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Spain PARTICIPATION IN NATO
Membership in NATO had not been a practical alternative
during Franco's lifetime because of the opprobrium with
which the
dictatorship was viewed by other West European states.
Moreover,
Franco displayed little interest in a Spanish contribution
to
West European security, regarding the Spanish military
primarily
as an instrument to protect the internal stability of the
country. Only after his death was Spain able to
contemplate the
possibility of participation in the alliance. With the
support of
the political parties of the right and of the
then-dominant Union
of the Democratic Center (Union de Centro
Democratico--UCD),
membership terms were successfully negotiated and approved
by the
Cortes in October 1981, in spite of opposition by the
Spanish
Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero
Espanol--PSOE) and the Communist Party of Spain (Partido
Comunista de Espana--PCE). Although most European members
were
less enthusiastic over Spain's membership than was the
United
States, the agreement was quickly ratified, and Spain's
formal
entry as the sixteenth member--the first new member since
West
Germany, twenty-seven years earlier--took place in May
1982.
Spanish participation was to be accomplished in stages:
first
by membership in the political committees and eventually
by
integration into alliance military activities. A few
months after
entry, however, in October 1982, a new PSOE government
took
office under Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, who
had
campaigned against Spanish adherence to the pact. Gonzalez
suspended further Spanish involvement in NATO military
operations, pending a national referendum on Spain's
continued
membership. A strong anti-NATO movement had been growing
among
the Spanish people. In the eyes of many, NATO membership
was
linked to the issue of United States bases and to the
likelihood
of an increased military budget. Spanish opposition became
part
of the movement then gaining ground elsewhere in Europe to
resist
the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on
the
continent. Nevertheless, a delay in calling the referendum
until
March 1986 was accompanied by a reevaluation in the PSOE
attitude. By this time, Gonzalez was openly supporting
Spain's
continued adherence, arguing that if Spain wished to
benefit from
membership in the European Community (EC), it would have
to
accept the responsibilities of membership in NATO as well
(see Spain and the European Community;
Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
, ch. 4).
The referendum took the form of asking the electorate
to
agree that it was in the national interest for Spain to
remain in
the alliance subject to three principles affirmed by the
Gonzalez
government: that Spain would not be incorporated into the
integrated military structure; that the ban on the
installation,
the storage, and the introduction of nuclear weapons on
Spanish
territory would be maintained; and that there would be an
effort
toward a progressive reduction in the United States
military
presence in Spain. Contrary to opinion polls predicting
continued
heavy opposition to Spanish membership, the government's
proposal
was approved by 52.6 percent to 39.8 percent.
The actual conditions of Spain's participation--as
subsequently negotiated--were that Spain would remain a
full
member of the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate
organs,
that Spain would be present as an observer on the Nuclear
Planning Group, that it would continue to be a member of
the
Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee, and
that
it would appoint military representatives for liaison with
the
NATO military commands. Spain would continue to
participate in
logistical coordination, development of common equipment
and
materiel, and civil protection measures, reserving its
position
on participation in the integrated communication system.
Spain
would be permitted to nominate candidates for the NATO
Secretariat and the International Military Staff.
Observers later
reported that Spain had offered to coordinate its national
military missions with those of NATO, especially control
of the
sea between the Balearic Islands and the Canaries. Spanish
forces
were to be commanded only by Spanish officers, however,
and no
troops were to be deployed outside of Spain on a sustained
basis.
The Spanish air defense system, which was compatible with
the
NATO system, was to be linked also to the French and the
Italian
air defense systems.
In spite of the formal limitations on Spain's
participation
in NATO, the coordinated strategic planning envisaged by
Spain
was intended to make it possible for Spanish forces to
operate in
conjunction with NATO in an emergency. NATO planners
viewed
Spain's relatively secure landmass as a potentially major
strategic asset, forming a marshaling area and a redoubt
from
which air and sea attacks could be launched against Warsaw
Pact
forces. In a crisis, it would be highly valuable as a
transit
center and a supply depot for reinforcement from the
United
States. The Spanish navy and air force, operating from
bases
located in the Balearic Islands and southern Spain,
afforded NATO
a stronger position in the western Mediterranean. The
Canary
Islands bases would be important for safeguarding shipping
lanes,
particularly for oil tankers bound for the North Atlantic
and the
North Sea. Moreover, the addition of a new and important
West
European country imparted a useful psychological boost to
NATO,
helping to demonstrate the restored vitality of the
alliance.
Politically, the United States and other NATO countries
believed that, by establishing a closer association
through NATO,
Spain's new democratic course would be strengthened. They
hoped
that membership would offer the Spanish armed services a
well-
defined military mission and would distract them from
involvement
in domestic politics. A greater professionalism of the
Spanish
military was expected to result, as well as efforts to
modernize
and to improve the armed forces through collaboration with
NATO,
perhaps at a lower cost than with otherwise be the case.
The conditions limiting Spain's membership restricted
the
participation of Spanish ground forces in NATO exercises,
although Spain conducted exercises with other NATO
countries on a
bilateral basis. In 1987 Spanish ships engaged in NATO
air-naval
maneuvers between the Bay of Biscay and the Canary
Islands, an
area of the Atlantic Ocean that Spain regarded as of
strategic
importance. Spanish officers were not eligible to hold
allied
command and staff positions, thereby denying them valuable
broadening experience and exposure to modern doctrinal and
tactical concepts. NATO funds were not available for
infrastructure projects in Spain. Particularly in light of
the
deficiencies and the obsolescence of much of the army's
equipment, Spain needed to increase its military budget
considerably to bring its forces within reach of minimum
NATO
standards. Some Spanish critics argued that Spain had
gained
little advantage from its membership because it had failed
to
secure any commitment regarding the eventual cession of
Gibraltar, and it had failed to obtain security guarantees
covering Ceuta and Melilla, which remained outside NATO's
area of
collective defense.
Prime Minister Gonzalez justified in part Spain's
failure to
accept the integrated military structure by pointing out
that
Spain had joined the alliance many years after its
formation,
when the command structure was already well established. A
complex readjustment of existing commands would have been
necessary, said Gonzalez, which would have created
conflict with
other members. For example, Spain's maritime role in the
Atlantic
would appropriately fall under the Supreme Allied
Commander,
Atlantic (SACLANT). Under the system prevailing when Spain
entered NATO, a command subordinate to SACLANT, the
Iberian
Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), headquartered at Lisbon under
a
Portuguese admiral, was responsible for surveillance and
control
of large ocean areas west of Portugal and south to the
Tropic of
Cancer. Spain would appropriately have an important role
in
IBERLANT, but Portugal made it plain that it would be
unwilling
to cede command responsibilities to Spain, even on an
alternating
basis. Similarly, for fully effective defense of the
strait,
Spanish cooperation with British forces on Gibraltar would
be
indispensable. Spanish sensitivities on this issue,
however, made
it hardly imaginable for Spanish officers to be part of a
combined NATO command, or to engage in area cooperation
with
British officers on Gibraltar, so long as Britain refused
to
negotiate seriously on the future of the stronghold.
In 1987 Spain changed its status from observer to full
member
on NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. It continued, however,
to
adhere to the policy, approved virtually unanimously
during the
parliamentary debate on NATO, that it would remain a
nonnuclear
power and that it would not agree to stockpile or to
install
nuclear weapons of NATO forces on its territory. In this
respect,
its position was similar to two other NATO members, Norway
and
Denmark. Spain had initially rejected adherence to the
1968
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
asserting that the treaty was unbalanced in favor of the
nuclear
signatories. But in 1987, after finding that its
nonadherence was
complicating its nuclear fuel supply relationships in the
EC and
with other countries as well, Spain reversed its position
and
acceded to the treaty.
The issue of nuclear weapons had been politically
charged
since three thermonuclear bombs were spilled over Spanish
territory and one dropped into Spanish coastal waters in
1966,
following an air collision between a United States B-52
bomber
and a KC-135 refueling plane. Although all the bombs
eventually
were recovered, subsequent agreements expressly committed
the
United States to refrain from storing nuclear devices or
components on Spanish soil. The last American units with
nuclear
armaments were submarines equipped with Poseidon missiles
that
were based at the Rota naval complex until they were
shifted to
Holy Loch, Scotland.
Data as of December 1988
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