting the Nicaraguan Resistance, the
Nicaraguan
government took steps to curtail the outward flow of
weapons.
Charges of FSLN support for rebel movements in other
Central
American nations were not fully substantiated, in spite of
repeated reports of Nicaraguan links with Guatemalan and
South
American insurgent groups. In 1993 the issue of the FSLN's
ties
with guerrillas and terrorists surfaced again when an arms
cache
exploded in Managua. The blast revealed tons of weapons,
including Soviet surface-to-air missiles, assault rifles,
and
machine guns, plus ammunition and explosives. Ownership of
the
weapons was admitted by a faction of the FMLN, which had
falsely
informed the United Nations (UN) that its weapons had been
destroyed in conformity with a UN-mediated peace process.
In
addition, many documents, including false passports, were
discovered, pointing toward a radical faction of
Sandinistas
continuing to operate clandestinely with ties to left-wing
Latin
American and European terrorists. A second cache of
explosives
and light arms appeared soon afterward, linking the
Sandinistas
to Guatemalan guerrilla groups.
Data as of December 1993
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