South Korea Interest Groups
National Museum of Korea, Seoul
Courtesy Oren Hadar
Despite its Constitution and formal structure, the South
Korean government has never fully conformed to the liberal
democratic model that sees the state as a simple summation of
diverse and competing interests within society. In politics, as
in economic life, South Korea has more closely fit the "strong
state" model, in which the government has tended to outweigh
particular social or group interests. Nonetheless, the balance
between the government and various interest groups showed some
dramatic changes in the late 1980s; as the 1990s began, observers
found it likely that such changes would continue, despite efforts
by the government to retain its traditionally strong position.
During most of the postwar period, the South Korean
government had encouraged organizations for the communication of
economic interests, but had not encouraged professional or
occupational interest groups to voice political demands.
Independent or unsanctioned interest groups had come into
existence from time to time to challenge fundamental policies of
the government. In the late 1980s, such challenges accounted for
a sizable proportion of extragovernmental political activity.
The relationship between government and business associations
in South Korea had its roots in the period of Japanese colonial
rule, when the governor general established the Seoul Chamber of
Commerce and Industry and other industrial associations as a
means of communicating economic policies to the business
community. Since 1952 all businesses were required by South
Korean law to belong to the Korean Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, the bylaws and initial membership of which closely
paralled those of the Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
the colonial period. Since 1961, when the Park government began
its economic development plans, the Federation of Korean Industry
has represented the major conglomerates. A larger organization,
the Federation of Small and Medium Industries, has had much less
influence. The Korea Traders' Association and the Korean
Federation of Textile Industries round out the four major
industrial associations. In 1989 there were some 200 additional
business associations licensed by the state
(see The Government and Public and Private Corporations
, ch. 3).
In most cases, the government recognizes only a single
association as the representative of that industry. Major
business leaders may have individual access to administrators
through personal ties and might be able to influence the
government in minor ways, such as obtaining exemptions from
specific taxes. For the most part, however, business associations
through the 1980s were dominated by the government. As noted by
one specialist, "it is through industry associations that the
Korean government implements its policies, enforces routine
compliance, gathers information, and monitors performance." In
the 1980s, this process was sometimes facilitated by the
placement of retiring senior military or national security
officials in industry association positions.
Institutional changes and pressures toward open markets began
to change the traditional government-business relationship in the
mid- and late 1980s. Larger corporations became interested in
having a role in policy formulation more commensurate with their
contribution to more than two decades of economic growth. This
interest took several forms, including substantial corporate
contributions to all major political parties during elections. As
economic ministries grew in influence within a more decentralized
economic planning structure in the 1980s, the related industry
associations, just as in Japan and the United States, gained a
greater voice. Growing liberalization of the domestic market
under foreign pressure also led to greater friction between the
interests of specific economic sectors and the need of the
government to satisfy its foreign critics or risk a loss of
access to vital foreign markets. As the 1990s began, these
frictions seemed likely to continue and to lead eventually to
further readjustments.
In general, the higher-paid professions establish and
administer their own associations and cooperate closely with the
appropriate government ministries, but receive no government
support. These associations are chiefly concerned with
maintaining standards and the economic status of the professions
concerned and have been traditionally regarded by the government
as politically safe. The major exception has been the Korean Bar
Association, which became increasingly outspoken on human rights
and related legal issues in the 1970s and 1980s.
The government has attempted to keep tight controls on the
intellectual professions, sponsoring the formation of the Korean
Federation of Education Associations and the Federation of
Artistic and Cultural Organizations of Korea. Membership in the
Korean Federation of Education Associations was compulsory for
all teachers through high-school level. Members of these umbrella
groups received significant medical benefits, and they tended to
avoid political controversy. The Korean Newspaper Association and
Korean Newspaper Editors' Association were politically cautious
during the early 1980s, but became much less constrained during
the early years of Roh's rule.
Dissident associations have frequently grown from the
intellectual sector of society. The Minjung Culture Movement
Association (minjung means populist) was formed in 1985 by
dissident artists and writers who did not want to belong to the
state-controlled Federation of Artistic and Cultural
Organizations of Korea. Similar organizations of dissident
journalists, such as the Association of Journalists Dismissed in
1980, or the Democratic Press Movement Association, often were
dealt with harshly under the Fifth Republic. The Association of
Korean Journalists, although more broadly based and less
ideological, was quick to resist censorship and, after a change
in the law in 1988, supported the formation of journalists'
unions.
The government has been especially sensitive about
unauthorized professional associations among teachers. Many
teachers, and some opposition political leaders, have been
determined to reduce the state's control over the political views
of teachers and the content of education. In early 1989,
President Roh vetoed an opposition-sponsored amendment to the
Education Law that would have allowed teachers to form
independent unions. In spite of the president's veto, activist
leftist teachers--numbering about 10 percent of the nation's
primary through high-school faculties--announced their intention
to form such a union. The National Teachers Union (Chon'gyojo),
inaugurated in late May 1989, criticized the Korean Federation of
Education Associations as progovernment and weak in protecting
teachers' rights
(see Primary and Secondary Schools
, ch. 2). The
Ministry of Education responded by dismissing more than 1,000
members of the new union in the spring and summer of 1989,
resulting in the eventual withdrawal of more than 10,000
additional teachers. The Agency for National Security Planning
conducted a well-publicized investigation into the union's
ideology, with the implication that members could be charged with
aiding an antistate organization under the National Security Act.
Police broke up pro-National Teachers Union rallies; members
participating in a signature-gathering campaign to support the
union were charged with traffic violations. Eventually, several
teachers' union leaders received prison terms on various charges.
The Ministry of Education produced new guidelines that permitted
teachers' colleges to deny admission to students with activist
records and that allowed district education boards to screen out
"security risks" when testing candidates for employment. These
measures effectively halted the activities of the National
Teachers Union.
The modern Korean labor movement, including unions of skilled
and unskilled workers, dates to the first decade of Japanese
colonial rule. South Korean law and constitutions since 1948 have
recognized the "three rights" of labor: the right to organize,
the right to bargain collectively, and the right to take
collective action. In practice, however, the government has
consistently attempted to control labor and mitigate the effects
of unionism through the use of a variety of legal and customary
devices, including company-supported unions, prohibitions against
political activities by unions, binding arbitration of disputes
in public interest industries, which include 70 percent of all
organized labor, and the requirement that all unions be
affiliated with one of the seventeen government-sponsored
industrial unions and with a general coordinating body, the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). In the 1980s, large
companies, often supported by the police and intelligence
agencies of the government, also exerted pressure on unions to
prevent strikes, to undermine the development of white-collar
unions, to retain control of union leaders, and to prevent
persons with some college education from attempting to organize
workers by taking positions as industrial laborers.
Despite such measures, the government has never exercised
total control of the labor movement. Even the Federation of
Korean Trade Unions occasionally has been able to file
administrative suits against government rulings or to lobby--
sometimes successfully--against laws that would have a negative
impact on working conditions or rights of unions. Through most of
its existence, however, the federation has been able to do little
beyond submit proposals for legal reform to the government.
Throughout the postwar period, dissenting labor organizations
have either attempted to function apart from the government-
sanctioned structure under the Federation of Korean Trade Unions,
or have formed rival umbrella organizations, such as the National
Council of Trade Unions, established in 1958.
South Korea experienced an explosion of labor disputes from
1987 through 1989 under the more open political conditions
following the crisis of late June 1987 and the pressures created
by long-deferred improvements in wages and working conditions
(see
table 13, Appendix;
Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea
, ch. 2).
More than 3,500 labor disputes occurred from
August through November 1987. Most were quickly resolved by
negotiated wage increases and by the prospect that another common
demand--freer scope for union activities--would be met in
forthcoming legislation. In 1988 labor-related laws were amended
to make it easier to establish labor unions and to reduce
government intervention in labor disputes. Unions were still
prohibited, however, from articulating any demands that the
government interpreted as political in nature.
In 1988 the number of unions increased from 4,000 to more
than 5,700. This figure included numerous new white-collar unions
formed at research institutes, in the media, and within the
larger corporations.
There was a general privatization of labor-management
conflict during 1988 and 1989 as the government adopted a more
neutral, hands-off stance. Companies experimented widely with
tactics such as lockouts (5 in 1987; 224 in 1988), and labor
unions achieved new levels of joint action by workers in
different regions and industries. The government's ability to
manage organized labor through the traditional means of
controlling the FKTU declined. The FKTU, under criticism for the
many years it represented the government more than labor, also
began to take a more independent posture as the 1980s came to a
close. In 1989 the once-docile umbrella organization prepared to
sponsor union candidates in anticipated local elections (an
illegal activity under existing law) and held education seminars
and rallies to press for "economic democracy" through revision of
labor laws and other reforms. Notwithstanding the increasing
ability of labor to organize and to present economic demands,
however, the government continued to suppress leftist labor
groups that appeared to have broad political goals or that
questioned the legitimacy of the government, such as the National
Council of Labor Unions (Chonnohyop), which was formally
established in early 1990.
In early 1990, the government announced new measures to
support its return to more restrictive policies governing
strikes. The number of intelligence agents at key industries was
more than doubled (from 163 to 337) and a special riot police
task force--sixty-three companies in strength--was deployed
against "illegal" strikes.
During the postwar period, articulation of workers' interests
had been weakest for South Korea's farming population. In 1946
the government used the Korea Federation of Peasants to mobilize
the rural population against leftist peasant unions. The
Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, established in 1957, was
also largely funded and administered by the state. Its purpose
was not to represent farmers' interests, but to facilitate
government control over the purchase and sale of grain and
farmers' purchases of fertilizer.
Although most South Korean farmers continued to belong to
cooperatives, two pressures converged in the late 1980s to change
the way in which farmers' interests were represented. First, as
rural-urban income disparities grew in the late 1970s and 1980s,
farmer dissatisfaction with the government cooperatives' role in
setting crop prices and the costs of agricultural supplies also
increased
(see Agriculture
, ch. 3). Some farmers turned to
independent organizations, such as the Korean Catholic Farmers
Association or the Christian Farmers Association. These groups,
which were viewed as dissident organizations by the government,
performed a variety of services for farmers and also took public
positions on government agricultural and price policies,
sometimes using mass rallies. The second change, which affected
larger numbers of farmers, was the result of South Korea's
growing trade surpluses in the late 1980s
(see Foreign Trade Policy
, ch. 3). As the government responded to pressure from
major trading partners, such as the United States, to open South
Korea's domestic markets, farmers became increasingly active in
large-scale protest rallies against both the government and the
major political parties. As the 1990s began, it was clear that
the traditional harmony of political interests between a
conservative rural population and conservative governments had
ended.
Data as of June 1990
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