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Somalia Government Security Policy
In the aftermath of the 1969 coup, the central government
acquired control of all legislative, administrative, and judicial
functions. The only legally permitted party was the Somali
Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). In April 1970, Siad Barre
authorized the creation of National Security Courts (NSCs), which
shortly thereafter tried approximately sixty people: leaders of
the previous government, businessmen, lawyers, and senior
military personnel who had failed to support the coup
(see Courts
, ch. 4). In September 1970, the Supreme Revolutionary
Council (SRC) proclaimed that any person who harmed the nation's
unity, peace, or sovereignty could be sentenced to death. The
government also promised to punish anyone who spread false
propaganda against Siad Barre's regime.
Until the early 1980s, the Siad Barre regime generally
shunned capital punishment in favor of imprisonment and
reeducation of actual, suspected, or potential opponents. The
earlier parliamentary government had been able to hold people
without trial up to ninety days during a state of emergency, but
the military government removed most legal restrictions on
preventive detention. After the coup, a local revolutionary
council or the National Security Service (NSS) could detain
individuals regarded as dangerous to peace, order, good
government, or the aims and spirit of the revolution
(see
National Security Service
, this ch. and
Human Rights
, this ch.).
Additionally, regional governors could order the search and
arrest of persons suspected of a crime or of activities
considered threatening to public order and security, and could
requisition property or services without compensation. In 1974
the government began to require all civil servants to sign
statements of intent to abide by security regulations.
Furthermore, any contact between foreigners and Somali citizens
had to be reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the
late 1970s, most Somalis were ignoring this latter regulation.
The Somali government became more repressive after an
unsuccessful 1971 coup. Officials maintained that the coup
attempt by some SRC members had sought to protect the interests
of the trading bourgeoisie and the tribal structure. Many
expected that the conspirators would receive clemency. Instead,
the government executed them. Many Somalis found this act
inconsistent with Islamic principles and as a consequence turned
against Siad Barre's regime.
During its first years in power, the SRC sought to bolster
nationalism by undermining traditional Somali allegiance to
Islamic religious leaders and clan groups. Although it tried to
avoid entirely alienating religious leaders, the government
restricted their involvement in politics. During the early 1970s,
some Islamic leaders affirmed that Islam could never coexist with
scientific socialism; however, Siad Barre claimed that the two
concepts were compatible because Islam propagated a classless
society based on egalitarianism.
In the mid-1970s, the government tried to eliminate a
rallying point for opposition by substituting allegiance to the
nation for traditional allegiance to family and clan. Toward this
end, the authorities stressed individual responsibility for all
offenses, thereby undermining the concept of collective
responsibility that existed in traditional society and served as
the basis of
diya-paying (see Glossary) groups. The
government also abolished traditional clan leadership
responsibilities and titles such as sultan and
shaykh.
By the late 1980s, it was evident that Siad Barre had failed
to create a sense of Somali nationalism. Moreover, he had been
unable to destroy the family and clan loyalties that continued to
govern the lives of most Somalis. As antigovernment activities
escalated, Siad Barre increasingly used force and terror against
his opponents. This cycle of violence further isolated his
regime, caused dissent within the SNA, and eventually
precipitated the collapse of his government.
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