|
Somalia The Warrior Tradition and Development of a Modern Army
Historically, Somali society accorded prestige to the warrior
(
waranle--see Glossary) and rewarded military prowess.
Except for a man of religion (wadaddo) (wadad; pl.,
wadaddo--see Glossary), and they were few in number, all
Somali males were considered potential warriors. As a result, a
culture of military readiness flourished throughout a long
history of foreign invasion, colonial occupation, domestic
conflict, and wars with neighboring countries.
Warfare always had been an important factor in relations with
outsiders such as the Ethiopian Christians and the Oromo and even
with other Somali clans. The lack of modern weapons, however,
prevented the Somalis from successfully resisting the imposition
of European colonial rule. Antagonists in intra-Somali conflicts
generally belonged to groups bound by their commitment to pay or
receive diya. Because the entire group would be considered
responsible for paying diya to compensate for damages
inflicted, and would receive diya for its own losses, a
war would begin only with the unanimous approval of its likely
participants. A meeting of the elders of the warring groups was
the usual means of restoring peace. The elders would determine
which group was responsible for starting the war and would decide
compensation, usually livestock, for damages incurred. The group
judged responsible for starting the war normally would be the
only one fined unless it emerged the victor. In a jihad (holy
war) against infidels and in most conflicts against non-Somalis,
such rules would not apply.
The number of warriors who belonged to each party
traditionally determined the strength of rival clans and
diya-paying groups. However, after the introduction of
firearms in the Horn of Africa in the late nineteenth century,
firepower became the primary determinant. Although Somalis may
have used matchlock guns as early as the sixteenth century,
firearms became numerous in the region only in the 1890s, when
various European nations and arms merchants began supplying them
to Ethiopian emperor Menelik II. Shipped through the port of
Djibouti, some of these weapons fell into Somali hands and came
into use against the Ethiopians and the British in Sayyid
Mahammad Abdille Hasan's 1899-1920 jihad. After 1920 the Italian
and British colonial governments pursued a policy of disarming
Somali nomads. For several years before independence, however,
nomads frequently were more heavily armed than the colonial
forces responsible for maintaining public order.
In 1884 Britain declared a protectorate over northern
Somaliland. During its first sixteen years, the colonial
administration relied on naval landing parties, detachments from
the Aden garrison, and a small local police force to maintain
order. The emergence in 1900 of Mahammad Abdille Hasan (the "Mad
Mullah") and his band of about 3,000 dervishes represented the
first serious challenge to colonial rule in British Somaliland
(see
Mahammad Abdille Hasau's Dervish Resistance to Colonial Occupation, ch. 1).
In response, the British deployed to Berbera the Central
Africa Rifles, 2d Battalion, which included 16 British officers,
1 British warrant officer, 30 Sikh, and 862 African troops, to
prevent Hasan from crossing into British Somaliland from his base
in eastern Ethiopia.
After the battalion left Somalia in December 1900, Captain
E.J.E. Swayne raised the Somali Levy, a force that included 1,000
infantry and 500 mounted men commanded by 20 British officers and
50 Punjabi havildars (drill instructors). Armed with
Enfield rifles, swords, bayonets, and Maxim guns, the Somali Levy
was one of the region's best trained military units. In 1901 the
British redesignated the Somali Levy as the 6th King's African
Rifles (KAR). They disbanded the unit in 1902, reactivated it in
1903, reorganized it in 1904, and converted it to an all-Indian
unit in 1905, when the colonial administration started drafting
Somalis into a new standing militia.
Between 1900 and 1904, the British launched four unsuccessful
campaigns against Hasan. After 1904 Hasan moved to Italian
Somaliland. When he returned to the British sphere in 1909, the
colonial administration reinforced the 6th KAR with an Indian
battalion; the standing militia and 300 police also supported
military operations against Hasan. In 1910, after failing to
defeat Hasan, the British relinquished control of the interior,
withdrew to the coast, and disbanded the 6th KAR and the standing
militia.
For the next two years, British administrators in Somaliland
argued for a more assertive policy. Finally, in June 1912 the
British government approved the formation of the 150-man Camel
Corps, which operated within an eighty-kilometer radius of
Berbera to counter Hasan's hit-and-run tactics. There also were
320 Aden troops and 200 Indians from a disbanded contingent of
the 6th KAR to support the Camel Corps.
Just before the outbreak of World War I, the British
reorganized the protectorate's military establishment. The Camel
Corps became the Somaliland Camel Corps. The British also
increased the unit's size by enlisting 450 Somalis, with a 150-
man Somaliland Indian Contingent in reserve. The authorities
organized this force into two camel companies and one cavalry
company; eighteen British officers seconded from the Indian and
regular armies commanded the force. A 400-man Somaliland Indian
Contingent (less 150 assigned to the Somaliland Camel Corps) and
a temporary garrison of 400 Indian infantrymen completed the
protectorate's military.
In 1920 a combined British land and air offensive--which
included the Somaliland Camel Corps, Somaliland Police, and
elements from the 2d and 6th KAR and an Indian battalion--finally
defeated Hasan's army. Despite this defeat, many Somalis
continued to hail Hasan as a warrior hero and the source of
modern Somali nationalism. In 1923 the colonial authorities
attached the Somaliland Camel Corps to the KAR. The unit, whose
nucleus remained non-Somali, relied on Yao askaris (East African
native soldiers) from the 1st KAR to fill its ranks. In the early
1930s, the Somaliland Camel Corps consisted of one camel and one
pony company, both staffed by Somalis, and one Yao mechanized
infantry company.
In 1940 Italian forces overran British Somaliland, which had
been defended by the Somaliland Camel Corps and five British,
Indian, and African battalions. Before withdrawing from
Somaliland, the British disbanded the Somaliland Camel Corps.
After defeating the Italians in 1941, the British reformed the
Somaliland Camel Corps and created two battalions, the 71st and
72d (Somali) KAR battalions, both of which eventually were
disbanded after World War II. In 1943 the colonial authorities
converted the Somaliland Camel Corps into an armored car
regiment. The following year elements in this unit mutinied; as a
result, the British permanently disbanded the Somaliland Camel
Corps.
The history of Somalia's postcolonial armed forces began in
1941, when the British formed an irregular force known as the
Somali Prisoner of War Guards. The next year, the colonial
authorities renamed the unit the Somali Companies; in 1943 the
British redesignated the unit as the Somaliland Scouts. During
the war, the British used this force to maintain lines of
communication and patrol the colony's frontiers. After 1945 the
Somaliland Scouts, which never belonged to the KAR, performed
internal security duties. In 1960 the British assigned the
Somaliland Scouts to Somalia's independent government; the unit
subsequently formed the nucleus of the SNA.
On the eve of independence, the provisional government in the
Italian-administered trust territory requested permission from
the United Nations (UN) Trusteeship Council to establish a
national army to protect its borders. The UN agreed and, a few
months before independence, the provisional government created a
small army from the Somali Police Force's Mobile Group
(Darawishta Poliska--commonly known as the Darawishta). At the
time the trust territory joined with British Somaliland to form
the Somali Republic, troops from the Darawishta combined with
those of the Somaliland Scouts to form the 5,000-man Somali
National Army (SNA). Its first commander was Colonel Daud
Abdullaahi Hersi, who had served in the Somalia Gendarmerie, the
British Military Administration's police force. He was succeeded
at his death in 1965 by Siad Barre.
Even before the 1969 coup, the SNA played a central role in
the foreign policy process. Although the 1961 constitution
renounced war as a means of settling international disputes, it
also urged the amalgamation of Somali-inhabited territories in
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya into a Greater Somalia. The
government also deployed the SNA in support of Somali irredentism
in Ethiopia.
The SNA was battle-tested in 1964 when the conflict with
Ethiopia over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden erupted into warfare.
On June 16, 1963, Somali guerrillas started an insurgency at
Hodayo, in eastern Ethiopia, a watering place north of Werder,
after Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie rejected their demand for
self-government in the Ogaden. The Somali government initially
refused to support the guerrilla forces, which eventually
numbered about 3,000. However, in January 1964, after Ethiopia
sent reinforcements to the Ogaden, Somali forces launched ground
and air attacks across the Ethiopian border and started providing
assistance to the guerrillas. The EAF responded with punitive
strikes across its southwestern frontier against Feerfeer,
northeaast of Beledweyne, and Galcaio. On March 6, 1964, Somalia
and Ethiopia agreed to a cease-fire; at the end of the month, the
two sides signed an accord in Khartoum, Sudan, agreeing to
withdraw their troops from the border, cease hostile propaganda,
and start peace negotiations. Somalia also terminated its support
of the guerrillas.
Despite its failure to incorporate the Ogaden into a Greater
Somalia, the SNA continued to enjoy widespread support. In the
late 1960s, for example, most Somalis believed that the SNA was
less influenced by clan divisions and corruption than the
civilian sector. The military also had succeeded in integrating
British- and Italian-trained units more rapidly than had civilian
institutions. The armed forces, moreover, maintained contact with
the people through civic action projects and public relations
programs. An army-trained, quasi-military youth group called the
Young Pioneers worked in several agricultural and construction
projects connected with national development ventures.
The SNA's reputation soared during the early stages of the
1977-78 Ogaden War. After Ethiopia defeated Somalia, however,
public support for the military waned. As opposition to Siad
Barre's regime intensified, the SNA became more and more
isolated. During the late 1980s, various international human
rights organizations accused the armed forces of committing
crimes against civilians, dissidents, and government opponents.
Costly counterinsurgency campaigns in northern, central, and
southern Somalia gradually sapped the military's strength. After
Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, the SNA ceased to
exist. As of early 1992, although the SNM and the USC had
announced their intention to reconstitute professionally trained
national armies in their respective areas of operation--northern
and south central Somalia, respectively, no progress had been
made toward this goal. A lack of resources and expertise,
however, would almost certainly prevent both groups from
achieving their objectives over the short term.
|
