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Panama The Oligarchy under Fire
In the mid-1960s, the oligarchy was still tenuously in charge
of Panama's political system. Members of the middle class,
consisting largely of teachers and government workers, occasionally
gained political prominence. Aspiring to upper-class stations, they
failed to unite with the lower classes to displace the oligarchy.
Students were the most vocal element of the middle class and the
group most disposed to speak for the inarticulate poor; as
graduates, however, they were generally coopted by the system.
A great chasm separated the rural section from the urban
population of the two major cities. Only the rural wageworkers,
concentrated in the provinces of Bocas del Toro and Chiriquí,
appeared to follow events in the capital and to express themselves
on issues of national policy. Among the urban lower classes,
antagonism between the Spanish speakers and the English- and
French-speaking blacks inhibited organization in pursuit of common
interests.
Literacy was high--about 77 percent--despite the scarcity of
secondary schools in the rural areas. Voter turnout also tended to
be high, despite the unreliability of vote counts. (A popular
saying is "He who counts the votes elects.") Concentration on the
sins of the United States had served as a safety valve, diverting
attention from the injustices of the domestic system.
The multi-party system that existed until the coup d'état of
1968 served to regulate competition for political power among the
leading families. Individual parties characteristically served as
the personal machines of leaders, whose clients (supporters or
dependents) anticipated jobs or other advantages if their candidate
were successful. Of the major parties competing in the 1960s, only
the highly factionalized PLN had a history of more than two
decades. The only parties that had developed clearly identifiable
programs were the small Socialist Party and the Christian
Democratic Party (Partido Demócrato Cristiano---PDC). The only
party with a mass base was the Panameñista Party (Partido
Panameñista---PP), the electoral vehicle of the erratic former
president, Arnulfo Arias. The Panameñista Party appealed to the
frustrated, but lacked a clearly recognizable ideology or program.
Seven candidates competed in the 1964 presidential elections,
although only three were serious contenders. Robles, who had served
as minister of the presidency in Chiari's cabinet, was the
candidate of the National Opposition Union, comprising the PLN and
seven smaller parties. After lengthy backstage maneuvers, Robles
was endorsed by the outgoing president. Juan de Arco Galindo, a
former member of the National Assembly and public works minister
and brother-in-law of former President de la Guardia, was the
candidate of the National Opposition Alliance (Alianza Nacional de
Oposición) coalition, comprising seven parties headed by the CPN.
Arnulfo Arias was supported by the PP, already the largest single
party in the country.
As usual, the status of the canal was a principal issue in the
campaign. Both the liberal and the CPN coalitions cultivated
nationalist sentiment by denouncing the United States. Arias,
abandoning his earlier nationalistic theme, assumed a cooperative
and conciliatory stance toward the United States. Arias attracted
lower-class support by denouncing the oligarchy. The Electoral
Tribunal announced that Robles had defeated Arias by a margin of
more than 10,000 votes of the 317,312 votes cast. The CPN coalition
trailed far behind the top two contenders. Arias supporters, who
had won a majority of the National Assembly seats, attributed
Robles's victory to the "miracle of Los Santos"; they claimed that
enough corpses voted for Robles in that province to enable him to
carry the election.
The problems confronting Robles were not unlike those of his
predecessors but were aggravated by the consequences of the 1964
riots. In addition to the hardships and resentments resulting from
the losses of life and property, the riots had the effect of
dramatically increasing the already serious unemployment in the
metropolitan areas. Despite his nationalistic rhetoric during the
campaign, the new president was dependent on United States economic
and technical assistance to develop projects that Chiari's
government, also with United States assistance, had initiated.
Chiari emphasized building schools and low-cost housing. He
endorsed a limited agrarian-reform program. Like his predecessor,
Robles sought to increase the efficiency of tax collection rather
than raise taxes.
By 1967 the coalitions were being reshuffled in preparation for
the 1968 elections. By the time Arias announced his candidacy, he
had split both the coalitions that had participated in the 1964
elections and had secured the support of several factions in a
coalition headed by the Panameñista Party. Robles's endorsement
went to David Samudio of the PLN. A civil engineer and architect of
middle-class background, Samudio had served as an assemblyman and
had held several cabinet posts, including that of finance minister
under Robles. In addition to the PLN, he was supported by the Labor
and Agrarian Party (Partido Laborista Agrario--PALA) and other
splinter groups. (Party labels are deceptive; the PALA, for
example, had neither an agrarian base nor organized labor support.)
A PDC candidate, Antonio González Revilla, also entered the race.
Because many of Arias's supporters believed that the 1964
election had been rigged, the principal issue in the 1968 campaign
became the prospective validity of the election itself. The
credibility crisis became acute in February 1968 when the president
of the Electoral Tribunal, a Samudio supporter, closed the central
registration office in a dispute with the other two members of the
tribunal, Arias supporters, over electoral procedures. The
government brought suit before the Supreme Court for their
dismissal, on the grounds that each man had a son who was a
candidate for elective office. Thereupon González Revilla, with the
backing of Arias, petitioned the National Assembly to begin
impeachment proceedings against Robles for illegal interferences in
electoral matters. Among other issues, Robles was accused of
diverting public funds to Samudio's campaign.
The National Assembly met in special session and appointed a
commission to gather evidence. Robles, in turn, obtained a judgment
from a municipal court that the assembly was acting
unconstitutionally. The National Assembly chose to ignore a stay
order issued by the municipal court pending the reconvening of the
Supreme Court on April 1, and on March 14 it voted for impeachment.
On March 24, the National Assembly found Robles guilty and declared
him deposed. Robles and the National Guard ignored the proceedings,
maintaining that they would abide by the decision of the Supreme
Court when it reconvened.
The Supreme Court, with only one dissenting vote, ruled the
impeachment proceedings unconstitutional. The Electoral Tribunal
subsequently ruled that thirty of the parliamentary deputies
involved in the impeachment proceedings were ineligible for
reelection. Robles, with the support of the National Guard,
retained the presidency.
The election took place on May 12, 1968, as scheduled, and
tension mounted over the succeeding eighteen days as the Election
Board and the Electoral Tribunal delayed announcing the results.
Finally the Election Board declared that Arias had carried the
election by 175,432 votes to 133,887 for Samudio and 11,371 for
González Revilla. The Electoral Tribunal, senior to the Board and
still loyal to Robles, protested, but the commander of the National
Guard, Brigadier General Bolívar Vallarino, despite past animosity
toward Arias, supported the conclusion of the Board.
Arias took office on October 1, demanding the immediate return
of the Canal Zone to Panamanian jurisdiction and announcing a
change in the leadership of the National Guard. He attempted to
remove the two most senior officers, Vallarino and Colonel José
María Pinilla, and appoint Colonel Bolívar Urrutia to command the
force. On October 11 the Guard, for the third time, removed Arias
from the presidency. With seven of his eight ministers and twentyfour members of the National Assembly, Arias took refuge in the
Canal Zone.
Data as of December 1987
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