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Somalia Manpower, Training, and Conditions of Service
Despite the social and economic benefits associated with
military service, the Somali armed forces began to suffer chronic
manpower shortages only a few years after independence. The
government attempted to solve this problem by instituting
obligatory military service in 1984. Conscription affected men
from eighteen to forty years of age and lasted for two years.
Opposition to conscription and to the counterinsurgency campaigns
against guerrilla groups resulted in widespread evasion of
military service. As a result, during the late 1980s the
government normally met manpower requirements by impressing men
into military service. This practice alienated an increasing
number of Somalis who wanted the government to negotiate a
peaceful resolution of the conflicts that were slowly destroying
Somali society. Traditionally, the Siad Barre regime had followed
a policy of mixing recruits from different parts of the country
in order to cultivate nationalism among the soldiers. However, as
the ongoing counterinsurgencies further isolated the regime,
members of Siad Barre's subclan, the Mareehaan, increasingly
dominated senior military positions. As a result, by 1990 many
Somalis looked upon the armed forces as Siad Barre's personal
army. This perception eventually destroyed the military's
reputation as a national institution.
Throughout the postindependence period, the Somali armed
forces relied on reserves to help defend national security and
preserve internal stability. In 1961, for example, the government
created the Women's Auxiliary Corps. Qualified enlistees
underwent a five-month period of basic training and instruction
in typing, record keeping, and related subjects. During their
two-year enlistment, Somali women worked in a variety of
positions associated with administration, personnel, and military
welfare. Most Women's Auxiliary Corps personnel served in army
headquarters in Mogadishu or in subordinate headquarters in the
field.
In 1964 border clashes with Ethiopia prompted the Somali
government to authorize the organization of a reserve force. The
National Assembly therefore passed legislation mobilizing about
2,000 volunteers to be trained by the army at special camps in
the regional capitals. After determining that these men would not
be needed in the border war, Mogadishu released them from active
duty. Although they carried identity cards, these reservists
received neither pay nor training and had no official status.
In 1967 the Somali authorities established a Home Guard and
called up 3,000 men for six months of training. After completing
their tours of duty, they received discharges and joined a
reserve pool. The government then called another 3,000 men for
the next six months.
In addition to the reserve forces, irregulars also augmented
the military. After its defeat in the Ogaden War, Somalia
organized paramilitary units in the country's many refugee
communities. Mogadishu also encouraged the creation of clan
militias, especially among Daarood civilians. The SNA trained and
financed both groups. Additionally, the Somali government
recruited nomads and Ogaden refugees into the WSLF, the insurgent
movement that sought to regain the Ogaden from Ethiopia. The use
of irregulars did little to improve Somalia's military
capabilities; indeed, these groups became a political liability
to Siad Barre's regime because they brutalized large numbers of
civilians.
The Somali armed forces always had depended on foreign
training. Many high-ranking Somali officers had served in the
British and Italian colonial armies and some had received
training at Italian military and police academies. From the early
1960s until 1977, the Soviet Union provided most officer
training. By the mid-1970s, as many as 60 percent of all activeduty officers had received Soviet training. The SNA used Soviet
methods of organization and tactics.
Beginning in the early 1980s, many Somali officers started
attending one of two military schools in Mogadishu. The Siad
Barre Military Academy offered general instruction, and the Ahmad
Guray War College was a staff school for senior officers.
Noncommissioned officers attended the General Daoud Military
Academy in Chisimayu. The Weapons School provided courses in
specialties such as field artillery, transportation, and
communications. The Somali armed forces also maintained
instruction centers for personnel from the engineering, railway,
and paratroop-commando corps. Despite the existence of these
academies and schools, the Somali military relied on foreign
training to maintain sophisticated weapons systems and to improve
the technical and leadership skills of its personnel. After the
breakup of the Somali-Soviet alliance, the SNA largely depended
on the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, and Italy for such
training. Following the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991 and
the disintegration of the armed forces, military training ceased.
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