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South Korea Relations with North Korea
Nordpolitik's final destination--P'yongyang--has proved
difficult to reach. After nearly two decades, inter-Korean
relations had not improved measurably. In fact, it may be argued
that political leaders in Seoul and P'yongyang have skillfully
used the perceived mutual threat to maintain and justify their
political legitimacy. Their postures may seem reasonable, given
that until the precarious 1953 armistice agreement is replaced by
a permanent peace treaty, the Korean War cannot be considered
completely over. Nevertheless, Seoul and P'yongyang have been
increasing their contacts across and around the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) in a gradual and uneven fashion. These expanding
contacts appear quite natural because there are an estimated 10
million separated family members. Moreover, South Korean business
leaders have been keenly aware of potential economic benefits in
improved relations with North Korea. As inter-Korean contacts are
gradually becoming a "growth industry," their prospects appear
promising.
Inter-Korean relations may be divided into four periods. The
first stage was between 1972 and 1973; the second stage was
P'yongyang's delivery of relief goods to South Korea after a
typhoon caused devastating floods in 1984; and the third stage
was the exchange of home visits and performing artists in 1985.
The fourth stage, activated by Nordpolitik under Roh, was
represented by expanding public and private contacts between the
two Koreas. These working-level contacts have included Red Cross
talks aimed at exchanging home visits by divided families and
performing artists; sports talks aimed at establishing a unified
team for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games; economic trade at the
level of premiers; preliminary talks for joint parliamentary
meetings; and expanded academic and religious exchanges.
The Nordpolitik blueprint--Roh's declaration of July 7,
1988-- opened a new chapter in inter-Korean dialogue. Calling for
the building of a single "national commonwealth," Roh solicited
the assistance of Washington and Tokyo to improve Seoul's
relations with Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, he
encouraged Washington and Tokyo to improve relations with
P'yongyang and expanded inter-Korean exchanges. Roh urged a
positive response from P'yongyang, but North Korea's reaction was
not positive.
P'yongyang issued an immediate and detailed statement on July
11, 1988. The CPRF dismissed Roh's proposal as old wine in a new
bottle, claiming that only the 1972 three basic principles for
Korean reunification--reunification by peaceful means, by
transcending ideological differences (nationalism), and without
external interference (self-determination)--could be the basis to
improve inter-Korean dialogue. Seen from P'yongyang's
perspective, Roh's July 7 proposal was nothing more than a
political ploy to cope with increasing radical student agitation
that opposed Seoul's hosting of the Olympics without P'yongyang's
participation. Consequently, Roh's statement angered rather than
mollified P'yongyang's posture, which was based on Kim Il Song's
proposal to establish a Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea.
Meanwhile, Seoul began to speak more openly about the rising
level of direct and indirect inter-Korean trade, much to the
displeasure of P'yongyang. P'yongyang claimed that Seoul had
fabricated these trade stories. By 1988, however, Seoul began to
reduce tariffs and other duties to liberalize trade with
P'yongyang. Trade statistics provided by Seoul and P'yongyang on
north-south trade were largely unreliable as each government had
its own reasons for reporting high or low figures. Much of the
trade was conducted through third parties.
P'yongyang's response to Seoul consisted of three points--
asking for the repeal of the National Security Act, which
designated P'yongyang an enemy, making a declaration of
nonaggression, and establishing a "Peaceful Reunification
Committee." Over the next few months, Roh's government attempted
to make progress toward satisfying each of these requirements. In
his October 18, 1988, United Nations speech, Roh advocated
convening a six-nation consultative conference to achieve a
permanent peace settlement in Korea and called for establishing a
partnership with P'yongyang. In his 1989 New Year's address, Kim
Il Song extended an invitation to the presidents of the major
South Korean political parties and religious leaders, including
Cardinal Kim Soo Hwan, Reverend Mun Ik-hwan, and Reverend Paek
Ki-wan, for a leadership-level inter-Korean reunification meeting
to be held in P'yongyang. However, any meaningful inter-Korean
dialogue bogged down at P'yongyang's objections to the annual
United States-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises.
Economic relations have demonstrated more promise. An
authorized public visit to North Korea by Chong Chu-yong,
honorary chairman of the Hyundai Group, in early 1989 (in
technical violation of South Korea's National Security Act) was a
remarkable breakthrough. After years of behind-the-scene efforts,
through a South Korean intermediary in Japan, Chong was invited
by P'yongyang and fulfilled his long-cherished dream to see his
relatives at his native village, near scenic Kumgang-san. Chong
was received in P'yongyang by Ho Tam, Chairman of the Committee
for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, and by business
leaders eager to discuss large-scale economic cooperation, such
as joint ventures and development of the tourist industry.
Chong's visit caused euphoric expectations and also engendered
other visits.
Many of Chong's expected business dealings, however, suffered
temporary setbacks after his return to South Korea. These
setbacks were primarily caused by the unauthorized visits to
North Korea of Reverend Mun Ik-hwan (March-April 1989), South
Korean lawmaker So Kyong-won (who had secretly visited P'yongyang
in August 1988, was accused of this June 28, 1989, and sentenced
in December 1989 to fifteen years in prison), and dissident South
Korean student representative, Im Su-kyong, also later sentenced
to a prison term for attending the thirteenth World Youth and
Student Festival, July 1-8, 1989, in P'yongyang. The government's
harsh handling of these visits clearly showed its intention of
keeping the initiative in dealings with North Korea, but it also
appeared to some Koreans to contradict Roh's July 7 statement
encouraging free inter-Korean contacts at various levels. That
Roh's statement itself seemed to disregard the National Security
Act added momentum to dissident calls for the law's abrogation or
revision.
Data as of June 1990
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