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Spain The Military in Political Life
The armed forces have constituted a highly important
and
often decisive factor in Spanish politics throughout the
modern
history of the country as a constitutional monarchy and
republic.
During most of the nineteenth century, the military was
considered to be a liberal influence, intervening to
enforce
necessary correctives against the failings of weak
civilian
governments, but not seeking to replace civilian
institutions
permanently. After about 1875, the army was less involved
politically, and it often found itself on the side of
maintaining
public order against popular movements of peasants and the
industrial working class. Although their outlook was
little
changed, the officers then occupied what had become the
right
side of the political spectrum in a period of rapidly
evolving
political ideas.
Until the Spanish Civil War, the range of acceptable
political beliefs among army officers remained quite
broad. One
result of the conflict was that the most conservative
officers
tended to join the Nationalist forces. More than 10,000
Nationalist officers who had survived the war, or who had
been
commissioned during its course, decided to stay on as
regulars.
The officer corps was completely purged of those who had
fought
on the losing side. The army leadership during the next
three
decades thus was drawn from the group that had been the
most
conservative and the most closely identified with Franco's
political ideology.
High-ranking soldiers were appointed by Franco to
important
state bodies and served in the Cortes. (Under the 1978
Constitution, officers are required to resign their
commissions
to run for parliamentary office.) Over one-third of the
ministers
in post-1939 cabinets had backgrounds as career officers.
The
ministers of the army, the navy, and the air force were
invariably professional military, as was the minister of
interior, who was responsible for internal security. Many
officers also served in civilian ministries and in other
agencies, in companies owned by the government, and on the
boards
of directors of leading private companies. Nevertheless,
as
modernization of the economy proceeded, the main functions
of
government fell increasingly under the control of civilian
technocrats. The influence of the military in the final
stages of
the Franco regime was limited primarily to the prime
minister and
to the armed forces ministerial portfolios. In spite of
its
prominent representation in the ministries and in the
industries
connected with defense, the military establishment had
little
success in persuading Franco to earmark for it the
resources
needed to overcome the obsolescence of the armed forces.
The more senior officers remained extremely
conservative,
violently opposed to the left, and suspicious of any
broadening
of political expression. Certain military reforms were
advanced
by Diego Alegria, the army commander who took office in
1970. He
aimed at more selective enlistments, at rationalization of
troop
deployments, and at promotion by merit rather than by
seniority.
Alegria's program was undermined, however, by right-wing
commanders, who secured his removal in 1974.
In 1972 a secret society of younger army officers, the
Democratic Military Union (Union Militar Democratica--UMD)
grew
quickly, numbering 300 in 1975 when many of its members
were
arrested and court-martialed. Most of the reforms they
proposed--the unification of the three service ministries,
a
restriction in the scope of the military justice system,
reductions in the length of obligatory military service,
curbs on
the military intelligence system, and a less prominent
role for
the captains general of the nine military regions--were
adopted
after Franco's death.
During the transition period after Franco's death, the
civil
government adopted a deferential attitude toward the
military
leadership which, as the national institution most loyal
to the
former regime and most able to intervene decisively,
presented
the greatest danger to the program of the new democratic
leaders.
The civilian authorities prudently consulted the military
before
adopting new proposals, seeking their implied consent.
Many
members of the officer corps willingly accepted the new
constitutional order, but others--mainly in the army--who
still
identified with the Franco era, regarded it as a betrayal
of the
Civil War victory in 1939.
In spite of objections by the most vocal elements, the
senior
military acquiesced in the important changes to the
military
command structure needed to bring it unambiguously under
civilian
direction
(see Jurisdiction over National Defense
, this
ch.). The
military was dangerously antagonized by other actions,
however,
particularly by the legalization of the Communist Party of
Spain
(Partido Comunista de Espana--PCE) in 1978 after the
military had
received what it had interpreted as a firm pledge against
such a
step.
The accumulating discontent of certain officers was
made
evident by a number of provocative incidents. The first of
a
series of plots against the government was uncovered in
November
1978. The extremely light sentences imposed on the
officers
involved may have encouraged conspiracies. In late 1980
and early
1981, at least three further schemes appeared to be afoot.
The
conspiracy that came closest to success was the invasion
of the
Congress of Deputies (lower house of the Cortes) on
February 23,
1981, by Civil Guardsmen and soldiers who took as hostages
the
entire body as well as the cabinet, which was present for
a
debate on a new government. The three principal plotters
were
Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, an officer of
the Civil
Guard; Lieutenant General Jaime Milan del Bosch, captain
general
of Valencia; and Lieutenant General Alfonso Armada Comyn,
a
confidant of the king. Milan del Bosch had previously been
commander of the elite Brunete Armored Division near
Madrid, but
he had been transferred, as a result of his well-known
antipathy
to the new political order, under suspicion of earlier
plotting.
Armada had been forced from a post in the royal household
because
of his political activities. The failure of other units to
join
the mutineers, the vacillation of a number of officers who
had
been counted on to join the revolt, and, most
particularly, the
denunciation of the attempt by King Juan Carlos de Borbon,
who
appeared in uniform on national television, brought the
release
of the civilian politicians, after twenty-two hours, and
the
surrender of the forces under the control of the
conspirators.
At least one further plot was foiled when a group of
colonels
was discovered planning to seize power on the eve of the
October
1982 general election. The subsequent accommodation of the
military to the Socialist government of Gonzalez, the
military's
grudging acceptance of the major reforms of the armed
forces,
introduced in 1983, and of Spain's membership in NATO and
in the
European Community
(EC--see Glossary)
appeared to have
moderated
the danger of new attempts by right-wing officers to
challenge
civilian authority.
In spite of the government's success in establishing
unequivocal authority over the principal issues of
national
security, certain matters continued to be sensitive for
the
military. Attacks by Basque terrorists on high-ranking
officers
and security personnel have been a source of bitterness.
Government plans to devolve greater autonomy on regional
governments were delayed; and, these plans were less
extensive
than originally foreseen, in deference to military
objections to
the decentralization process, especially as it applied to
the
Basque region. The inflexibly nationalistic stance of the
military commanders was the primary factor determining
government
policy regarding the status of the enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla
on the North African coast as well as on negotiations with
Britain over the status of Gibraltar
(see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla
, ch. 4).
By 1986 the authority of the defense minister was great
enough to enable him to replace the JEMAD and the three
service
chiefs of staff, reportedly because they had failed to
support
the military reform program. Nevertheless, the military
leaders
continued to be treated with prudence. The government made
a
considerable effort to demonstrate sympathy and respect
for the
military in ceremonies and in official statements. The
king, who
had received training in the three military academies, had
carefully forged links with the military. As supreme
commander,
he could in theory supersede the political authority of
the
country. His public addresses recognized the contribution
of the
military and were sensitive to the need to sustain its
morale in
the face of the fundamental changes that it had been
obliged to
accept. At the same time, the king stressed that, in a
democracy,
the armed forces must comport themselves with discipline
and
restraint
(see Political Interest Groups
, ch. 4).
Data as of December 1988
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