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Panama The Politics of Frustrated Nationalism
The CPN placed another candidate, Ernesto de la Guardia, in the
presidency in 1956. The Remón government had required parties to
enroll 45,000 members to receive official recognition. This
membership requirement, subsequently relaxed to 5,000, had excluded
all opposition parties from the 1956 elections except the National
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Nacional--PLN) which traced its
lineage to the original Liberal Party.
De la Guardia was a conservative businessman and a member of
the oligarchy. By Panamanian standards, he was by no means anti-
Yankee (see Glossary),
but his administration presided over a new
low in United States-Panamanian relations. The Egyptian
nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 raised new hopes in the
republic, because the two canals were frequently compared in the
world press. Despite Panama's large maritime fleet (the sixth
greatest in the world), Britain and the United States did not
invite Panama to a special conference of the major world maritime
powers in London to discuss Suez. Expressing resentment, Panama
joined the communist and neutral nations in a rival Suez proposal.
United States secretary of state John Foster Dulles's unqualified
statement on the Suez issue on September 28, 1956--that the United
States did not fear similar nationalization of the Panama Canal
because the United States possessed "rights of sovereignty" there--
worsened matters.
Panamanian public opinion was further inflamed by a United
States Department of the Army statement in the summer of 1956 that
implied that the 1955 treaty had not in fact envisaged a total
equalization of wage rates. The United States attempted to clarify
the issue by explaining that the only exception to the "equal pay
for equal labor" principle would be a 25-percent differential that
would apply to all citizens brought from the continental United
States.
Tension mounted in the ensuing years. In May 1958 students
demonstrating against the United States clashed with the National
Guard. The violence of these riots, in which nine died, was a
forecast of the far more serious difficulties that followed a year
later. In November 1959 anti-United States demonstrations occurred
during the two Panamanian independence holidays. Aroused by the
media, particularly by articles in newspapers owned by Harmodio
Arias, Panamanians began to threaten a "peaceful invasion" of the
Canal Zone, to raise the flag of the republic there as tangible
evidence of Panama's sovereignty. Fearful that Panamanian mobs
might actually force entry into the Canal Zone, the United States
called out its troops. Several hundred Panamanians crossed barbedwire restraints and clashed with Canal Zone police and troops. A
second wave of Panamanian citizens was repulsed by the National
Guard, supported by United States troops.
Extensive and violent disorder followed. A mob smashed the
windows of the United States Information Agency library. The United
States flag was torn from the ambassador's residence and trampled.
Aware that public hostility was getting out of hand, political
leaders attempted to regain control over their followers but were
unsuccessful. Relations between the two governments were severely
strained. United States authorities erected a fence on the border
of the Canal Zone, and United States citizens residing in the Canal
Zone observed a voluntary boycott of Panamanian merchants, who
traditionally depended heavily on these patrons.
On March 1, 1960--Constitution Day--student and labor groups
threatened another march into the Canal Zone. The widespread
disorders of the previous fall had had a sobering effect on the
political elite, who seriously feared that new rioting might be
transformed into a revolutionary movement against the social system
itself. Both major coalitions contesting the coming elections
sought to avoid further difficulties, and influential merchants,
who had been hard hit by the November 1959 riots, were
apprehensive. Reports that the United States was willing to
recommend flying the republic's flag in a special site in the Canal
Zone served to ease tensions. Thus, serious disorders were averted.
De la Guardia's administration had been overwhelmed by the
rioting and other problems, and the CPN, lacking effective
opposition in the National Assembly, began to disintegrate. Most
dissenting factions joined the PLN in the National Opposition
Union, which in 1960 succeeded in electing its candidate, Roberto
Chiari, to the presidency. De la Guardia became the first postwar
president to finish a full four-year term in office, and Chiari had
the distinction of being the first opposition candidate ever
elected to the presidency.
Chiari attempted to convince his fellow oligarchs that change
was inevitable. He cautioned that if they refused to accept
moderate reform, they would be vulnerable to sweeping change
imposed by uncontrollable radical forces. The tradition-oriented
deputies who constituted a majority in the National Assembly did
not heed his warning. His proposed reform program was simply
ignored. In foreign affairs, Chiari's message to the Assembly on
October 1, 1961, called for a new revision of the Canal Zone
arrangement. When Chiari visited Washington on June 12 to 13, 1962,
he and President John F. Kennedy agreed to appoint high-level
representatives to discuss controversies between their countries
regarding the Canal Zone. The results of the discussions were
disclosed in a joint communique issued on July 23, 1963.
Agreement had been reached on the creation of the Bi-National
Labor Advisory Committee to consider disputes arising between
Panamanian employees and zone authorities. The United States had
agreed to withhold taxes from its Panamanian employees to be
remitted to the Panamanian government. Pending congressional
approval, the United States agreed to extend to Panamanian
employees the health and life insurance benefits available to
United States citizens in the zone.
Several other controversial matters, however, remained
unresolved. The United States agreed to increase the wages of
Panamanian employees in the zone, but not as much as the Panamanian
government requested. No agreement was reached in response to
Panamanian requests for jurisdiction over a corridor through the
zone linking the two halves of the country.
Meanwhile, the United States had initiated a new aid program
for all of Latin America--the Alliance for Progress. Under this
approach to hemisphere relations, President Kennedy envisioned a
long-range program to raise living standards and advance social and
economic development. No regular United States government
development loans or grants had been available to Panama through
the late 1950s. The Alliance for Progress, therefore, was the first
major effort of the United States to improve basic living
conditions. Panama was to share in the initial, large-scale loans
to support self-help housing. Nevertheless, pressure for major
revisions of the treaties and resentment of United States
recalcitrance continued to move.
Data as of December 1987
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