Panama Noriega Takes Control
In November 1982, a commission was established to draft a
series of proposed amendments to the 1972 Constitution. The PRD
supported the amendments and claimed that they would limit the
power of the Guard and help the country return to a fully
democratic system of government. These amendments reduced the term
of the president from six to five years, created a second vice
presidency, banned participation in elections by active members of
the Guard, and provided for the direct election of all members of
the legislature (renamed the Legislative Assembly) after nomination
by legitimate political parties. These amendments were approved in
a national referendum held on April 24, 1983, when they were
considered to be a positive step toward lessening the power of the
National Guard. In reality, however, the National Guard leadership
would surrender only the power it was willing to surrender.
General Paredes, in keeping with the new constitutional
provision that no active Guard member could participate in an
election, reluctantly retired from the Guard in August 1983. He was
succeeded immediately by Noriega, who was promoted to brigadier
general. During the same month, Paredes was nominated as the PRD
candidate for president. National elections were only five months
away, and Paredes appeared to be the leading presidential
contender. Nevertheless, in early September, President de la
Espriella purged his cabinet of Paredes loyalists, and Noriega
declared that he would not publicly support any candidate for
president. These events convinced Paredes that he had no official
government or military backing for his candidacy. He withdrew from
the presidential race on September 6, 1983, less than a month after
retiring from the Guard. Although Paredes subsequently gained the
support of the Popular Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista
Popular--PNP) and was able to appear on the 1984 ballot, he was no
longer a major presidential contender. Constitutional reforms
notwithstanding, the reality of Panamanian politics dictated that
no candidate could become president without the backing of the
National Guard and, especially, its commander.
With Paredes out of the way, Noriega was free to consolidate
power. One of his first acts was to have the Legislative Assembly
approve a bill to restructure the National Guard, which thereafter
would operate under the name of Panama Defense Forces (Fuerzas de
Defensa de Panamá--FDP). Nominally, the president of the republic
would head the FDP, but real power would be in the hands of
Noriega, who assumed the new title of commander in chief of the FDP
(see Missions and Organization of the Defense Forces
, ch. 5).
Meanwhile, the PRD--the military-supported party--was left
without a candidate. To strengthen its base for the upcoming
election, the PRD created a coalition of six political parties
called the National Democratic Union (Unión Nacional Democrática--
UNADE), which included the PALA, PLN, and PR, as well as the
smaller PP and the left-of-center Broad Popular Front (Frente
Amplio Popular--FRAMPO). With the approval of the military, UNADE
selected Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino to be its presidential
candidate. Ardito Barletta, a University of Chicago-trained
economist and former minister of planning, had been a vice
president of the
World Bank (see Glossary)
for six years before his
nomination in February 1984. Ardito Barletta was considered well
qualified for the presidency, but he lacked his own power base.
Opposing Ardito Barletta and the UNADE coalition was the
Democratic Opposition Alliance (Alianza Democrática de Oposición--
ADO) and its candidate, the veteran politician, Arnulfo Arias. ADO,
formed by the PPA, the PDC, the center-right National Liberal
Republican Movement (Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacional--
MOLIRENA), and an assortment of leftist parties, was a diverse
coalition made up of rural peasants (especially from Arias's home
province of Chiriquí) and lower- and middle-class elements that
opposed military rule and government corruption. During the
campaign, Arias emphasized the need to reduce military influence in
Panamanian politics. He called for the removal of the defense bill
passed in September 1983, which had given the FDP control over all
security forces and services.
The campaign proved to be bitterly contested, with both sides
predicting victory by a large margin. Arias and his backers claimed
that Ardito Barletta was conducting the campaign unfairly. Indeed,
UNADE took advantage of being the pro-government coalition, and
used government vehicles and funds to help conduct its campaign. In
addition, most of the media--television, radio stations, and
newspapers--favored the government coalition. For example, only one
of the country's five daily newspapers supported the ADO.
Voting day, May 6, 1984, was peaceful. Violence broke out the
next day between supporters of the two main candidates in front of
the Legislative Palace, where votes were being counted. One person
was killed, and forty others were injured. Irregularities and
errors in the voter registration and in the vote count led to
credible charges of electoral misconduct and fraud. Thousands of
people, who believed that they had registered properly, showed up
at the polling places only to discover that their names had been
inexplicably left off the voting list. Large-scale vote-buying,
especially in rural areas, was reported.
More serious problems developed during the next several days.
Very few official vote tallies were being delivered from the
precinct and district levels to the National Board of Vote
Examiners, with no apparent reason for the delay. The vote count
proceeded slowly amid a climate of suspicion and rumor. On May 9,
the vote tabulation was suspended. On May 11, the members of the
National Board of Vote Examiners declared that they could not
fulfill their function because of 2,124 allegations of fraud, and
they turned the process over to the Electoral Tribunal. The
opposition coalition publicized evidence showing that many votes
had been destroyed before they had been counted. These charges and
all subsequent challenges by the opposition were rejected by the
tribunal, even though the head of the three-man tribunal demanded
a further investigation into the allegations. The election results
were made public on May 16. Ardito Barletta won the election with
300,748 votes; Arias came in second with 299,035; retired General
Paredes received 15,976. The military-supported candidate had won
the election, and the threat to the political power of the FDP had
been circumvented.
The United States government acknowledged that the election
results were questionable but declared that Ardito Barletta's
victory must be seen as an important forward step in Panama's
transition to democracy. Relations between the United States and
Panama worsened later in the year because of Panama's displeasure
at the alleged slowness with which the United States-controlled
Panama Canal Commission was replacing American workers with
Panamanians.
The resignation of President Ricardo de la Espriella and his
cabinet on February 13, 1984 was barely noticed during the intense
election campaign. De la Espriella was forced out by Noriega. De la
Espriella had opposed the military's manipulation of the election
and strongly advocated free elections for 1984. During his brief
tenure, de la Espriella had failed to institute any significant
policy changes, and his presidency was lackluster. De la Espriella
was succeeded immediately by Vice President Jorge Illueca, who
formed a new cabinet.
Ardito Barletta, a straitlaced and soft-spoken technocrat, took
office on October 11, 1984. He quickly launched an attack on the
country's economic problems and sought help from the International
Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary)
to refinance part of the
country's US$3.7-billion debt--the world's highest on a per-capita
basis. He promised to modernize the government's bureaucracy and
implement an economic program that would create a 5-percent annual
growth rate. On November 13--to meet IMF requirements for a
US$603-million loan renegotiation--he announced economic austerity
measures, including a 7-percent tax on all services and reduced
budgets for cabinet ministries and autonomous government agencies.
He revoked some of the measures ten days later in response to
massive protests and strikes by labor, student, and professional
organizations.
Negative popular reaction to Ardito Barletta's efforts to
revive the country's stagnant economy troubled opposition
politicians, the military, and many of his own UNADE supporters.
Ardito Barletta's headstrong administrative style also offended
Panamanian politicians who had a customary backslapping and back-
room style of politicking. Moreover, Arditto Barletta's economic
program conflicted with the military's traditional use of high
government spending to keep the poor and the political left
placated.
On August 12, 1985, Noriega stated that the situation in the
country was "totally anarchic and out of control;" he also
criticized Ardito Barletta for running an incompetent government.
Observers speculated that another reason--and probably the real
one--for the ouster of Ardito Barletta was FDP opposition to the
president's plan to investigate the murder of Dr. Hugo Spadafora,
a prominent critic of the Panamanian military. Shortly before his
death, Spadafora had announced that he had evidence linking Noriega
to drug trafficking and illegal arms dealing. Relatives of
Spadafora claimed that witnesses had seen him in the custody of
Panamanian security forces in the Costa Rican border area
immediately before his decapitated body was found on September 14,
just a few miles north of the Panamanian border.
Because of uneasiness within the FDP over the Spadafora affair,
Noriega, using Ardito Barletta's ineffectiveness as an excuse,
pressured Ardito Barletta to resign, which he did on September 27,
1985, after only eleven months in office. Ardito Barletta was
succeeded the next day by his first vice president, Eric Arturo
Delvalle Henríquez, who announced a new cabinet on October 3, 1985.
* * *
A number of good books are available in English, dealing with
various periods of Panamanian history and with the construction of
the canal and the diplomatic controversies that have arisen. David
Howarth's Panama provides particularly good coverage of the
period of conquest and colonization. The most comprehensive account
of Panama's unhappy association with Colombia is found in Alex
Perez-Venero's Before the Five Frontiers.
The importance of the canal in Panamanian development is
explored in the eminently readable and informative The Path
Between the Seas by David McCullough. A painstakingly thorough
study of bilateral relations that focuses on the Panama Canal
dispute from its origin until ratification of the Panama Canal
treaties is found in U.S.-Panama Relations, 1903-1978
coauthored by David N. Farnsworth and James W. McKenney. Detailed
information on the negotiations and related events leading to the
1977 treaties is found in A Chronology of Events Relating to the
Panama Canal, prepared for the United States Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
Steve C. Ropp's Panamanian Politics: From Guarded Nation to
National Guard focuses on Panamanian political history until
1980. No detailed studies can be found on Panamanian political
developments since 1980, but articles authored by Robert F. Drinan,
Roberto Eisenmann, Jr., and Robert F. Lamberg are useful. (For
further information and complete citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1987
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