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South Korea Relations with the Soviet Union
Seoul-Moscow relations entered a new era in the 1980s. In
many ways, Roh's Nordpolitik and Mikhail Gorbachev's "New
Thinking" had something in common--they were attempts to reverse
their nations' recent histories. Their efforts, while supported
by popular longings, still confronted serious resistance from
conservative and powerful bureaucracies. In a fundamental sense,
the Soviet economic crisis appeared responsible for Moscow's
improved relations with Seoul. Politically, Gorbachev had
signaled Soviet interest in improving relations with all
countries in the Asia-Pacific region irrespective of
sociopolitical system, including South Korea, as was clearly
spelled out in his July 1986 Vladivostok and August 1988
Krasnoyarsk speeches.
Improved Seoul-Moscow relations appear to have been carefully
and systematically planned in three related stages: sports,
trade, and political relations. The Seoul Olympics was a major
catalyst. The Soviets were eager to participate in the games, if
only for the sake of the athletic competition. More than any
other country--including the United States--Seoul's honored
guests were from the Soviet Union. Moscow sent more than 6,000
Soviets to South Korea. Soviet tourist ships came to Pusan and
Inch'on and Aeroflot planes landed in Seoul. And when the Soviet
team headed for home, it also took along thirty-six South Korean
television sets, seven minibuses, four large buses, four cars,
and one copy machine--all gifts from Daewoo.
Economically, Seoul and Moscow were natural partners. South
Korea had been seeking to trade with the Soviet Union even before
Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev desired foreign capital and
high technology, as well as Seoul's help in alleviating the
Soviet economic crisis through direct investment, joint ventures,
and trade. Moreover, with the advantage of geographic proximity,
South Korea was an ideal source of badly needed consumer goods
and managerial skills. As early as May 1979, during a visit to
Helsinki, then South Korean minister of foreign affairs Pak Tongjin signed an agreement obtaining Finnish assistance in exporting
South Korean products to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Seoul has welcomed trade opportunities with Moscow and
considers the Soviet Union a significant part of the global
market. Moreover, the natural resources Seoul increasingly
needs--oil, metals, timber, and fish--are abundant in the Soviet
Far East. Trade with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China
would also alleviate South Korea's apprehension over the United
States' increasing trade protectionism. Moreover, South Korea's
expanding trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
initially was encouraged by the United States, although
Washington later became increasingly concerned over possible
high-technology transfers.
Because of the lack of diplomatic relations, most South
Korean-Soviet trade initially was indirect; Eastern Europe, Hong
Kong, Japan, and Singapore served as intermediaries. With an
increasing volume of trade, Seoul and Moscow began trading
directly, using facilities near Vladivostok and Pusan. Several
major South Korean businesses including Daewoo, Sunkyong, and
Lucky-Goldstar traded directly with the Soviet Union in 1990.
Based on mutual economic interests, the Korean Trade
Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) and the Soviet Chamber of Commerce
and Industry exchanged a trade memorandum in 1988 pledging mutual
assistance in establishing trade offices in 1989. During a
six-day visit to Seoul in October 1988, Vladimir Golanov, deputy
chairman of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was
received by officials of South Korea's major multinationals.
KOTRA president Yi Sun-gi signed the trade memorandum in Moscow
in December 1988. Seoul's trade office in Moscow opened in July
1989; Moscow's trade office in Seoul opened in April 1989. In
December 1989, Seoul invited Soviet officials to attend a trade
exhibition where members of the Soviet state-run Tekhsnabeksport
displayed impressive high-technology items.
Political relations were developing gradually. South Korea's
new-found wealth and technological prowess had been attracting
the interest of a growing number of socialist nations. In
initiating Nordpolitik, its chief architect Pak Ch'or-on--Roh's
confidential foreign policy adviser--was rumored to have visited
Moscow to consult with Soviet policymakers. Kim Young Sam visited
Moscow from June 2 to June 10, 1989, with the apparent approval
of the Roh administration. Selected from among several other
South Korean politicians (including Kim Dae Jung, who had
reportedly been invited to Moscow) to make certain that the newly
emerging Seoul-Moscow relationship would proceed steadily, Kim
Young Sam was received as a guest of the Soviet Institute of
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). He
participated in talks with various Soviet officials, including
the newly elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet, academician
Yevgeni Primakov. In a joint statement, the Reunification
Democratic Party (RDP) and IMEMO pledged to promote closer trade
and cultural ties between the two nations. While Kim Young Sam
was in Moscow, the Kremlin announced that it would allow some
300,000 Soviet-Koreans who had been on the Soviet island of
Sahkalin since the end of World War II to return permanently to
South Korea--clearly a reflection of the continuing improvement
in Seoul-Moscow relations.
Moscow even arranged a Seoul-P'yongyang meeting. Planned by
IMEMO, Kim Young Sam, with Roh's prior approval, met with the
North Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union, Kwon Hui-gyong, who
reportedly proposed a regular exchange between the RDP and the
Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), as well as a North-South summit
meeting. Kim also met with Ho Tam, chairman of the Committee for
Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), who came to
Moscow from P'yongyang.
The progress in Seoul-Moscow relations was extraordinary.
Given the complementary and parallel interests between Seoul and
Moscow, their relations were likely to proceed even if there were
temporary setbacks. A highly experienced South Korean diplomat,
Kong No-myong, was assigned to the Moscow consulate; an equally
experienced Soviet diplomat was posted to Seoul. In June 1990,
Roh held his first summit with President Gorbachev in San
Francisco. Moscow's "Seoul Rush" may be regarded as an effort to
reconcile (and possibly to terminate) its past political-military
obligations to P'yongyang with the new economic and strategic
opportunities in Seoul. Seoul's "Moscow Rush" had been conceived
primarily as a way to utilize its growing economic power for
political purposes, particularly in its relations with
P'yongyang. On the other hand, if indeed the final destination of
Nordpolitik was P'yongyang, Seoul had thus far proved to be less
successful than Moscow.
Data as of June 1990
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