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South Korea South Korea Responds to the North Korean Military Buildup
Unavailable
Figure 13. Comparative Growth of the Armed Forces of South
Korea and North Korea, 1950-90
In the 1960s, P'yongyang began a sustained expansion of its
armed forces that continued without interruption through the
1980s
(see
fig. 13). Under presidents Syngman Rhee and Park Chung
Hee, the South Korean military remained largely dependent on the
United States to deter a second North Korean invasion and to
provide much of the training and equipment needed by the armed
forces. When the First Republic (1948-60) fell, South Korea's
military institutions were stronger relatively than most of its
other government agencies. Each service had a well-established
school system and adequate supplies of weapons, ships, and
aircraft from World War II and the Korean War.
Because of internal politics and Syngman Rhee's policy of
controlling the promotion and assignment of all general rank
officers, the military leadership was already at the edge of
involvement in the nation's politics. Park Chung Hee and the
other military leaders who participated in the May 1961 coup
d'état that brought down the Second Republic (1960-61) were
motivated largely by dissatisfaction with their corrupt and
ineffective military and civilian superiors
(see The Democratic Interlude
, ch. 1). They believed that South Korea's survival as a
nation depended on the reestablishment of social and economic
stability. They viewed the strength of the armed forces and the
reinstitution of the National Security Act of 1960 and other laws
intended to reduce civil disturbances as necessary means to
restore order and promote sound economic development. By 1963
when Park won election to the presidency of the Third Republic
(1963-72) as a civilian, he already had placed other former
military leaders, mostly members of the eighth class of the
Officer Candidate School who had graduated in 1949, in key
government positions.
Two of Park's major objectives during the Third Republic were
to improve defense cooperation with the United States and to
modernize the armed forces
(see South Korea Under Park Chung Hee, 1961-79
, ch. 1). In pursuit of these goals, Park devoted onethird of all government spending to defense in 1965. As a sign of
support for United States policies in Southeast Asia and in
exchange for the substantial financial and material contributions
for modernizing the army, Park deployed units of the South Korean
army and marine corps to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
In the early 1970s, the Park administration, with United
States assistance through its Foreign Military Sales program,
promoted the establishment of an indigenous defense industry.
Park's military advisers were concerned that Kim Il Sung already
had built a North Korean arms industry. The Nixon administration
was calling for Washington's allies to assume more responsibility
for their own defense. Nixon's national security advisors also
feared that Seoul might be too weak to deter a North Korean
invasion unless it began to manufacture some of its own weapons.
A Defense Industry Bureau was established in the Ministry of
National Defense and planning, for a defense industry was
incorporated into South Korea's first Force Improvement Plan
(1971-76). Some of the weapons were assembled in government-owned
plants. Licensed production of the United States-designed Colt M16 rifle was initiated in 1971, with select South Korean
companies supplying the government assembly plant with most of
the parts for the weapon. In other cases, coproduction
responsibility was entirely delegated to civilian-managed
companies, many of which already had produced nonmilitary items
with technical assistance from various United States firms. The
Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, for example, assisted a South Korean
shipbuilding company based in Chinhae in constructing several
classes of patrol boats, including the Paegu-class derived from
the Asheville-class, which was equipped with Harpoon antiship
missiles.
Park's assassination in 1979 did not obscure his regime's
contributions to improving the armed forces during the eighteen
years he was in power. He reorganized the Ministry of National
Defense and each of the armed services to enhance the
government's capability to manage any military contingency,
including an all-out attack by North Korea across the DMZ, smallscale infiltrations along South Korea's extensive 8,640-kilometer
coastline, and various types of low-intensity conflict, such as
commando raids that targeted industrial, power, and
communications facilities, or attempts by terrorists to
assassinate key government officials.
President Chun Doo Hwan perpetuated the military's dominance
over politics from December 1979 until Roh's inauguration in
February 1988 and protected Park's legacy of simultaneously
improving the country's economic and military capabilities. Chun
continued Park's policy of devoting one-third of all government
spending to the military, outstripping estimated North Korean
military expenditures during most of the 1980s. Chun also
continued Park's policy of promoting defense-related research and
development and commercial agreements with the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe--a policy that provided Seoul with
access to more advanced defense technologies. Particular emphasis
was placed on expanding the air force and establishing a modern
air defense network.
Korean Air, then South Korea's only civil airline, began
coproduction of Northrop F5-E/F fighter aircraft in 1982. At the
end of Chun's term in office, Seoul was considering coproducing
either the General Dynamics F-16 or the McDonnell Douglas FA-18.
During Chun's administration, South Korean shipbuilders increased
production of various types of frigates, missile-equipped fast
attack craft, and other, smaller naval vessels. Civilian
industries also became more involved in coproduction of defense
ordnance, including armored personnel carriers, self-propelled
artillery, tanks, and communications equipment.
Data as of June 1990
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