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Spain MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
The Pact of Madrid, signed in 1953 by Spain and the
United
States, ended a period of virtual isolation for Spain,
although
the other victorious allies of World War II and much of
the rest
of the world remained hostile to what they regarded as a
fascist
regime sympathetic to the Nazi cause and established with
Axis
assistance. The 1953 accord took the form of three
separate
executive agreements that pledged the United States to
furnish
economic and military aid to Spain. The United States, in
turn,
was to be permitted to construct and to utilize air and
naval
bases on Spanish territory.
Although not a full-fledged military alliance, the pact
did
result in a substantial United States contribution to the
improvement of Spain's defense capabilities. During the
initial
United States fiscal year
(FY--see Glossary) 1954 to
FY1961
phase, military aid amounted to US$500 million, in grant
form.
Between FY1962 and FY1982, a further US$1.238 billion of
aid in
the form of loans (US$727 million) and grants (US$511
million)
was provided. During the period FY1983 to FY1986, United
States
military aid, entirely in the form of sales under
concessional
credit terms, averaged US$400 million annually, but it
declined
to slightly more than US$100 million annually in FY1987
and in
FY1988. The military credits were scheduled to be phased
out in
FY1989, in keeping with Spain's growing self-sufficiency
in
national defense. More than 200 Spanish officers and NCOs
received specialized training in the United States each
year
under a parallel program.
Although Spain had purchased some military equipment
from
countries other than the United States, and although some
officers had received training in other countries, the
only major
foreign influence on the Spanish military between the end
of
World War II and Franco's death in 1975 had been the
United
States. After the democratic regime was installed in 1976,
the
United States continued to be Spain's predominant partner
in
military cooperation, in spite of that country's growing
involvement with France and with other West European
countries.
Between 1982 and 1986, the value of arms shipments to
Spain from
the United States totaled US$725 million. France was the
second
ranking supplier (US$310 million), and West Germany was
third
(US$50 million).
As of 1988, there were 12,000 United States military
personnel in Spain, at four major bases and at several
smaller
communications and navigation facilities. The legal status
of the
American military personnel and their dependents was
governed by
status of forces accords that were similar to the standard
NATO
status of forces agreements. One of the major bases was
the naval
complex at Rota near Cadiz, northwest of the Strait of
Gibraltar,
which provided fuel and ammunition storage facilities for
American forces. It was also a naval air base supporting
antisubmarine warfare and ocean surveillance operations.
Rota was
the site of a United States Defense Communications System
(DCS)
terminal tied to a number of radar and microwave stations
throughout Spain, with further linkage to DCS sites
elsewhere in
the Mediterranean, that remained in continuous contact
with the
United States Sixth Fleet.
The United States shared with Spain the use of three
airbases: Torrejon, just east of Madrid; Zaragoza, in
northeast
Spain; and Moron, near Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) in
southwest
Spain. Torrejon was the headquarters of the Sixteenth Air
Force
of United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). A tactical
fighter
wing of seventy-two F-16 aircraft at Torrejon was rotated
to
other USAFE airbases at Aviano, Italy, and at Incirlik,
Turkey.
Torrejon was, in addition, a staging, reinforcement, and
logistical airlift base.
Zaragoza was the base for a detachment of five United
States
aerial refueling aircraft, and it also was used by USAFE
as a
tactical fighter training base. It was located near
Spain's
Bardenas Reales firing range, where gunnery and bombing
techniques could be practiced. Moron served as a support
base for
units of USAFE, including a detachment of fifteen aerial
refueling aircraft.
Torrejon, Zaragoza, and Moron were built initially as
bases
for Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-47 bombers, which had a
relatively limited range. After the B-47s were phased out,
SAC no
longer needed the bases, but they continued to serve
useful
functions for airlift, communications, resupply, rear
basing, and
fighter training in conjunction with the NATO obligations
of the
United States.
As the time approached in 1987 for the renegotiation of
the
existing base agreement, which had entered into force in
1983 for
a five-year period, pressures mounted for a reduction of
the
United States military presence in Spain. Communist
political
groups and elements of the PSOE had campaigned against the
bases.
Moreover, the base agreement had become a symbol of United
States
cooperation with the former Franco regime. It was
important to
many Spaniards to eliminate vestiges of this history by
converting Spain's long-standing bilateral relations with
the
United States into a multilateral undertaking through
NATO.
According to a poll taken in early 1987, 53 percent of
Spanish
citizens regarded the bases as prejudicial to the security
and
the defense of Spain, and 47 percent thought they should
be
removed.
The outcome of the 1986 referendum on membership in
NATO
committed Gonzalez to negotiate the reduction of the
United
States military presence in Spain. Gonzalez insisted that
the
wing of seventy-two F-16 aircraft be removed from Torrejon
as a
condition for renewal of the base agreement, and he
threatened to
expel all United States forces in Spain if this demand
were not
accepted. His stand was considered unduly inflexible by
the
United States and inconsistent with an earlier Spanish
commitment
that the level of security would be left intact. The
United
States felt that Spain, the military contribution of which
was
minimal, was permitting domestic factors to dictate a
weakening
of NATO defenses. Even though Italy subsequently agreed to
station the F-16 wing on its territory, the cost of
transfer
would be high, and the unit would be in a more exposed
position.
In January 1988, Spain and the United States announced
jointly that agreement had been reached in principle on a
new
base agreement with an initial term of eight years,
essentially
meeting the conditions demanded by Spain. The F-16 fighter
wing
was to be removed from Torrejon within three years, by
mid-1991.
It was expected that this step would reduce the number of
United
States personnel in Spain by nearly one-half.
Use by the United States of the bases in Spain for
non-NATO
purposes was a matter requiring Spanish approval, which
was not
likely to be forthcoming unless the mission had Spain's
endorsement. In keeping with its policy of avoiding
involvement
in the Arab-Israeli dispute, Spain withheld diplomatic
clearance
for the United States to use the bases to resupply Israel
during
the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Gonzalez reportedly was
approached indirectly regarding the possible use of the
Spanish
bases and overflights of Spain in connection with the
United
States raid on Libya in April 1986. His negative response
necessitated a long detour over international waters by
the
aircraft flying from British bases. One of the American
fighter-bombers was forced to make an emergency landing at
Rota,
however. Gonzalez defended the landing as consistent with
the
provisions of the base agreement, in spite of the
criticism that
it evoked in Spain.
Data as of December 1988
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