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South Korea INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
The Agency for National Security Planning
The Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) was
originally established on June 19, 1961 as the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) directly under the Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the May 16,
1961, military coup. Its duties were to "supervise and coordinate
both international and domestic intelligence activities and
criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies,
including that of the military." Its mission was akin to that of
a combined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
The first head of the KCIA was Kim Chong-p'il. Kim, utilizing
the existing Army Counterintelligence Corps, built a 3,000-member
organization--the most powerful intelligence and investigatory
agency in the republic. The KCIA maintained a complex set of
interlocking institutional links with almost all of the
government's key decision-making bodies. The KCIA had a nearmonopoly over crucial information concerning national security
under the charter of the Act Concerning Protection of Military
Secrets and, more importantly, possessed considerable veto power
over other agencies through its supervisory and coordination
functions.
The KCIA's practically unlimited power to investigate and to
detain any person accused of antistate behavior severely
restricted the right to dissent or to criticize the regime. The
frequent questioning, detention, or even prosecution of
dissidents, opposition figures, and reporters seriously
jeopardized basic freedoms and created an atmosphere of political
repression.
After the 1979 assassination of President Park Chung Hee by
the KCIA director, the KCIA was purged and temporarily lost much
of its power. Chun Doo Hwan used his tenure as acting director of
the KCIA from April to July 1980 to expand his power base beyond
the military. The organization was renamed the Agency for
National Security Planning, and its powers were redefined in
presidential orders and legislation. The ANSP, like its
predecessor, was a cabinet-level agency directly accountable to
the president. The director of the ANSP continued to have direct
presidential access. In March 1981, the ANSP was redesignated as
the principal agency for collecting and processing all
intelligence. The requirement for all other agencies with
intelligence-gathering and analysis functions in their charters
to coordinate their activities with the ANSP was reaffirmed.
Legislation passed at the end of 1981 further redefined the
ANSP's legally mandated functions to include the collection,
compilation, and distribution of foreign and domestic information
regarding public safety against communists and plots to overthrow
the government. The maintenance of public safety with regard to
documents, materials, facilities, and districts designated as
secrets of the state was the purview of the ANSP as was the
investigation of crimes of insurrection and foreign aggression,
crimes of rebellion, aiding and abetting the enemy, disclosure of
military secrets, and crimes provided for in the Act Concerning
Protection of Military Secrets and the National Security Act. The
investigation of crimes related to duties of intelligence
personnel, the supervision of information collection, and the
compilation and distribution of information on other agencies'
activities designed to maintain public safety also were
undertaken by the ANSP. By 1983 the ANSP had rebounded and again
was the preeminent foreign and domestic intelligence
organization.
As of 1990, the organizational structure of the ANSP, was
considered classified by Seoul, although earlier organizational
information was public knowledge. Despite the social and
political changes that came with the Sixth Republic (1987- ), the
ANSP apparently still considered the support and maintenance of
the president in power to be one of its most important roles. In
April 1990, for example, ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP)
coleader Kim Young Sam complained that he and members of his
faction within the DLP had been subjected to "intelligence
maneuvering in politics" that included wiretapping, surveillance,
and financial investigations.
Nevertheless, the ANSP's domestic powers were indeed
curtailed under the Sixth Republic. Prior to the change, the ANSP
had free access to all government offices and files. The ANSP,
Defense Security Command, Office of the Prosecutor General,
Korean National Police, and the Ministry of Justice had stationed
their agents in the National Assembly to collect information on
the activities of politicians. In May 1988, however, overt ANSP
agents, along with agents of other intelligence agencies, were
withdrawn from the National Assembly building. The ANSP's budget
was not made public, nor apparently was it made available in any
useful manner to the National Assembly in closed sessions. In
July 1989, pressured by opposition parties and public opinion,
the ANSP was subjected to inspection and audit by the National
Assembly for the first time in eighteen years. The ANSP removed
its agents from the chambers of the Seoul Criminal Court and the
Supreme Court in 1988.
As of 1990, however, the ANSP remained deeply involved in
domestic politics and was not prepared to relinquish the power to
prevent radical South Korean ideas--much less North Korean ideas-
-from circulating in South Korean society. Despite an agreement
in September 1989 by the chief policymakers of the ruling and
opposition parties to strip the ANSP of its power to investigate
pro-North Korean activity (a crime under the National Security
Act), the ANSP continued enforcing this aspect of the law rather
than limiting itself to countering internal and external attempts
to overthrow the government. The ANSP continued to pick up
radical student and dissident leaders for questioning without
explanation.
In another move to limit the potential for the ANSP to engage
in "intelligence politics," the ANSP Information Coordination
Committee was disbanded because of its history of unduly
influencing other investigating authorities, such as the Office
of the Prosecutor General. Additionally, the ANSP, responding to
widespread criticism of its alleged human rights violations, set
up a "watchdog" office to supervise its domestic investigations
and to prevent agents from abusing their powers while
interrogating suspects.
Aside from its controversial internal security mission, the
ANSP also was known for its foreign intelligence gathering and
analysis and for its investigation of offenses involving external
subversion and military secrets. The National Unification Board
and the ANSP (and the KCIA before it) were the primary sources of
government analysis and policy direction for South Korea's
reunification strategy and contacts with North Korea. The
intelligence service's reputation in pursuing counterespionage
cases also was excellent.
The ANSP monitored visitors, particularly from communist and
East European countries, to prevent industrial and military
espionage. Following the diplomatic successes of the late 1980s--
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union
and the countries of Eastern Europe, and the increased informal
contacts with China, Mongolia, and Vietnam--this mission grew in
importance. The security watch list contained 162 out of 3,808
visitors from communist nations in 1988 and 226 out of 6,444
visitors in 1989.
Data as of June 1990
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