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South Korea POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Compromise and Reform: July-December 1987
The period from late June through December 1987 saw rapid
implementation of political reforms in an unusual mood of
compromise between the ruling and opposition parties. In July the
government paroled 357 political offenders, amnestied more than
2,000 other prisoners, and restored full political rights to
prominent opposition figure Kim Dae Jung. In August the National
Assembly established a committee to study constitutional
revision. Representatives of four parties took one month to
negotiate and propose a draft constitution that incorporated most
of the provisions long sought by the opposition parties: greater
press freedom and protection for civil rights, a stronger
National Assembly, and direct presidential elections. After the
bill passed the National Assembly, more than 93 percent of the
voters approved the new draft in a plebiscite on October 28,
1987.
Anticipating the presidential election of December 1987, the
four major presidential candidates (Roh Tae Woo, Kim Dae Jung,
Kim Young Sam, and Kim Chong-p'il, collectively referred to in
the media as "one Roh and three Kims", began their informal
campaigning with a series of public appearances and speeches in
October.
In April 1987, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had led their
respective factions, who together included seventy-two National
Assembly members, out of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) to
form the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). Summer-long
efforts to produce a single RDP presidential candidate failed. By
late September, Kim Young Sam was finally left in control of the
party when Kim Dae Jung and his followers departed to form a new
party of their own--the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). Kim
Young Sam announced his candidacy on October 10 and the RDP
convention proclaimed Kim the party's candidate on November 9.
Kim Chong-p'il was affiliated with the New Democratic Republican
Party (NDRP).
Hoping to benefit from the inability of Kim Dae Jung and Kim
Young Sam to agree on a unified candidacy, Roh Tae Woo's
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) expected to win the election with
a plurality of 1 million votes and sweep about 45 percent of the
total vote. The party's strategy was based on the substantive
appeal of Roh Tae Woo's June 29 declaration in favor of a new
democratic constitution and other reforms along with a massive
public relations campaign. The public relations campaign--roundly
scored by Roh's political rivals--portrayed the former four-star
general and division commander (he had helped Chun depose the
army chief of staff in December 1979) as a simple, "ordinary man"
who would bring about a society in which other ordinary people
could live comfortably and more affluently. The Roh campaign also
avoided the traditionally strident slogans of South Korean
politics, preferring promising phrases, such as "Commitment to a
Bright Future."
DJP strategists seeking the youth vote, which accounted for
nearly 60 percent of the electorate, acknowledged the party's
likely problem with the more opposition-minded liberal arts
college graduates; instead, they focused on segments of the young
population believed to be more easily won, such as high-school
graduates and technical college graduates. As the campaign
continued, Roh increasingly attempted to distance himself from
his patron, Chun Doo Hwan, admitting that the government had
committed torture and "other mistakes" and affirming that not
even the head of state could be exempted in eradicating
corruption.
The other conservative candidate, viewed by some of the press
as a "spoiler," who would take votes from Roh Tae Woo, was Kim
Chong-p'il. Kim's campaign used the "man of experience" theme and
was structured around small meetings (especially outside his
native South Ch'ungch'ong Province), some larger rallies, and
carefully chosen television spots financed from the coffers of
the Fraternal Association of National Revitalization and by other
affluent and conservative South Koreans. In his speeches, Kim
criticized Roh's long association with the evils of the Fifth
Republic and outlined a tentative program of financial relief for
farmers, coal miners, and others.
Like the other major candidates, Kim Young Sam took advantage
of the liberalized political climate to begin his presidential
campaign with a series of public rallies even before the October
28 national referendum on the new constitution. The failure to
agree with Kim Dae Jung on a unified opposition candidacy
required a two-pronged offensive, designed both to divert blame
for potentially splitting the opposition vote in the election and
to attack Roh Tae Woo. The RDP's slogans, "End Military
Government with Kim Young Sam" and "A Man for Peace, Harmony, and
Honesty," reflected the dual objectives of the campaign. On
October 17, 1987, Kim told a home-town audience of 1 million in
Pusan that, unlike Roh, he would lead a corruption-free
government that would end a "long tradition of military-backed
governments" and would make appropriate monetary and symbolic
compensation to those killed and wounded in the 1980 "civilian
uprising" in Kwangju. In a large rally in Taejon on October 24,
Kim suggested that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy would "bring about
sharp confrontation among Cholla and Kyongsang people." In
keeping with the name of his party, Kim also publicized his plan
for "Five Steps to Peaceful Unification" on October 12.
Kim Dae Jung's populist campaign themes were national
reconciliation, a just economy, political neutrality of the
military, and pursuit of reunification. The platform struck a
balance between appeals to Kim Dae Jung's hoped-for constituency
among workers, farmers, and lower middle-class voters and
reassurances to voters who feared that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy
could inflame regional loyalties or result in vindictive purges
against those who held power during the Fifth Republic. One of
Kim's sons directed specialized party organs such as the United
Democratic Youth Association to attract younger voters. Like Roh
and Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung was able to assemble 1 million
participants in rallies in Seoul and in home-province
appearances, while drawing somewhat smaller crowds in other
provinces.
In addition to the four principal candidates, several minor
parties also offered candidates. These included relative
unknowns, such as Kim Son-jok of the Ilche Party (Unified Party),
Sin Chong-il of the Hanism Unification Party, and Hong Suk-cha of
the Social Democratic Party. Another candidate, Paek Ki-wan, was
prominent in dissident circles. Most of these candidates faded as
the campaign progressed, eventually withdrawing their candidacy
in support of one or another major candidate.
The election results closely followed projections based on
the regional origins of the four major candidates, despite
protestations by all that regionalism should not divide the
country. Of the major candidates, Roh took 36.9 percent of the
votes, Kim Young Sam 28 percent, Kim Dae Jung 26.9 percent, and
Kim Chong-p'il only 8 percent.
Losers in the election had been charging the government party
with illegal electioneering activities ever since it became clear
in late September that Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam would not
be able to agree on a unified candidacy. The traditional
advantages of incumbency were evident early; by October the
business pages of Seoul's daily press were already discussing the
"election inflation" caused by election-related spending, which
included government disbursements for development projects. Such
spending, common in many countries prior to elections, included a
substantial decrease in the price of heating oil, an increase in
the official purchase price of rice, and a salary increase for
civil servants. Also common, although by no means limited to the
ruling party, were customary "transportation costs" given to
people to people to attend rallies and the wide distribution of
small gifts, such as the cigarette lighters bearing Roh Tae Woo's
name, dispensed by the ruling party. Political cartoonists could
easily make light of the latter practice, probably because it had
been many years since the votes of South Koreans, even in rural
areas, had been swayed by simple gifts such as a bowl of rice
wine or a pair of rubber shoes. One candidate seemed to sum up
the prevailing attitude in remarks at a mid-November rally: "If
they give you money, take it. If they take you to Mount Sorak for
sightseeing, then have a nice journey. But on 16 December, be
sure to give your vote to me."
More serious irregularities reported prior to and during the
elections included acts of violence or intimidation against
election observers, biased television coverage, mobilization of
local officials and neighborhood organization officers to
encourage people to vote for Roh, and fraudulent handling of
ballot boxes. In one working class district in Seoul, for
example, election observers seized two ballot boxes being
surreptitiously brought in to a polling station on the morning of
the election. The government, which removed the observers by
force two days later, claimed that the boxes contained absentee
ballots, but had no explanation for why they were delivered in
commercial trucks carrying fruit, bread, and other consumer
goods.
Conversely, few election observers commented on the
intimidating effect--no less on potential voters than on
candidates--of acts of violence that repeatedly occurred against
all major candidates. Candidates were forced to hire phalanxes of
bodyguards with plastic shields for protection against flying
objects and often were made to cut short public speeches during
appearances in regional strongholds of other candidates. In spite
of local abuses, it was difficult to estimate what fraction of
Roh Tae Woo's plurality of almost 2 million votes, out of 23
million cast, may have been improperly influenced. Extravagant
claims of wholesale manipulation in the computerized vote
tabulation were made difficult to assess by the failure of those
who had made such charges to present convincing evidence. Claims
of election rigging also were undercut at the time by the
continued insistence of both the Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam
camps that their candidate was the one to whom the election
rightfully should have gone.
Within a week after the election, public anger at the outcome
was divided. Protests continued against election irregularities,
but were accompanied by increasing criticism of the two major
opposition leaders for their failure to produce a unified
candidacy that could have defeated the government party
candidate. The RDP and PPD, embarrassed by the fact that Kim Dae
Jung and Kim Young Sam together received 54 percent of the vote
to Roh's 36 percent, both apologized to the public, while vowing
to continue disputing the results of the election. Both major
opposition parties, together with Kim Chong-p'il's party,
gradually turned their attention to the question of upcoming
National Assembly elections.
Data as of June 1990
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