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Pakistan
Baloch
The final major ethnic group in Pakistan is the Baloch. A comparatively
small group, the Baloch, like the Pakhtuns, are a tribal population
whose original territory extends beyond the national borders.
Over 70 percent of the Baloch live in Pakistan, with the remainder
in Iran and Afghanistan. The Baloch trace their roots to tribes
migrating eastward from around Aleppo, in Syria, before the Christian
era. Sometime between the sixth century and the fourteenth century,
they migrated to the region of present-day Balochistan.
Baloch speak Balochi, part of the Iranian group of Indo- European
languages. Linguistic evidence indicates the origin of Balochi
to be in the pre-Christian Medean or Parthian civilizations. The
modern form has incorporated elements from Persian, Sindhi, Arabic,
and a number of other languages. Beginning in the early nineteenth
century, Baloch intellectuals used Persian and Urdu scripts to
transcribe Balochi into written form. Since Pakistan's independence
and with the rise of Baloch nationalism, Baloch have favored the
Nastaliq script, an adaptation of Arabic script.
The land of Balochistan is exceedingly inhospitable; geologists
have even compared the landscape with Mars. A Pakhtu expression,
reflecting on ethnic relations as well as on geography, describes
Balochistan as "the dump where Allah shot the rubbish of creation."
Subsistence is hard in this environment and is achieved by pastoral
nomadism, dryland and irrigated agriculture, and fishing. Dryland
farming is marginal, although it is a mainstay for many seminomadic
herders. The Baloch plant drought-resistant grains in earthen
embankments where scanty rainfall has accumulated.
Irrigated farming is concentrated near oases in two kinds of
systems: open channels that bring water from a few riverbeds,
and subsurface drains (karez) that channel groundwater
downward to planted fields. However, such irrigation and cultivation
are extremely limited, forcing most Baloch to eke out a living
by herding or farming in the marginal hinterland.
Sheep and goats are the main herd animals. The herder typically
consumes the dairy products these animals produce and sells the
meat and wool. Pastoralists organize themselves around water sources;
wells are the property of specific camps.
Kinship and social relations reflect the exigencies of dealing
with the harsh physical environment. Like other Pakistanis, Baloch
reckon descent patrilineally. Lineages, however, play a minimal
role in the lives of most Baloch. They are notably flexible in
arrangements with both family and friends. Ideally, a man should
maintain close ties with relatives in his father's line, but in
practice most relations are left to the discretion of the individual,
and there is wide variation. It is typical for lineages to split
and fragment, often because of disputes with close kin over matters
such as inheritance and bad relations within marriages. Most Baloch
treat both mother's and father's kin as a pool of potential assistance
to be called on as the occasion demands. Again, the precariousness
of subsistence favors having the widest possible circle of friends
and relatives.
Marriage patterns embody this kind of flexibility. As in many
parts of West Asia, Baloch say that they prefer to marry their
cousins. Actually, however, marriage choices are dictated by pragmatic
considerations. Residence, the complex means of access to agricultural
land, and the centrality of water rights, coupled with uncertain
water supply, all favor flexibility in the choice of in-laws.
The plethora of land tenure arrangements tends to limit the value
of marrying one's cousin, a marriage pattern that functions to
keep land in the family in other parts of Pakistan.
The majority of Baloch are Hanafi Sunnis, but there is a community
of an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Zikri Baloch, who live in the
coastal Makran area and in Karachi. The Zikris believe in the
Messiah Nur Pak, whose teaching supersede those of the Prophet
Muhammad. Their beliefs, considered heretical, have led to intermittent
Sunni repression of their community since its founding in the
fifteenth century.
Only among the coastal Baloch is marriage between cousins common;
there, nearly two-thirds of married couples are first cousins.
The coastal Baloch are in greater contact with non- Baloch and
manifest a concomitantly greater sense of group solidarity. For
them, being "unified amongst ourselves" is a particularly potent
cultural ideal. Because they are Zikris, they have a limited pool
of eligible mates and do not generally marry outside of the group
of Zikri Baloch.
Baloch society is stratified and has been characterized as "feudal
militarism." The significant social tie is that between a leader,
the hakim, and his retinue, consisting of pastoralists,
agriculturists, lower-level leaders, and lower- level tenant farmers
and descendants of former slaves (hizmatkar). Suprafamily
groups formed through patrilineal descent are significant mostly
for the elite hakim, whose concern for rivalry and politics
is not shared by other groups.
The basic exchange traditionally underlying this elaborate system
was the hakim's offer of booty or property rights in
return for support in battle. In more modern times, various favors
are generally traded for votes, but the structure of the system--the
participation of the lower-level leaders and the hizmatkar
through patron-client ties--remains much the same.
In common with the neighboring Pakhtuns, Baloch are deeply committed
to maintaining their personal honor, showing generous hospitality
to guests, and giving protection to those who seek it of them.
However, the prototypical relationship is that between the leader
and his minions. A Baloch suffers no loss of status in submitting
to another. Although competition for scarce water and land resources
characterizes social relations between minor leaders and hizmatkar,
competition coexists with a deeply held belief in the virtues
of sharing and cooperation. Sharing creates networks of obligation
among herders, mutual aid being an insurance policy in the face
of a precarious livelihood.
Baloch tribal structure concentrates power in the hands of local
tribal leaders. The British played local rivals against each other
in a policy of indirect rule, as they did with the Pakhtun tribes
to the north--and virtually throughout the subcontinent. In essence,
the British offered local autonomy and subsidies to rulers in
exchange for access to the border with Afghanistan. In the early
1990s, local leaders maintained this policy to a large extent,
continuing to exploit the endemic anarchy, whether local, provincial,
or national.
There have been sporadic separatist movements in Balochistan
since independence. Baloch have long been accustomed to indirect
rule, a policy that leaves local elites with a substantial measure
of autonomy. The 1970s saw a precipitous deterioration in relations
between Balochistan and the central government, however. The violent
confrontation between Baloch insurgents and the Pakistani military
in the mid-1970s was particularly brutal (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
and A New Constitutional System , ch. 1). The conflict touched
the lives of most Baloch and politicized those long accustomed
to accepting the status quo. Original demands for greater regional
autonomy escalated into a full-scale movement aimed at restructuring
the government along confederal lines. By the mid-1980s, traditional
cleavages among hakim, minor leaders, and hizmatkar
had declined in importance as the Baloch increasingly thought
of themselves as a unified group in opposition to Pakistani, or
Punjabi, hegemony.
Zia ul-Haq's overthrow of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 was welcomed
by many in Balochistan, in contrast to popular sentiment in the
rest of the country, which was appalled by the extraconstitutional
act. As relations with the central government began to smooth
out, however, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December
1979, placing nearly the entire northern border of Balochistan
on alert as a frontline area.
Balochistan's landscape in the 1980s changed markedly as Afghan
refugee camps were established throughout the northern parts of
the province. In many instances, temporary mud housing eventually
became transformed into concrete structures. The refugees also
caused the demographic balance to change as ethnic Pakhtuns--many
refugees from Afghanistan--came to settle in Balochistan.
Although social conditions in rural areas have changed little
for most Baloch, two scandals in the early 1990s caused the region
to receive much attention. The first grew out of reports that
some owners of brick kilns in remote parts of the province had
labor practices that resembled slavery, complete with indenturing
workers to loans that were passed down through generations. The
second was the charge that young boys were being recruited from
the most remote parts of the province to be "camel boys" in races
in the Persian Gulf states. The screaming of the young boys, who
are tied to the backs of racing camels, supposedly scares the
animals into running faster. The young boys often are maimed or
killed in the process. Impoverished parents unwittingly accepted
payment on the promise that their son would be employed as an
apprentice.
Because of the area's limited population and its low population
density levels, there has been little development in Balochistan
except in Quetta, the capital of the province. The rural programs
that exist stem mostly from the efforts of the Agha Khan Rural
Support Development Project, an NGO that has expanded into rural
Balochistan on the basis of its successes in the mountains around
Gilgit, in the far north of the country. This project works on
organizing disparate communities into local support groups and
has had particular success in reaching women in remote areas of
Balochistan.
Data as of April 1994
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