Panama Torrijos Government Undertakes "Democratization"
Ironically, the successful conclusion of negotiations with the
United States and the signing of the Panama Canal treaties in
August 1977 added to the growing political difficulties in Panama.
Virtually all observers of Panamanian politics in the late 1970s
agreed that the situation in the late 1970s could only be
understood in terms of the central role traditionally played by
nationalism in forming Panamanian political consensus. Before
August 1977, opponents of Torrijos were reluctant to challenge his
leadership because of his progress in gaining control over the
Canal Zone. The signing of the treaties eliminated that restraint;
in short, after August 1977, Panamanian resentment could no longer
be focused exclusively on the United States.
The widespread feeling among Panamanians that the 1977 treaties
were unacceptable, despite their being approved by a two-thirds
majority in the October 1977 plebiscite, contributed to growing
opposition to the government. Critics pointed especially to the
amendments imposed by the United States Senate after the October
1977 plebiscite, which they felt substantially altered the spirit
of the treaties. Furthermore, political opponents of Torrijos
argued that the government purposely limited the information
available on the treaties and then asked the people to vote "yes"
or "no," in a plebiscite that the opposition maintained was
conducted fraudulently.
Another factor contributing to the erosion of the populist
alliance built by Torrijos during the early 1970s was the graduated
and controlled process of "democratization" undertaken by the
Torrijos government after signing the new canal treaties. In
October 1978, a decade after the government declared political
parties illegal in the aftermath of the 1968 military coup d'état,
the 1972 Constitution was reformed to implement a new electoral law
and legalize political parties. In the spirit of opening the
political system that accompanied the ratification of the Panama
Canal treaties, exiled political leaders, including former
President Arnulfo Arias, were allowed to return to the country, and
a flurry of political activity was evident during the subsequent
eighteen months. Foremost among the activities were efforts to
obtain the 30,000 signatures legally required to register a party
for the October 1980 elections.
The 1978 amendments to the 1972 Constitution markedly decreased
the powers of the executive branch of government and increased
those of the legislature, but the executive remained the dominant
branch. From October 1972 until October 1978, Torrijos had acted as
the chief executive under the titles of head of government and
"Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution." After the 1978
amendments took effect, Torrijos gave up his position as head of
government but retained control of the National Guard and continued
to play an important role in the government's decision-making
process. Before stepping down, Torrijos had agreed to democratize
Panama's political system, in order to gain United States support
for the canal treaties. In October 1978, the National Assembly
elected a thirty-eight-year-old lawyer and former education
minister, Aristides Royo, to the presidency and Ricardo de la
Espriella to the vice presidency, each for a six-year term.
The PRD--a potpourri of middle-class elements, peasant and
labor groups, and marginal segments of Panamanian society--was the
first party to be officially recognized under the registration
process that began in 1979. Wide speculation held that the PRD
would nominate Torrijos as its candidate for the presidential race
planned for 1984. Moreover, many assumed that with government
backing, the PRD would have a substantial advantage in the
electoral process.
In March 1979, a coalition of eight parties called the National
Opposition Front (Frente Nacional de Oposición--FRENO) was formed
to battle the PRD in the 1980 legislative elections, the first free
elections to be held in a decade. FRENO was composed of parties on
both the right and the left of center in the political spectrum,
including the strongly nationalistic, anti-Yankee Authentic
Panameñista Party (Partido Panameñista Auténtico--PPA), which was
led by the aged but still popular former president, Arnulfo Arias;
the PLN; the reform-oriented PDC; and the Social Democratic Party
(Partido Social Democrático--PSD), which was left of center and
reform-oriented. Three right-of-center parties--the Republican
Party (Partido Republicano--PR), the Third Nationalist Party, and
PALA--had also joined the FRENO coalition. The Independent
Democratic Movement, a small, moderately left-of-center party,
completed the coalition. Such diverse ideologies in the opposition
party suggested a marriage of convenience. FRENO opposed the Panama
Canal treaties and called for their revision on terms more
favorable to Panama.
All qualified parties competed in the 1980 legislative
elections, but these elections posed no threat to Torrijos's power
base because political parties vied for only nineteen of the fiftyseven seats in the legislature. The other two-thirds of the
representatives were appointed, in essence by Torrijos's
supporters. The PRD won twelve of the available nineteen seats; the
PLN won five seats, and the PDC, one. The remaining seat was won by
an independent candidate running with the support of a communist
party, the Panamanian People's Party (Partido Panameño del Pueblo--
PPP). The PPP had failed to acquire the signatures required for a
place on the ballot. Despite the lopsided victory of the progovernment party and the weakness of the National Legislative
Council (budgeting and appropriations were controlled by President
Royo, who had been handpicked by Torrijos), this election
represented a small step toward restoring democratic political
processes. The election also demonstrated that Panama's political
party system was too fragmented to form a viable united front
against the government.
Data as of December 1987
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